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ABSTRACT
The thesis is concerned with research in the field of human 
decision-making, concentrating on techniques of gaming for the pursuit 
of this research.
Following an introduction to the v«ork and a statement of the research 
programme as it was initially conceived, some current ideas in gaming 
are investigated. The Superior Commander system of game control is 
introduced. The content of research games is discussed, and the 
Organisational Control Game, a board war game desired for research, is 
described. It is shown that the Organisational Control Game and Superior 
Commander system successfully meet the requirements for a useful research 
game and gaming methodology.
A detailed literature survey of the psychological secondary task 
technique for assessing mental processing load is presented. It is noted 
that the technique might be extended to the study of tasks which have a 
large problem-solving conponent. A secondary task ejq^eriment on such a 
task, a chess problem task, is described. It is demonstrated that the 
secondary task approach can provide techniques for the investigation of 
conplex problem-solving and decision-making tasks.
A series of plays of the Organisational Control Game, in which the 
players had had previous military e^erience, is described. These games 
are coirpared with an earlier series of games, in which the players were 
students. Certain differences in playing style are identified.
brary,
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The research programme is re-examined, and modifications to it 
are described. The need for a technique for elucidation and examination 
of an individual decision-maker * s percutions of his decision-making 
environment is identified. The technique Of cognitive mapping is 
shown to be suitable for this purpose. A cognitive map analysis of a 
series of games in which the players were serving army officers is 
presented.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This thesis is concerned with research in the field of human 
decision-making, concentrating on techniques of gaming for the pursuit 
of this research. It describes work carried out in the course of a 
programme of research intended, firstly, to develop appropriate 
gaming techniques, and, secondly, to apply these techniques to the 
investigation of human decision-making. These two aspects of the 
programme are reflected in the contents of this thesis. Thus, many 
of the discussions and conclusions presented here are concerned with 
gaming techniques and methodology. However, I have also discussions 
and conclusions to present concerning human decision-making, 
particularly in the làter chapters of. the thesis.
Most of the work to be described here (including all of the 
experimental work ) wras carried out in a two-year period during which 
I was a postgraduate student in the Department of Mathematics at 
Royal Holloway College (University of London), working on a "Crisis 
Gaming" project funded by the Ministry of Defence. The progress of 
this project had been described in three progress reports (Cooper 
et al, 1978; McDowell et al, 1979a, 1979b), and, in addition, we 
have published a number of papers describing the work in the 
Operational Research literature (Cooper, 1978, 1979; Cooper &
Klein, 1980; Cooper et al, 1980; Klein & Cooper, 1981, 1982). The 
four papers with which I was associated are reproduced in the /^pendix. 
In this thesis I have been able to substantially develop and 
explore much of what was presented in these papers.
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This chapter introduces the subject matter and provides a 
suitable background to the work to be described in subsequent 
chapters. In particular, I want to explain as fully as possible the 
rationale of the work, so that it will be clear why our research 
programme took the course that it did. Research programmes do not 
come into existence spontaneously, or, at least, they should not: 
a number of decisions as to areas of interest and direction of research 
should be taken, and, if necessary, retaken. A programme of research 
into decision-making should be no exception to this rule.
I shall begin by consideration of the general area of decision­
making research, and proceed to describe our initial interest in 
decision-making in crisis. This will lead us to an appreciation of 
the usefulness of games as research tools in this area. From here I 
shall go on to consider how the stress content of crisis might be 
simulated in a laboratory environment, and thus arrive at a statement 
of our research programme as we conceived of it initially.. This 
programme, although subsequently modified, led us to start 
investigating particular aureas of research gaming and decision-making 
science. I shall show how we intended to operationalise this 
programme. What happened when this operationalisation was started 
forms the contents of the subsequent chapters, which are briefly 
set out and described at the conclusion of this chapter.
1.2 Decision-Making Research
Although precise definitions of Operational Research vary greatly, 
most workers in the field would agree that its main aim must be to 
aid decision-makers. Traditionally, the main area of attention has
19
been the definition and articulation of techniques directed towards 
the resolution of reasonably well defined problems* There is little 
doubt that Operational Research has been extremely successful in this 
area* Problems that only a few decades ago might have been considered 
to be extremely taxing to resolve satisfactorily are today Often 
regarded as relatively routine.
Yet, in the last few years it has been increasingly recognised 
that the service provided by Operational Research to decision-makers 
is not as full as is desirable. While great progress has been made in 
techniques for the resolution of well-defined problems, conparatively 
little has been done to provide concrete assistance for decision-makers 
faced with more conplex and ill-defined problem situations. Ackoff 
(1979) has appropriately described such situations as "messes", and 
Radford (1978) has referred to the unpredictability and rapid change 
inherent in the environments of such problems as "turbulence".
( Techniques for the resolution of well-defined problems have 
largely been provided by mathematics, often inspired by mathematical 
applications in the physical or life sciences. Indeed, a predominantly 
mathematical approach is always likely to be fruitful wben a problem 
can be well-defined, because well-defined problems can generally be 
formulated in mathematical terms.
In dealing with ill-defined messes, the situation is someidiat 
different. Here, mathematical descriptions are, by definition, poor
20
fits* and, when tried, appear crude and uncomfortable. To assist 
decision-makers under such circumstances, it is necessary to search 
for frameworks other than models with a high mathematical content, 
predominantly inspired by methods appropriate to the "harder" sciences.
In fact, what is required is an Operational Research based on a 
"science" of decision-making (as arguedty, for example, Dando et al, 
1977). Since this state of affairs does not at present exist, it is 
inpossible to state precisely what form this science would take, but 
it seems highly probable that it would be a "human" science, deriving 
much of its content from such disciplines as psychology and sociology. 
This, of course, does not preclude anything else that might seem 
appropriate.
it seems clear that tc develop a decision-making science, some 
study of decision-making is required. It was in this spirit that the 
work to be described in this thesis was undertaken. We were interested 
in a practical study of decision-making, under experimental (that is, 
suitably controlled) conditions. Further, our general aim in such a 
study would be to identify ways in which human decision-making might 
be improved.
Decision-Making in Crisis
An area in which human decision-making is at its most frail 
and susceptible to failure is decision-making under conditions of
21
crisis. Much work has been done (paxticulauriy in the field of
political science ) on the behaviour of decision-makers in crisis.
This work ranges from detailed studies of actions in specific crises 
of various types to broader generalisations which describe the type 
of effects that might be caused by crisis. However, the linking of 
these two areas of research tends to be tenuous. The derivation of 
the broader perspectives from the specific instances tends often to 
be vaguer and less rigorous than is ideal. . Consequently, the inpact 
of the broader perfectives is weakened. Reviewing concepts and 
theories pertaining to behaviour in crisis, Robinson (1972) states 
(p.27); "there is no such thing as a theory of crisis or even 
theories of crisis". Later (p.35) he continues: "students of crisis 
have relied heavily on ad hoc theorizing and few have placed their 
investigations in any fundamentally theoretical context. Until efforts 
are launched toward systematizing and integrating theories, knowledge 
will remain relatively superficial and anecdotal". In similar vein, 
Milburn (1972) notes a tendency to formulate "descriptive and 
empirical hypotheses about crisis" as opposed to "prescriptive 
hypotheses" - a tendency from wbich he intends to move away (p.262).
A linking of the ideas met in the "case-study" type of work 
and the "general description" type of work might be attained by 
experimental investigation of crisis b^aviour* Gonparatively little 
has been done, however, to investigate decision-making in crisis 
in controlled experiments. Given the initial assunption that crisis 
situations do influence decision-making in certain definable ways, 
an experimental approach to the study of models of decision-making
22
which attempt to account for such phenomena would appear to be valid 
and useful.
Thus, we initially formulated the aim of our work as being: to 
develop a suitable methodology and we use it to test models of decision­
making. The models would take the form of descriptions of decision­
making behaviour, particularly under conditions of crisis. More 
specificallyf we would hope to study a decision-maker's perceptions
of situations and his assessment of the importance of various factors
!
connected with his decisions. Useful models of decision-making should 
be able to account for changes in many a^ects of behaviour due to 
crisis, and it should be possible to examine the models ty analysis 
of the changes.
Definition of Crisis
It will be useful to have in mind a working definition of
Î
crisis. I shall present two complementary pictures of crisis, vbich 
each capture a different flavour of the area of interest. The first 
is due to Harris (1974, p. 3), who defines a system to be in a state of 
crisis "when it, or one of its subsystems, is unable to cope wdth its 
intended sphere of activity". This "systems" definition can be cast
I
in a form more appropriate to a single human decision-maker. 
Effectively, crisis can arise under one or more of the following 
conditions (Gboper, 1977):
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1. There is no way of reconciling any of the options 
considered by the decisionr-maker with all of his 
aims.
2. The quantity of information is too great for the 
decision-maker to process adequately in the time 
allowed.
3. The deci sion-maker does not have appropriate 
information processing strategies available.
These three aspects of crisis can be seen to correspond roughly 
to the three dimensions of threat, time, and surprise that Hermann 
(1972a) identifies in our second definition of crisis, drawn from the 
field of political science. In full, Hermann defines (p.13) a crisis 
to be a situation that;
1. Threatens high-priority goals of the decision­
making unit.
2. Restricts the amount of time available for 
response before the decision is transformed.
3. Surprises the members of the decision-making 
unit by its occurence.
Clearly, the two definitions are by no means identical, but 
both emphasise the threat to aims inposed by the situation, the 
limited time available to achieve resolution, and the urpreparedness 
of decision-makers to deal with the situation. With the picture of
24
crisis provided by these t w  definitions, we can proceed to consider
the behaviour of decision-makers in crisis.
H^/potheses Cbncerning Crisis Behaviour
As a source of testable hypotheses concerning decision-making in 
crisis, we turn to Milburn (1972), vAio has collected a set of 24 such 
hypotheses. Milburn is not the only worker who has attempted to 
formulate his ideas in this way - indeed, the book in which Milburn*s 
hypotheses appear (Hermann, 19721) boasts a total of 311 "empirically 
testable propositions" (p. 304) by various authors. However, 
inspection shows many of Milburn ' s to be oriented towards the behaviour 
of individuals (rather than groups) and, generally, to be formulated 
in terms which appear to offer relatively simple, operational testing 
measures- I should emphasise, though, that it is not simply a 
question of picking the "easiest" hypotheses first, but rather of 
picking those which offer a framework upon which future work could be
based. Note, also, that in focussing attention on Milburn*s work we
follow a course suggested by Sharp and Dando (1977).
Milburn drew a distinction between "research findings relevant 
to scientific theory and specific knowledge applicable to policy 
problems" (p. 271). He explains: "in the world of the scientist,
descriptive hypotheses help to approximate certain theoretical 
variables in concrete operational terms which the scientist may 
observe in the laboratory or field to note Wiat happens. On the other 
hand, a decision-maker employs prescriptive hypotheses as guides to 
his actions, as recipes for success or failure". Consequently, 
''hypotheses concerning crisis management are not like conventional 
scientific statements; rather, they are imperatives - recipes for 
action". Milburn formulates his hypotheses by first of all asking a
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question "wiiich an experienced crisis manager might reasonably and 
legitimately seek to answer before,'or at the start of, a crisis"
(p. 272 ). This is followed by a hypothesis "from enpirivcal research". 
Finally, a decision rule is presented based on the (presumably valid) 
hypothesis. I present, in full, two of Milburn's hypotheses, chosen 
for their particular am^iability to testing.
Hypothesis 13 (p.274)
Question : Are our perceptions of the situation highly
definite and fixed?
Hypothesis Crises increase a tendency toward rigidity 
of perception and thought.
Decision Rule Avoid simplistic renditions of the problem, 
such as those cast in terms of the capacity 
of the other side without reference to their 
attitude or intentions.
Hypothesis 17 (p.275)
Question Does the crisis appear to.give the other side 
more flexibility and alternatives, while 
restricting our own? As compared to the other 
side, do we seen to be losing oiir ability to 
control events?
Hypothesis In a cfisis one's own alternatives ^pear to 
contract while the other side's options seem 
to grow.
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Decision Rule ; Recognise that the other side is probably
experiencing similar feelings of relative 
loss of control and limited alternatives.
By your own action give the other side a 
range of choices; do not force them into 
a corner. Attempt to think through or 
simulate what the opponents may regard as 
limitations on their behaviour. In order 
that the other side may sedc and review 
alternatives, do not demand responses in 
substantially less time than they normally 
require for processing decisions.
As well as presenting us with hypotheses which might be tested, . 
Milburn*s formulations provide an obvious extension. Having validated 
(or otherwise) a given hypothesis, we could then go on to test the 
usefulness of the appropriate decision rule, by running similar tests 
on actors who have been "indoctrinated" with the rule.
1.3 A Gaming Approach
As I have alread/ noted, comparatively little controlled 
experimentation has been carried out on decision-making in crisis, 
or, indeed, on decision-making in general. Most research has been 
based on the study of real-life decision-making. This work is 
unquestionably valuable, but such a research methodology quite clearly 
does not have the scientific power of a controlled experiment.
The experimental approach to decision-making is research gaming.
A research game sets up an artificial decision-making environment in
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which the decision-maker may act; thus he becomes an experimental 
subject. suitable design of the game the decision-making 
environment may be controlled to the required degree, and the decision­
maker * s behaviour recorded in such detail as required; , Although 
when stated so concisely, the design and running of a research game 
sounds exctremely straighforward, in practice it is not. In fact 
several issues have to be dealt with, such as; just how, in practice, 
an experimenter achieves a suitable degree of control over the game 
environment; how an experimenter can be sure that his subject is 
behaving as a real decision-maker, rather than merely as a subject 
in an experiment; and what aspects of behaviour should be studied. 
Discussion of these issues, and others, will form much of the content 
of subsequent chapters in this thesis.
Having decided to adopt a gaming approach, there is still a 
wide choice as to precisely what type of game might be appropriate.
One dimension along which games might be measured is the degree of 
complexity of the decision-making environment. This can range from 
exctremely sinple to exctremely conplex. At the sinple end of the 
spectrum are matrix games such as those described by Pruitt and 
Kimmel (1977). Matrix games are characterised by a Very small 
number of options open to the experimental subject (typically two), 
and a very small number of possible outcomes to the game (typically 
four), the whole game being presented in sinple and rather clinical 
mathematical form. Cbmplex games are typified by war games such as 
described by Shephard (1963), and are characterised by large numbers 
of options and outcxxmes (often not really enumerable objectively ).
In between the two exctremes can be found a few interesting hybrids 
(see, for exanple, Emshoff, 1971), but it is probably true to say 
that most research gaming has tended towards the exctremes rather than
28
deliberately setting out to occupy the middle ground.
We decided that since we were interested in real decision-making, 
the complex type of game, with a rich decision-making environment, was 
more suited to our requirements. It is by no means clear how one 
would, in general, extrapolate the results of a simple matrix-type game 
to decision-making in the real world (but see Emshoff, 1971). A 
complex game would, ideally, provide a rich artificial world similar 
enough to the real world to permit "real" decision-making in the game 
(though the actual situation is f#r less straightforward than this 
argument suggests, as will be seen in subsequent chapters ).
Having decided on a conplex research game approach, it was then 
decided that the game should be a war game. Other types of complex 
reality-simulating game would have been equally appropriate; for 
example, business gaming. We chose war gaming because one of us 
(Dr. Dale F. Oooper ) had previous military experience, and also 
because, due to our funding by the Ministry of Defence, we had 
contact with workers with some war gaming experience and also the 
option of using serving military officers as players if necessary 
(as we subsequently did).
Processing Load Imposed by a Game Scenario
Considering once again the definition of crisis due to Harris 
(1974), we note that attention is drawn to the information processing 
load inposed on the decision-maker by the crisis situation. The idea 
that a decision-maker has only a limited processing capacity seems 
reasonable (as will be shown in later chapters, there is considerable 
hard evidence for a capacity model of human information processing);
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it has received a recent exposition in the Operational Research 
literature by Sharp and Dando (1979) who use what they call a 
"decision resource" model to account for the effects of crisis on 
decision-making. They regard crises as situations in which the 
limited processing capacity is exceeded, and thus new processing 
strategies must be adopted. However, the analysis provided by the 
new strategies will necessarily be cruder than that provided by 
the normal strategies, giving rise to effects such as those 
hypothesised by Milburn (1972).
We decided that the information processing load imposed on our 
experimental players by our game might well be one of the variables 
we would need to control. In particular, we envisaged that at some 
point in our experiments we might wish to run different game scenarios 
which we knew to impose the same processing load, or which could be 
ranked according to increasing processing load. Accordingly, we 
decided to investigate the use of a psychological technique, the 
secondary task technique, as a means of measuring processing load 
associated with a task such as playing a game scenario.
1.4 Crisis and Stress
A different model of the decision-maker to the limited capacity 
model that may also account for crisis behaviour is the arousal model. 
The argument goes that a crisis induces psychological stress in a 
decision-maker, and this stress will cause many of the observed crisis 
effects. Note that this model in no way invalidates the limited 
capacity model - both effects may occur in crisis, and might well be 
roughly additive.
There is good evidence to suggest that stress will affect the
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performance of a complex task such as decision-making. Poulton (1971) 
discusses stress effects on skilled performance and decision-making. 
Essentially, stress can be directly related to the level of 
psychological arousal. For a given task, the relationship between 
quality of task performance and arousal levels follows an inverted 
U-shaped curve - that is, there is an optimum arousal level for a 
given task below or beyond which the quality of performance 
diminishes.
In crisis, we would be interested in hyperarousal caused by 
stress due in particular to the aspects of crisis associated with 
threat to high-priority goals. To bring about this type of emotional 
stress in a gaming situation would be difficulty to carry out 
ethically - in any normal game, goals relating to the game decision­
making environment would not be sufficiently important to induce severe 
hyperarousail. Some kind of deception in which "real" goals (external 
to the game decision-making environment ) were apparently severely 
threatened would probably be necessary. We were not anxious to become 
involved in this type of experimental work.
However, arousal can be artificially increased by various 
techniques, one of which is exposure of the subject to various types 
of noise. It was our intention to use loud, continuous "white" noise 
as a stressor, and to compare decision-making behaviour in stressed 
and unstressed conditions, looking once again for effects of the type 
described by Milburn (19 72). We carried out a considerable amount of 
work in preparing equipment for experiments using noise as a stressor, 
including some consideration of methods of actually measuring 
physiological arousal in our subjects. However, we did not eventually 
conduct any experiments using noise, and consequently no further
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discussion of this aspect of the work will be presented in this thesis. 
For a study of the relationship between decision-making and stress I 
would refer the reader to Broadbent (1971); a more physiological 
approach to arousal is provided by Duffy, (1962). Broadbent (1957) 
has presented a brief overview of the effects of noise on behaviour, 
and some interesting comments on the measurement of stress have been 
made by Parrot (1971 ).
1.5 A Research Programme
I have now briefly described our initial thoughts concerning the 
research in which we were interested. It is now possible to give a 
concise statement of our initial research programme.
Our major aim was to develop a research game suitable for testing 
hypotheses concerning decision-making in crisis. Having developed such 
a game, we would proceed with hypothesis testing in the following 
manner;
1. Select a hypothesis.
2. Test hypothesis using game.
3. Formulate appropriate decision-making rule.
4. Test decision-making rule using game.
Measures of decision-making would vary according to the hypothesis 
under consideration, but it was felt that such measures as the 
number of options perceived by the player as being open to both himself 
and his opponent would be of particular inportance.
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Against this major programme, two subsidiary programmes would 
be developed for later insertion into the main programme. The first 
was the development of a secondary task method of measuring the 
processing load imposed by a game scenario. This was required because 
we envisaged, in particular, running individual players through 
different scenarios of similar processing load under stressed and 
unstressed conditions, and, more generally, we felt that some method 
of ranking scenarios in terms of increasing processing load would be 
enlightening as far as scenario design methods were concerned. The 
second subsidiary programme was the development of an understanding 
of the stress aspect of crisis, and in particular the preparation of 
a technique for using noise as a stressor.
This, then, was how we viewed the programme at the outset; 
however, the programme did not work out this way. As we progressed we 
found it more sensible to revise our aims and follow a different course 
in our research. As will become clear in later chapters, many of our 
ideas concerning the nature of decision-making needed re-examination, 
and ultimately we found it more profitable to take our research in a 
slightly different direction.
Specifically, having designed and developed a working research 
game, we found it more appropriate to use it to develop methods of 
describing decision-making rather than follow our original intention 
of hypothesis testing. Consequently the secondary task method of 
measuring the processing load imposed by game scenarios was not 
required in our main programme, though, as will be seen, the secondary 
task work was, in itself, extremely interesting and provided results 
of some worth. The induction of arousal by noise, and the associated
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testing of decision-making behaviour under stressed and unstressed 
conditions, was not ultimately pursued.
1.6 Plan of the Thesis
I conclude this chapter by outlining the plan of the rest of 
this thesis, considering each subsequent chapter briefly.
Chapter 2, "The Use of Games", is a tour of some current 
ideas in gaming. It is not intended to be a review of 
gaming literature. It simply identifies points that will 
be of relevance in later chapters. Considerable use is 
made of classifications of games by purpose and structure 
as formulated hy Bowen (1978), and I consider the 
Intelligence Man system of game control (Sharp & Dando,
1977 ) before introducing the Superior Commander system 
(Cooper, 1978, 1979) which we used.
Chapter 3, "Board War Games for Decision-Making Research", 
is concerned with the content of research games. It is 
derived largely from our early exç>erience with commercial 
board war games and the developmait of our own Organisational 
Control Game. I derive a set of requirements for a useful 
research game and gaming methodology, and show how the 
Organisational Control Game and Superior Commander system 
meet these requirements. Much of the content of this 
chapter has been published (Cooper & Klein, 1980).
Chapter 4, "The Organisational Control Game", describes
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in detail the Organisational Control game, and should give the reader 
a thorough idea of the nature of the game and the complexity of 
the decision-making environment.
Chapter 5, "Secondary Task Methods for Assessing Mental 
Processing Load - A Literature Survey", is a review of 
literature describing development of the psychological 
secondary task technique of mental processing load assessment.
I describe the capacity model of human information processing, 
and show how a secondary task may be used either as a loading 
task or a subsidiary measuring task. Finally, I indicate 
possible extensions of the technique to study tasks which 
have a large problem-solving component.
Chapter 6, "A Secondary Task Exqxeriment to Assess Problem 
Conplexity", describes a secondary task experiment we conducted 
on a task with a large problem-solving component, namely a 
chess problem task. I demonstrate that the secondary task 
approach can provide techniques for the investigation of 
complex problem-solving and decision-making tasks. An account 
of this experiment has been published (Klein & Cooper, 1981).
Chapter 7, "Ëxçxerience with the Organisational Control Game", 
returns to our main programme and describes a series of games 
played with players who had had previous military exqxerience.
I comment on their decision-making and compare it with the 
behaviour of student players (an account of this comparison, 
by Cooper et al, 1980, has been published), I then proceed 
to re-examine our research programme, and show how we found 
it necessary to alter our research aims. The chapter concludes
with a description of games played with a number of 
serving army Majors.
Chapter 8, "A Cognitive Map Analysis of the Organisational 
Control Game", uses the psychological technique of cognitive 
mapping to analyse the games described at the end of the 
previous chapter. It is shown that cognitive mapping is 
a suitable technique for elucidation and examination of 
the individual decision-maker's perceptions of his decision­
making environment, and may begin to provide the framework 
of a language for discussion of decision-making. Much of 
the content of this chapter has been published (Klein &
Cooper, 1982).
Chapter 9, "Summary and Conclusions", presents concisely the 
results and conclusions of the work described in the previous 
chapters. This chapter emphasises in particular the use of 
techniques such as cognitive mapping as a basis for developing 
a decision-making science appropriate to Operational Research.
The reader may find it useful to bear in mind a convenient 
classification of the chapters in the thesis. Chapters 1,2,3 and 
4 are primarily concerned with gaming methodology and game design. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted entirely to secondary task methods of 
measuring mental processing load. Chapters 7 and 8 are primarily 
concerned with decision-making research. These three areas of work 
are summarised in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2
THE use OF GAMES
2.1 Introduction
In the previous Chapter I outlined the aims of our research 
programme as we initially formulated them and noted the integral part 
played by research gaming in the programme. In this chapter I shall 
consider the use of games in research and related fields and discuss 
various points that will be of relevance in later chapters.
This chapter is not intended to be a complete, or even partial, 
review of gaming literature. Such a review is far beyond the scope 
of this thesis, and would be of little relevance. A comprehensive 
survey of gaming in the United States of America, with particular 
emphasis on military gaming, has been undertaken (Shubik & Brewer, 
1972a, 1972b; Shubik et al, 1972; Shubik, 1975a, 1975b; Brewer & 
Shubik, 1979); as far as I know no similar survey on such a large 
scale exists for United Kingdom games, though Gibbs (1974) provides 
a British-based register of games and simulations. A United Kingdom 
gaming survey might well fill a useful "directory" function, but, 
since games are used in such a wide variety of contacts and for such 
disparate purposes, it does not seem to me that it would be able to 
offer much beyond that.
A working definition of a game will be useful in what follows.
As I shall have occasion to do often in the chapter, I follow Bowen 
(1978, p.3-4) in stressing that a game will be played for a purpose. 
The purpose will be "to develop some understanding of the way in which 
purposeful behaviour can effect the situations occuring in the game",
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where the situations in some sense model real situations in the 
real world. A game is thus some type of simulation of the real 
world where the aspect that is of particular interest is the 
interaction between the purposive behaviour of the player or 
players and the rest of the game world. As a rule, the purposive 
behaviour is supplied by real, purposive human beings. Situations 
in which the behaviour is supplied by mechanic al models of 
deterministic or probabilistic nature can be regarded as special 
cases. (This contrasts with the view often conveyed in Operational 
Research texts of games with real players being special cases of 
entirely mechanical simulations. )
It is worth making two points here. Firstly, gaming as 
defined above has little to do with that branch of mathematics known 
as "game theory", and, as far as the work presented in this thesis 
is concerned, there is no connection at all. It was hoped at one 
time that game theory would advance in some way the understanding of 
human behaviour, but this hope was by and large unfulfilled,’, as 
modern game theory texts might reluctantly concede (for example, 
Jones, 1980, p.16). Extensions and developments of game theory 
may be valuable, however, in the construction of worthwhile decision 
aids — two such developments which I regard as extremely worthwhile 
are hypergames (Bennett,1980) and metagames (Radford, 1975). It is 
interesting to note, in passing, that game theory sometimes appears 
appropriate to the stucfy of (non-human) animals (see for example, 
Maynard Smith, 1974). A game theoretic approach to modelling 
behaviour may be appropriate wherever the organism in question is 
unable to consciously reflect about its behaviour. Conscious 
reflection, which implies, for example, being able to conceive of 
and compare alternative futures, is an ability which most creatures
most of the time seem not to possess.
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The second point is that, despite the possibly frivolous 
overtones that the word "game" implies, games are to be taken 
seriously. Unfortunately, this sometimes does not happen - most 
of us involved in gaming have met people who refuse to believe 
that anything that could be called a game could have anything 
worthwhile to offer. At least some of these people should know 
better. In some instances, of course, the misunderstanding may be 
deliberate, for rhetorical purposes - for example, a report (Time 
Out, 1981) on a civil Defence game with which I have been involved.
2.2 Classification of Games by Purpose
tour of the gaming world begins with a consideration of the 
classification of games by purpose offered by Bowen (1978). Two 
criteria are used for this classification (see Figure 2.1); "control 
of players" and "selection of players".
As far as the selection of players is concerned, two states are 
possible; the game may be designed to meet the needs of a specific 
group of people, or suitable people may be found to play the game.
In the latter case is included the research game, where, to put it 
simply, a game is designed to research some situation, and subjects 
are then found whose abilities and skills will be appropriate to the 
research. Also in this regime can be found the game for fun, where 
once again anyone can play provided they meet the fundamental 
requirement that they should enjoy it. On the other hand, games 
designed to meet the needs of a specific group of people are clearly 
intended to educate those people in some way.
Bowen uses the criterion of control of players to separate the
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found to play 
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CONTROL
OF
PLAYERS
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TEACHING RBSEARQi
■*~lay unrestricted 
subject only to 
game rules and 
format
LEARNING FUN .
Figure 2.1. Classification of games by purpose, after Bowen (1978).
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categories of fun games and research games. In research games, play 
is controlled to a high degree so that player behaviour in specific 
situations is made explicit; however, in games for fun, such control 
is clearly superfluous. When the criterion of control is applied to 
the educational games, Bowen finds that he can identify two distinct 
types of educational game; a teaching game, in which play is highly 
controlled to guide players through the game in order to put across 
a specific lesson; and a learning game , in which such control is 
not exercised and the players are free to extract from the game 
environment whatever experience they may generate.
If one has never been involved in practical gaming it is ea^ 
to dismiss such considerations as those above as trite and pointless. 
In fact, though, it seems that an understanding of the purpose of a 
game, and, in particular, an understanding of what the game is not 
supposed to achieve, is a valuable component in directing the design 
of the game. Thus, it is important to realise that if a research 
game is not suitably controlled it will "degenerate" into a fun-type 
game (though, of course, it need not actually be enjoyable to anyone)
- and there is the related point, that a fun game (for example, a 
commercial board war game) is not really suited, as it stands, to 
research.
Of particular interest to^those involved in educational gaming 
should be the distinction between teaching and learning games. In 
practice the distinction:may be subtle, and it is quite possible for 
one type of game to degenerate into the other without anyone realising, 
A teaching game, it will be recalled, is intended to convey specific 
lessons (presumably about the real world, of which it provides some 
type of model) whereas a learning game offers a far less explicit
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experience (which nevertheless should be relevant, in some sense, to 
the real world). Clearly the two types of game are appropriate in 
different situations.
Learning games are particularly appropriate when the object of 
the exercise is to supply the players with general experience of working 
in an unfamiliar environment. This is the intention of a game such as 
the civil defence game HOT SEAT (R.M.C.S. reports, 1977). This 
game, which has been described in the O.R. literature (Hartley et al, 
1979), is a large scale exercise designed as part of a training course 
for senior officers in local government with designated wartime roles.
It is in fact a simulation of the administration of a typical county 
in the period following a widespread nuclear attack on the United 
Kingdom. Hartley et al state (p.862); "it was intended that the 
players should be led to draw valid conclusions for themselves rather 
than be taught "correct" procedures; for who knows now for certain 
what the correct procedures would be". Thus the game is clearly 
intended to be a 1earing game, and rightly so.
Dando (1981) has recently criticised HOT SEAT, as it is 
currently played, on grounds related to the fact that the game has, 
in his opinion, degenerated into a teaching game. However, he does 
not offer much practical advice on the prevention of such degeneration 
in the contexct of the design of a useful game. Replies to Dando's 
criticisms from representatives of the designers (Clayton, 1981;
Johnson & Hartley, 1981 ) have been published.
I have myself been involved in the design of a similar game,
HOT SPOT (R.H.C. reports,1980; Klein & McDowell, 1981), which is 
a smaller scale home defence game with similar general purposes as
HOT SEAT, save that it is designed for use specifically in a 
metropolitan borough environment. I cannot honestly claim that 
we have in any way eliminated the degeneration problem, beyond 
possibly making the danger more explicit. In the three years 
intervening between HOT SEAT and HOT SPOT the issue has become 
clearer, and the type of garaing-consciousness promoted by Bowen 
(1978) has become more widespread, at least among game designers.
If there is any advance in this aspect of the games it will almost 
certainly be due to this general progress in understanding rather 
than any radically new approach to game design. Sounding an 
optimistic note, at the time of completion of HOT SPOT our clients, 
the Ehiergency Planning Division of the Greater London Council, 
appeared to have a very good understanding of the issue, and seemed 
determined to avoid allowing the game to teach untested doctrine.
Whether the same will be the case in, say, five years time, however, 
is impossible to predict.
If considerable effort has to be expended in ensuring that a 
learning game functions:properly, it should not be imagined that the 
design of a teaching game is any easier. A teaching game is supposed 
to put across to its players a specific point or specific set of points; 
therefore the designer should be absolutely clear what exactly he is 
trying to teach, and should ensure that no other message is 
accidentally conveyed. This point is emphasised in a description of 
an industrial relations teaching game designed by Dando and Brown (1981): 
the game was intended to show shop stewards that the content of 
communications from management may often serve to disguise the substance 
of communications. The designers comment (p. 627); "our aim was to 
produce an industrial relations teaching game which illustrated this 
point so well that no-one who took part was likely to forget it - even
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in a critical negotiation". The designers assert that their results 
"overwhelmingly confirmed that the point had got home and that its 
real-world consequences were understood".
As Bowen points out (Bowen, 1978, p.14) the distinction between 
teaching and learning games is not rigid: "a game could be a deliberate 
cross between a teaching and a learning game". Probably most 
educational games fall somewhere between the two extremes. This is 
quite permissible provided the game designer has no illusions about 
the nature of the messages the game is likely to convey to players.
In an introduction to business games, Lloyd (1978) seems to be making 
this point when he exhorts the game administrator to identify his 
objective or objectives for the game (p. 14). He offers a number of 
possible objectives, ranging from "teaching of specific material" 
to promotion of "better understanding between departments or 
disciplines", which seem to correspond roughly to Bowen's teaching 
and learning regimes.
Clearly the hybridisation of game types can be extended, with 
suitable precautions, to all four categories of game. An entertaining 
example is provided by Laver's political games (Laver, 1979) which 
are published as fun games, yet have a very explicit learning element 
in them. "Each game is an attempt to capture one of the essential 
puzzles of the political process" (p.9).
More worrying, to me, at least, are the political games described 
by Handel (1977). These games presented their players, who were often 
as familiar with the political situation under consideration as "real" 
decision-makers might be expected to be, with scenarios depicting 
foreign policy crises in which they had to act. Mandel suggests that
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decision-makers in a game exhibit greater "imagination, flexibility 
and attentiveness" (p.615) than they would under standard operating 
procedures. At ths same time, "certain distortions in international 
perceptions during crises are reflected in political gaming". Mandel 
uses the first point to argue that gaming is a useful exercise for 
decision-makers (a learning mode), but the second point, he argues, 
shows that these same games also have value as research games. It 
seems to me that if political gaming really reflects distortions, 
then it may be dangerous to assume that it can at the same time 
truly fulfill its purpose as a learning game, since it is possible 
that the distorted perceptions may be learnt. Political games 
can be research games or learning games, but in either case more 
care must be taken to attain the intended aims of the games than is 
reported by Mandel (although, of course, his descriptions of the 
games in his short paper may have suffered for the sake of brevity).
It requires little effort to identify a pure fun game - chess 
is a fine example, of course. Research games, in the Bowen sense, 
are more difficult to find: as he comments (Bowen, 1978, p.83), 
"games have all too often been called research games despite their 
having no stated purpose nor any coherent method of control in order 
that any research purpose might be met". Work with simple matrix 
games springs to mind as an example of gaming used as a decision- 
making research tool. In this context, the "cautionary tale" of 
Huxham et al (1981) makes entertaining reading, throwing some 
considerable doubt on the validity of much previous experimental 
work using matrix games.
Two recent research games of a more complex nature than matrix
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games are the doctored fun board game of Sharp and Dando (1977), and 
the battle game described by Daniel (1980). Both these games will be 
met again later in this chapter.
?.3 Classification of Games by Structure
In addition to his classification of games by purpose, Bowen
(1978) has also developed a classification of games by structure. 
Cooper (1979) has briefly described this structural classification, 
and I follow his description closely in this section.
The classification is sumarised in Table 2.1. Two-player games 
are considered (though the classification is easily extended to 
n-player games) between a friendly Blue player (B) and an opponent 
Red player (R), who may be Nature. Each player may exdiibit different 
kinds of behaviour, effect on the game, and knowledge of the game.
Behaviour may either be person-like (P) or automaton-like (A). 
Classification "A" describes any player who always follows a set 
of rigid rules - this would clearly include a computer as a player.
If this condition is not strictly adhered to, then the player is 
classified "P'.
Regarding effect on the game, a player may be able to interact
with the game situation, and thereby modify it, in which case his
situation is modifiable (M). Alternatively, the game may be so 
designed that no modification is possible (N).
Regarding knowledge of the game, a player may have access to
a limited or closed information set (C), or he may have open access
Players R Blue, the friendly player 
R Red, the opponent, or Nature
Behaviour P ''^er son-1 ike 
A Automaton-like
Effect on game M nodifiable state of the game 
N Non-modifiable state of the game
Information access C Closed or limited access 
0 Open access
O' Extended open access to intentions
Table 2.1. Classification of games by structure, after Eowen (1978).
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to all information about the physical state of the game (O). If, 
as occasionally is found, a player's open information is extended 
to the thoughts and intentions of his opponent, then he is said 
to be in an extended open category (O').
each player's state in the game, then, is described by three 
parameters. In this scheme, the game of chess would be classified 
B(P,M,0) . R(P,M,0): both players are person—like, can modify the 
state of the game, and have open access to all information concerning 
the physical state of the game. As with the classification of 
games by purpose, this structural schane may seem rather pointless 
- unless one has actually been involved in practical gaming. Then 
it can be seen as a useful framework upon which to develop a game 
structure appropriate to one's needs.
Much research has been carried out using the three-room game 
system described by Shephard (1963) and illustrated in Figure 2.2,
The idea is that Blue player. Red player and Game Control each 
occupy a separate room: only Game Control has access to all game 
data. Blue and Red communicate all their moves to Game Control, 
from vdiom they receive information or misinformation about the state 
of the game. Thus a considerable degree of control is exercised 
over precisely what data is accessible to the players. In Bowen's 
structural classification, a three-room game typically has the structure 
B(P,M,C) . R(P,M,C).
This structure may be in at least one way inappropriate to a 
research game. The inappropriateness centres around the fact that 
both players are able to modify the state of the game. Oonsequently
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GAME CONTROL
M A S T E R M A P
BLUE ROOM RED ROOM
/  #
BLUE'S M A P RED'S M A P
Fiours 2.2. The thro.?-room .^vargane, adapted from Shephard (1963). 
Can? Control sends information and intelligence to Blue and Red, who 
communicate moves and intentions to Game Oentrol. Blue and Red have no 
contact with each other except tnrough Game Control.
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the G5ç>erimenter has comparatively little control over the state 
of the game; he will find it difficult to direct the game towards 
the specific states in which he is interested. If the experimenter 's 
interests are sufficiently general, this is acceptable. However, if 
the experimenter wishes to run a replicable e5ç>eriment — that is, if 
he wishes to subject several different players to identical game 
states, so that he may test behavioural hypotheses statistically - 
then his structure is of little value. This is unfortunate, because 
the richness of the interaction and detail that is possible in a 
three^room game provides a game environment which, other things 
being equal, would provide a highly desirable environment for 
decision-making research.
To meet the requirement of strict replicability, what clearly 
is needed is a game which the player or players cannot modify, so 
that the game state is always under the control of the experimenter 
alone. This non-modification condition can of course be relaxed at 
the end of the game, when it is no longer essential that the game 
state is not disturbed by a player. Thus we would have a single- 
decision game in which a player would spend most of the game simply 
observing the changing states and at the end of which he would be 
able to make just one decision. The structure of a simple single- 
decision game would be B(P,N,C) . R(A,N,C). Note that only one of 
the players in this structure (Blue) is an experimental subject;
Red has been designated automaton-like (this is not essential, but 
it is practical).
Unfortunately, the single-decision game loses by its very 
nature the richness of interaction that is a key feature of the 
three-room game. For most of the duration of the single-decision
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game, a player will do nothing — he will just watch. Cooper 
(1979, p. 537) comments; "players are likely to feel restricted and 
rather helpless, particularly under conditions of crisis, and they 
may be encouraged to become less committed to their roles as 
decision-makers". He continues; " changes in observed behaviour 
are likely to reflect the players* increased role separation"; 
clearly, the players must be made to feel they are active 
participants in the game.
What clearly would be desirable is a game structure which 
combines the rich interaction property of the three-room game 
with the r^licability property of the single-decision game.
This amounts to saying that we require a game which simultaneously 
has both the structure B(^,M,C) . R(P,M,C) and the structure 
B(P,N,C) . R(A,N,C). As it stands, this is clearly impossible.
If we resort to deception, however, a solution may be available. 
The experimenter requires a B(P,N,C) . R(A,N,C) game. If we can 
persuade the player that he is really playing a B(P,M,Cj . R(P,M,C) 
game, though, it should be possible to design a game which meets 
both the requirements of interaction and of replicability. The 
player will be under the illusion that he can modify the game; in 
reality game states are strictly controlled, and he cannot.
I conclude this chapter by describing two gaming systems which 
are attempts to carry out this superiiqDOsition of game structures by 
deception. The first system, the Intelligence Man system, goes part 
of the way towards this aim; the second system, the Superior Commander 
system, appears to meet the requirements entirely, on paper, and it 
is the syst^ Ti which was used in the experiments I shall describe in
subsequent chapters.
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7»4 The Intelligence Man System of Game Oontrol
The Intelligence Man system for the control of games was 
developed by Sharp and Dando (1977) as part of their programme of 
decision-making research at the University of Sussex. They had 
chosen to adopt a commercial board game, "Diplomacy" (Avalon Hill,
1976) which they recognised as having features which might make it 
P^ticularly relevant to their interests. The game involves a 
great deal of complex and potentially rich negotiation between 
players, which is generally regarded as being of far more central 
importance than the comparatively mundane complementary task of 
moving counters on the board. The game is at its richest when 
played by seven players - the maximum possible number. In their 
initial attempts to stu<^ the behaviour of players in this rich 
environment. Sharp and Dando ran their games using a "three-room" 
methodology: players were separated, and communications between them 
were in writing, transmitted by the game controller. Thus a complete 
record of the game, and in particular the negotiations between 
players, was produced for study.
However, Sharp and Dando wished to introduce replicability to 
their games. They wanted to be able to present as many players as 
they required with identically evolving games, so they could compare 
the,behaviour of subjects in a strictly controlled game environment.
The Intelligence Man system utilised a deception to bring this about.
All experimental players were told that they were each to be 
part of a two-person decision-making team, consisting of a decision­
maker and an adviser (or "Intelligence Man"). The decision-maker 
would be an experienced player located in another room; the experimental
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players would act as advisers to their decision-makers, although they 
would take over as active decision-makers later. An adviser would be 
party to all information available to his decision-maker (communications 
sent and received, and the situation on the game board). His only 
role in the game, however, would be to send advice and information 
to his decision-maker. There would be no guarantee that any advice 
would be followed, though of course it would be considered by the 
decision-maker in formulating his next moves.
In reality, all experimental players were advising an imaginary 
player, and all were receiving precisely the same data about the 
state of the game. The game was entirely predetermined, except at 
the end when the players took over as decision-makers and made their 
own final move (believing that the game would continue for some 
moves yet). The differences between the players' view of the game 
and the real situation are illustrated in Figures 7.3 and 2.4.
Thus the game structure is in reality of the single-decision type, 
B(^,N,C) , R(A,N,C), though the players do not see it as such. Cooper
(1979) has found it convenient to extend the Bowen classification in 
order to describe the situation the players see. A player may not 
only either be able to modify (M) or not modify (N) the game; there 
is also an intermediate state where a player has no direct effect on 
the game situation, but may be able to influence it (I), by advice, 
for example. The structure of an Intelligence Man game as seen by a 
player is then B(P, I,C) . R(P,M,C).
Now, the ideal situation would be where a player believes 
himself to be in a three-room structure B(P,M,C) . R(P,M,C), It can 
be seen that the Intelligence Man system gets close to this: the only
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ADVISERS’
ROOM
GAME
CONTROL
PLAYERS
ROOM
A-HA-H
Figure 2.3. The situation iFiich the players in the Intelligence • 
■Ian "3i jlomacy" games perceived. "layers represent different countries: 
A-H = Austro-Hungary; E ^ England; ~ = France; G = Germany; J = Italy;
R - Russia; T =  Turkey. (After Tharp A Dando, 1977.)
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ADVISERS'
ROOM
GAME
CONTROL
IMAGINARY
PLAYER
Figurs 2.4. The real Intelligence Man "Diplomacy" game. All 
players were advisers to Italy, an imaginary player directed by Game 
Control. (After Sharp & Dando, 1977.)
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difference is the influence/modify disparity in the players* perceived
views.
How critical is this disparity? Sharp and Dando (1977, p.287) 
report that they were able ’’to produce a testing game for theories 
about perception, which was complex (and therefore rich in behavioural 
alternatives) but controlled”. They felt that they had demonstrated 
’that complex games in general can be played in a controlled manner 
to achieve useful results”, and emphasise that their system's virtue 
is in ’’providing interactive responses in a non-interactive situation”.
Despite this, there is still a difference between being a 
decision-maker and a mere adviser, and the separation of game-playing 
and e5ç>erimental subject roles that was noted in the context of 
single-decision games may still occur, albeit less extremely. This may 
be why Daniel (1980), in comparing the performance of players in a 
research battle game which was first run using a type of single-decision 
structure (in which the player decided when his decision should be 
made) and then using the Intelligence Man system, feels (p.417) that 
■’it is possible ... that changing from the original game to the 
’’Intelligence Man” game has reduced the players* performances.” Cooper 
(1979, p.533) comments: ’’built into the Intelligence Man system itself 
is just that separation of roles which stress and crisis will 
exacerbate”. To avoid this, we need a gaming system ”in which the 
player's main role is perceived as Decision-Maker rather than 
Intelligence Man”.
2.5 The Superior Commander System of Game Control
The Superior Commander system (Cooper, 1978, 1979) is a gaming
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çystem which permits a single-decision game to be played in which 
the experimental player believes he is a real decision-maker, able 
to modify the game, throughout the game. In this chapter, only a 
brief description of the system will be given; the system in practice 
will be described more fully in later chapters.
The Superior Commander system works by embedding the e>perimental 
player in a hierarchy of decision-makers, as shown in Figure 2.5, The 
experimental player is told that he will be supplied with data 
concerning the state of the game from two (or more) subordinate 
decision-makers. On the basis of this data he can make his decisions, 
which he will communicate to his subordinates, who will implement 
them. The subordinate decision-makers are separated from the 
experimental player; all communications are carried from player to 
player by the game controllers. The subordinate decision-makers 
will necessarily each be playing in a subsection of their superior's 
game environment.
In reality, the subordinate decision-makers do not exist: the 
game is entirely predetermined. Often, therefore, the subordinate 
commanders will appear to deviate from the commands given by the 
experimental player. This can be explained to the e)Ç)erimental player 
quite easily: he is told that the details of the situation in the 
subordinate's area of interest made his superior's instructions 
inappropriate or even impossible to carry out.
One problem with such a system might be that the experimental 
player's necessary distance from the low level, where the 
implementation of play is going on, may cause him to lose interest in 
the game. To deal with this problem, the player must be assigned a
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SUBORDINATE 
FLAYER 2
SUBORDINATE 
PLAYER 1
EXPERIMENTAL
PLAYER
Figure 2.5. The basic hierarchy of decision-makers required for 
the Superior Commander system.
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dummy task. The dumn^ task may be any task that appears to permit 
the player direct interaction with the game environment {as opposed 
to interaction via subordinate decision-makers). The task should be 
distinct from the main decision—making duty, but should appear to the 
player to be important to the outcome of the game. Needless to say, 
in reality the dummy task will have no effect on the game at all.
I have described the absolute essentials of the Superior 
Commander system. In fact, it seems appropriate to expand the 
command hierarchy in various ways. This expansion is illustrated 
in Figure 2.6, which shows the player's view of the game, and 
Figure 2.7, which shows the reality of the situation.
Probably the most important expansion is the addition of a third 
level to the decision-making hierarchy superior to the experimental 
player. The experimental player believes this superior to be a real 
player, though in fact he is not. The superior's purpose is to direct 
the experimental player, and assist in defining for him what his 
objectives in the game should be. This goes a long way towards 
ensuring that all experimental players have some common view of the 
aim that they and their decisionmaking team is attenpting to 
achieve. In many games, this may not be at all obvious.
Fictitious decision-makers at the lower level (and, indeed, at 
the level of the experimental player) may be introduced as the 
game situation demands. There is also no real reason why all data on 
the game state should be supplied (apparently) by low level decision­
makers. Additional data may quite legitimately be supplied by the 
game controllers direct to the exq^erimental player.
As can be seen, a game played using the Superior Commander
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SUPERIOR
COMMANDER
EXPERIMENTAL
PLAYER
SUBORDINATE
COMMANDERS
GAME
Figure 2.6. The Superior Commander system, in full, as seen by the 
experimental player.
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GAME
CONTROL
SUBORDINATE
COMMANDERS
GAME
DATA
EXPERIMENTAL
PLAYER
SUPERIOR
COMMANDER
Figure 2.7. The Superior 
the experimenter.
Zommander system, in full, as seen by
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system has the single-decision structure B(P,N,C) . R(A,N,C). As 
far as the player is concerned, when playing against some kind of 
enemy (which may be Nature) he is very definitely a decision-maker 
who is able to modify the game, and therefore its apparent structure 
is the three-room ■ B(P,M,C) . R(P,M,C). Thus the Superior Commander 
system satisfies our requirement that a single-decision game can be 
made to seem like a three-room game.
Cooper (1979, p.536) notes three minor difficulties associated 
with the system. First, deception is required, with attendant 
special demands concerning game secrecy. Second, the system inposes 
some restrictions on scenario design. Finally, the system does not 
entirely eliminate the effect of a player having two roles in a 
game, as experimental subject and as decision-maker, although the 
effects should be reduced considerably. However, "any gaming approach 
must have this problem".
i
Cooper concludes (p.536): "the Superior Commander methodology is 
... a general methodology for research games that can be used for a 
range of purposes for which realism and good experimental control are 
both required". In the following chapters I shall describe the 
development and use of the Organisational Control Game, a research 
game developed around the Superior Commander system, which 
convincingly demonstrates the effectivness of the system.
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g-IAPTBR 3
BOARD WAR GAMES FOR DBCISION-MAKING RBS5ARCH
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter was concerned mainly with developing ideas 
about the structure of a research game. This ultimately led to a 
description of Cooper's Superior Commander System (Cooper, 1978, 1979). 
The description was quite deliberately couched in general terms, to 
emphasise the point that the structure of the system is largely 
independent of the specific subject matter of the game. The Superior 
Commander System would be applicable to any situation in which some 
kind of hierarchical command or administrative structure could be 
legitimately used - for example, war gaming, as will be described in 
this chapter, or business gaming.
By contrast, this chapter will be concerned mainly with developing 
ideas about the content of a research game. Many of the points to be 
made here have already been aired in the literature (Cooper & Klein, 
1980). I shall develop the ideas in the context of a description of 
the early viork of game development which w% carried out at Royal 
Holloway College. It should be realised, therefore, that although 
the problems that are identified in this chapter are, I feel, quite 
general in the field of research gaming, the specific solutions that 
I offer are by no means considered to be unique. In other vords, the 
research game which w^ e developed is not the only possible game which 
meets the requirements which were specified. Other games could be 
developed, and may well be.
The initial aim of our work was to develop a suitable methodology
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to test hypotheses about decision-making behaviour. More generally, 
we wished experimentally to test models of the decision-maker. It 
is not really possible to study, in a controlled fashion, decision­
makers in their natural decision-making environments. In such 
environments, of course, important variables are not subject to 
control in the strict way we might like for hypothesis-testing. We 
wished to study decision-making in controlled environments, where 
variables could be manipulated to enable specific aspects to be 
examined; a gaming approach seaned suitable for this purpose (Bowen,
1978). Our initial experimental work was directed towards the 
development of a game in which a subject vould be required to make 
decisions under experimentally controlled conditions, and in which 
it would be possible to analyse his decision-making in detail.
War gaming has been used for the analysis of military situations 
and the training of commanders since the early nineteenth century 
(Wilson, 1970). Although many of these games were played for 
recreation by military officers, it is only in the last twenty-five 
years that wrar games have become available to the public (Strategy and 
Tactics, 1977). A wdde variety of commercial board war games are now 
produced (Palmer, 1977).
Our interest centred on war gaming for mainly practical reasons. 
One of us (Dr. Dale F. Cooper) had some military experience which would 
be valuable in designing game scenarios. In addition, we had a source 
of military decision-makers h- m i l i t a r y  officers— to be supplied by our 
sponsors to play the game. It was therefore natural to prepare for 
them a military decision-making environment. A board w^ ar game is an 
economic and relatively simple depiction of a military situation.
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In the next section I describe our initial experiments wdth a 
commercially available board war game, and with the Intelligence Man 
System for the control of research games. Both the game and the 
gaming system proved to have severe limitations for our purposes.
In the followdng section I discuss in detail the properties which 
a board war game should possess if it is to be used for research.
Nexct I consider the game which we developed, and its control by the 
Superior Commander System. In the final section I comment briefly 
on vfax game design.
3.? Experiments with a Tactical War game
The first stage of our experimental programme w^ as to assess 
whether a commercial board war game could be adapted to our research 
purposes. The game we chose to study wras "Panzer Leader", a war game 
manufactured by Avalon Hill (1974), depicting tactical armoured 
combat on the Western Front in the Second World War. The game is 
appreciably complex. It features many different types of fighting 
unit, each with its own characteristics, and a wide variety of terrain 
which influences combat in many ways. This complexdty was one of the 
most attractive features of the game, and that which suggested to us 
that it might have potential for research. It was envisaged that 
scenarios could be designed which involved decisions concerning a 
wide range of possible courses of action, offering a wide range of 
options to players. Padmer (1977) regards "Panzer Leader", and its 
companion game "Panzer Blitz" (Avalon Hill, 1970) as being exciting 
and requiring a high level of skill. It wras hoped that these features 
would encourage experimental subjects to become involved with the 
scenarios and induce them to play as well as they possibly could.
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It was recognised that in preparing an experimental war game of 
this kind the "Panzer Leader" rules might have to be simplified 
considerably, since few subjects are likely to have had much previous 
experience in the playing of commercial war games of this type. Even 
if playing only an advisory role, a subject would require a reasonable 
degree of conpetence before he could begin to make meaningful 
judgments of game situations.
Our initial choice of a gaming methodology was a variant of the 
Intelligence Man system developed by Sharp and Dando (1977), which wras 
discussed in the previous chapter. In this system, it will be recalled, 
subjects, believing themselves to be acting as advisers to real 
players, are led through identical series of predetermined moves. 
Subjects supply the experimenter with information about their views of 
the game in the form of messages to the players wrhom they believe 
they are advising, and, possibly, by a real move which they may be 
asked to imiake to conclude the game. Sharp and Dando used their 
Intelligence Man system successfully with an adaption of the 
commercial board game "Diplomacy" (Avalon Hill, 1976).
Recording a Tactical Game
Our preliminary investigations were concerned with the feasibility 
of recording "Panzer Leader" games. It seemed to us that a desirable 
feature of an experimental game would be that it should be possible 
to record the entire course of the game accurately, unambiguously, 
quickly and with a minimum of disturbance to the players.
"Panzer Leader", in common with most commercial war games, is 
played on a hexagonal map-board, each hexagon being individually coded.
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Counters representing units are approximately V ’ X and are 
identified by a series of numbers representing combat strengths and 
movement capabilities (sufficient to identify the type of unit) as 
well as a number identifying each unit individually. In even sinple 
scenarios as many as twenty or more units may be moved or engage in 
combat at each round of the game.
A straightforward game using what we judged to be one of the 
simplest scenarios supplied with the game (with a small number of 
units and fewr types of unit ) was played between players who had had 
previous experience with "Panzer Leader" and other war games. In fact, 
the players were members of the Royal Holloway College Games Club.
The experimenters attempted to record the whole course of play, while 
it was going on, on specially prepared forms.
The results of this.first trial indicated convincingly that 
recording "Panzer Leader" and similar games is not a feasible 
proposition. It is not possible to get close enough to the board 
while a move is taking place to be able to record the move without 
interfering considerably with the players. This means that either 
play must be held up frequently, or there must be a long pause at the 
end of each round in which the recorder notes in detail the outcome 
of the round. Neither alternative is satisfactory. Additionally, 
there are several operations in "Panzer Leader" and other games which 
require the player to explain to the recorder exactly wbat he is 
doing; virtually all combat requires such a commentary.
Even when the time spent on the recording process exceeded 
tolerable limits, and, interference to the players was considerable, 
recording errors still occurred. It does not seem possible to
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record "Panzer Leader" reliably without severely disrupting the flow 
of the game.
Intelligence Man System Applied to Panzer Leader
Our next experiments were to assess whether the Intelligence Man 
system could be applied to games of the style of "Panzer Leader". As 
was described in the previous chapter. Intelligence Man has worked 
admirably for "Diplomacy" (Sharp & Dando, 1977), but the kind of 
war games w^ e hoped to use differ from "Diplomacy" in many ways and the 
applicability of Intelligence Man could not be taken for granted. The 
output of an Intelligence Man exjxeriment is to a large extent obtained 
in the messages the adviser sends to the person he believes is playing 
the game; therefore, it is important to find out exactly what the 
subject, in his role as adviser, makes 6f his task. He may see 
himself as being in a similar role to a real player, and his 
messages may provide detailed suggestions concerning the microstructure 
of play; alternatively, he may take a wider view, and, freed of the 
constraints of organising the details of movement and combat, may 
point out strategies and options that might otherwise have gone 
unnoticed. It is in this latter mode that wre felt that the output 
of the game would be most interesting, at least for our research 
purposes; in any case, it is doubtful whether an adviser with little 
or no practical experience of the game could supply much worthwhile 
advice in the former mode.
Pour subjects were required for an Intelligence Man evaluation 
applied to "Panzer Leader". Two subjects player a normal game, and 
each wfas assigned one of the other subjects as an adviser. The 
advisers were separated from the players (all communications being
in writing, and carried by the experimenters) and they were presented 
with an identical game. There were, needless to say, several hitches 
in transmitting the details of play to the advisers' game, because 
of recording problems already discussed. The subjects were, once 
again, members of the Royal Holloway College Games Club.
It is important to note that Intelligence Man, as used here, 
differs from conventional Intelligence Man exqxeriments in that there 
was a real game going on - no deception wras involved. Our purpose 
wras to study the nature of the output of the advisers and their 
general attitude to the game. Their reactions to the specific 
scenario were not being tested.
Despite repeated discouragement from the experimenters, the 
advisers tended to become extremely involved with the detailed 
mechanics of the game. Much advice consisted of details of movement 
and deployment of individual units; the game wras viewed from a 
tactical rather than strategic viewpoint and there wras little sign 
that the advisers had studied and assessed alternative courses of 
action. They wrere, in effect, thinking as frustrated players rather 
than as advisers. This wras not the result for wrhich wre had hoped.
It seems likely that it is an intrinsic quality of "Panzer Leader" 
and similar tactical games to encourage this mode of thinking.
"Panzer Leader" was designed as a game of tactical level combat, and 
to expect subjects to seek comparatively abstract strategies wrhen it 
is clear to them that the outcome of the game wrill be decided at a 
tactical level is perhaps unfair. Everything about the format of 
"Panzer Leader", the wealth of terrain detail, the diversity of units, 
and the range of combat strengths, demands attention at a tactical
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level. At this stage, we decided that this type of game had little 
to offer us in our experimental work.
It wras becoming clear that wre wrere ourselves going to have to 
design our owrn, strategic level, research game. The system of game 
control that wre would use would undoubtedly be of central importance. 
The Intelligence Man system appears to work reasonably wrell - in the 
ex^ xeriraent I have described wre satisfied ourselves that the role of 
adviser is one that an experimental subject can reasonably be expected 
to adopt. Howrever, as I shall argue later in this chapter, this 
may not be enough - wre have certain reservations concerning the 
validity of results obtained writh the Intelligence Man system, and 
this led us to incorporate the Superior Commander system (Cooper, 1978, 
1979) in our game.
In order to describe the considerations which wre felt it 
necessary to bear in mind wrhen designing our game, I shall, in the nexct 
section, set out the requirements wrhich wre felt an experimental game 
and gaming methodology would need to have in order to be of value to 
us for resear(di. In the section after this, I shall describe the wray 
in which wre attempted to meet these requirements.
3.3 Requirements for a Research Game
I identify six major requirements for an experimental game, and 
three major requirements for a gaming methociology. The latter have 
already been, in part, considered in the previous chapter; here, they 
are considered in detail, in the contexct of the experimental work 
described in the previous section.
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Requirements for a Game
Gl; Simple, easily learnt, rules. Detailed analysis of 
"Panzer Leader" games shows that even experienced players sometimes 
unintentionally break the game rules without their opponent or any 
observers noticing. Inexperienced players have virtually no chance 
of playing a faultless game. Even if subjects are only to be 
advisers, they must nevertheless understand fully the potential 
of every unit on their game board, and the effect of every piece 
of terrain. Bearing in mind that we: may wish to use subjects who 
have little or no w^ ar game experience, and that wre would hope an 
experiment would last no longer than one working day, including a 
minimum of training time, it is clear that the game rules must be 
much simpler than those of "Panzer Leader". They must be simpler, 
indeed, than those of all but the most elementary commercial w^ ar 
games.
Not only must the rules be simple in practice, but they must be 
seen to be simple: that is, they must be easy to learn. This requires 
that they are concise and short, do not require any specialised 
knowledge, and, of course, are wrell-written.
. G2: Speed of Play. An experimental war game is rarely shorter 
than five rounds long, and it is essential that the play moves as 
quickly as possible, otherwise the subject will become fatigued, bored, 
and lose interest in the game towards the end. (Usually it is towards 
the end of a game that wre would hope to exctract the most interesting 
information^ )
We feel that an experimental wrar game should not last longer than
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five or six hours. For our purposes wre regard sixty minutes as the 
maximum acceptable time for a round, although it would be preferable 
if this could be cut by as much as half. The length of a wrar game 
round is usually roughly proportional to the complexity of the game, 
and it is felt that if, as advocated in Gl, a simple game is developed, 
this problem will cease to be as serious as it wras with the "Panzer 
Leader" games, in wrhich the players' spirits definitely lagged towrards 
the end.
G3: Base of recording. It should be possible, if necessary, to 
take down an accurate record of an experimental game. The format of 
the game, therefore, should allowr easy, swift recording, with the 
mimimum of interference to the players. "Panzer Leader" wras not 
suitable in this respect.
G4; Strategic aspect. From the point of view of our research, a 
strategic orientation is the most important property of the game, 
because strategies and options form the material wrhich wre would like 
the subject to consider. The fact that "Panzer Leader" is in practice 
almost entirely tactical has alreacfy been discussed. We would like a 
game wrhich is entirely strategic, presenting no tactical aspects to 
the subject at all. He should adopt a strategic frame of mind naturally, 
prompted only by the format of the game; it should not appear to be a 
rather unconventional and contrived wray of looking at the situation.
Scenarios must be rich in strategic options, and there must be 
potential decisions for the subject to make. To some extent preparation 
of these rich scenarios could clash writh requirement Gl, that the 
game be simple. Careful design of scenarios is necessary to 
reconcile these conflicting requirements.
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G5; Interest. To be successful, an experimental game needs to 
be interesting enough to hold the attention of the subject for the 
duration of play. Thus, in designing a simple game, wre must not 
allowr the game to become too abstract and unrealistic. The 
excitement and interest of "Panzer Leader" is attributed in no 
small measure to its complexdty and its realism (Palmer, 1977,
Chapter 7). A strategically-rich game, as advocated in G4, seems 
likely to hold the interest of subjects.
G6; Natural Extraction of Bxqxerimental Data. As much as possible 
of the data that we wish to exctract from the experiment should be 
provided by the subject in the natural course of playing the game. 
Intelligence Man achieves this elegantly: the data is supplied by 
the advisers* communications to their (non-exdstent ) players, and 
also by their move at the end of the game. This has the advantage 
of not encouraging the subjects* tendency, often prominent wrhen 
experimenters try to exctract data from than directly, to supply the 
sort of data they feel the experimenters expect ( see, for example, 
Silverman, 1977). We would hope for a similarly "natural" data 
exctract ion process in any other gaming methodology.
Requirements for a Methodology
Ml: Replicability. The fundamental property of an experimental 
methodology that wre require is replicability: that is, the capability 
to put many subjects into a scenario which develops in a predetermined 
wray each time it is played. Only in this wray can wre hope to derive 
general results about decision-making behaviour, rather than a 
commentary on the behaviour of individual subjects in unique, ' 
non-replicable situations.
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In our case the problem is complicated by the constraint that 
subjects must not realise that scenarios are predetermined. They 
must believe that they are modifying, or at least influencing, the 
course of events, wben in fact they are not. The Intelligence Man 
system has managed this deception admirably (Sharp and Dando,’ 1977), 
and as far as I know: it was the first methodology developed to allowr 
the replication of complex games. Any other methodology must perform 
as wrell in this respect as Intelligence Man.
M7; Complekity. A game must contain sufficient complexity and 
detail to be accepted by the player as realistic. If a player is 
expected to play in a sensible fashion, he must be convinced that the 
game environment is a reasonable representation of reality, and that 
his role in the game is realistic. In particular, the game must offer 
the player scope for complex interaction writh a detailed game 
environment. Such scope is available in three-room wrar games 
(Shephard, 1963), but is lacking in single-decision games, of which 
Cooper (1979, p.532) has commented: "it is not obvious that the 
players would regard them as realistic".
M3: Role of the Subject. I come nowr to wrhat I feel is an 
important shortcoming of the Intelligence Man system, especially 
in situations in which subjects are stressed: situations in which 
we would be interested. A subject in a gaming experiment can be 
regarded as having two roles: as a Participant in the game; and 
as a Subject in the exqxeriment. The experimenter is interested in 
the subject's Participant role. However the subject is constantly 
awrare, to some extent, of his Subject role. Effects due to this 
awrareness are not wranted by the experimenter, and should be minimised.
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The ideal situation, r from the point of view of the e:>ç>erimenter, 
is one in which the subject is entirely involved with the game - he 
is, effectively, entirely Participant. Under stress, however, the 
Participant role may become, in some sense, unpleasant. An escape 
from this role is therefore sought, and is conveniently provided in 
the form of the Subject role. In stressful circumstances the subject 
is more likely to become particularly aware of his Subject role, and 
his Participant role will weaken: he will become less involved in 
the game. I-^  we are interested in the effects of stress on his 
Participant role behaviour, this shift in awaraiess of roles should 
clearly be avoided as much as possible.
It is felt that the Intelligence Man system, in which the 
subject can only hope to influence the game indirectly as an adviser, 
is likely to exacerbate this problem. An adviser is intrinsically 
less involved in a game than a player; other things being ecjual, he 
will be less committed to the game. In particular, under stress he 
is likely to lose interest and involvement to a greater degree than he 
would if he felt he played a more important, central part (see Cooper,
1979). Such effects may account, in part, for the results of 
experiments by Daniel (1980) using the Intelligence Man system.
We require a gaming methodology that gives a subject a central 
part: one which, in the subject's view, is not merely useful but 
essential to the play of the game. At the same time, we must not 
infringe the requirement of replicability, which gives a 
methodology its strength as a scientific means of examining behaviour.
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3.4 A Board War Gaming System for Research
In this section I describe the Organisational Control Game, which, 
in conjunction with the Superior Commander system, has been developed 
to meet the requirements outlined in the previous section. I believe 
that these requirenents have been satisfied and that we have a gaming 
system which has the potential for a wide range of applications.
Initial trials of the system and the results and conclusions from 
these trials wdll be discussed.
The Organisational Control Game
The Organisational Control Game is a hierarchical war game with 
three different levels of play, involving many players. For oar 
purposes we need only consider the structure of the Friendly side.
The highest level 6f play involves a Corps under the command 
of a single Corps Commander. The Corps is split into three Divisions, 
each under the command of a Divisional Commander, and each Division 
is further split into a number of Task Forces, each under the command 
of a Task Force Commander. During play, all the various Commanders 
are separated from each other, and can communicate only in writing.
Bach of the Task Force Commanders engage in combat with the 
enemy in a tactical war game not unlike ’’Panzer Leader”, played on a 
detailed mapboard representing only the area of terrain within the 
Task Force's sphere of influence. The only major differences, from a 
Task Force Commander's point of view, are that he has to report 
periodically on the state of the battle to his Divisional Commander and 
that the Divisional Commander will send him advice, information and 
directives at regular intervals.
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The Divisional Commander receives reports from the Task Force 
Commanders which furnish most of his knowledge of the state of the 
lower level, tactical battle. He plays on a mapboard covering the 
Divisional area, and on it the Task Forces are represented, each 
subdivided into a few battalions, although their detailed structure 
is not visible at this level. The Divisional Commander's view of 
the game is far less detailed than those of his Task Force 
Commanders, but covers a wider area. Additional information is 
supplied to the Divisional Commander by intelligence reports from 
Local Reconnaissance, and by information sent from the Corps Commander, 
to whom he is required to report from time to time.
The Divisional Commander's role is to examine the information 
that comes in to him and to use it to develop strategies which he 
can attenpt to implement by sending appropriate directives to his 
Task Force Commanders. He is playing a strategic game. In addition 
to this main task, he is also involved with an additional, task: the 
maintenance of supply lines to his Task Forces.
At the top of the chain of command the Corps Commander receives 
reports from his Divisional Commanders, as well as his own intelligence 
units. On the basis of these he forms his overall view of the game 
and sends information, advice and directives to his Divisional 
Commanders accordingly.
In general, experimental subjects will play Divisional Commanders, 
and I now wish to show that, as far as the Divisional Commanders are 
concerned, the Organisational Control Game meets the six requirements 
for an experimental game set out in the previous section.
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Gl: Simple, Easily Learnt Rules. The design of the game is such 
that *all combat with the enemy is handled by the Task Force Commanders. 
The Divisional Commander, in order to make maximum use of the 
representation of the battle on his gameboard, need only be supplied 
with general combat rules. By removing the responsibility for, or 
even the possibility of commenting upon, the detailed tactical 
aspects of the game, many of the problems associated with learning the 
rules necessary in a complex war game are eliminated. The Divisional 
Commander's rules are, in comparison to those of a Task Force 
Commander, extremely simple indeed. For example Divisional Commanders 
are given the following combat guidelines (from the "Rules for 
Divisional Commanders" as reproduced by McDowell et al, 1979b, p.Ar-4);
Combat is resolved in detail at the Task Force level, and 
Divisional Commanders require no detailed knowledge of the 
combat rules.
A friendly Task Force consists of four battalions and an 
emeii^ regiment consists of three battalions. The battalions 
are likely to be of roughly equal size. In an engagement 
r between two battalions, that wrhich is defending will have 
an advantage over the other. Howrever, various other factors 
, will alter the strengths of units.
The defensive strength of a unit is increased if the unit 
did not move in the previous turn; this represents the 
ability o^ a unit to 'dig in'. Eioth the offensive and 
defensive strengths of units are severely reduced if they 
are not kept in supply. The strengths of units are 
increased if they occupy hill hexes or town hexes.
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G3; Speed of Play. Because individual units are represented 
as aggregates on the Divisional Commander's map, there is very much 
less work to do in assessing them and organising them in each round. 
This reduces considerably the time taken for each round.
G3: Base of Recording. The relatively fewr units counters on 
the map at Divisional Commander level make recording a far easier 
task than with a more complex game. In fact, the Divisional Commander 
cannot move units directly, only indirectly through his orders to the 
Task Force Commanders, and detailed combat evaluation only occurs at 
the Task Force level. Very little work is therefore required to 
prepare a record of a game at the Divisional Commander level.
G4; Strategic Aspect. From the strategy and tactics point of 
viewf, the Organisational Control Game at Divisional Commander level 
is very different from "Panzer Leader". Any details concerning the 
tactical battle are entirely eliminated from the Divisional Commander's 
map; his view is in aJ.1 respects strategic. Thus he wdll generally 
give strategic rather than tactical advice to his Task Force 
Commanders, and he is concerned almost entirely with strategies and 
possible courses of action, both of his own forces and of the enemy.
G5: Interest. It is felt that the Divisional Commander's task 
in the Organisational Control Game, wrhile conceptually simple and 
unencumbered by detailed rules, is potentially interesting for a 
player, even one who has had no previous exçterience wdth w^ ar games. 
Interest is of course closely related to the specific game scenarios 
to be played. The scenarios we developed wdll be described in the 
next chapter. For the time being, I note that the Organisational 
Control Game allows a fair amount of flexibility in scenario design -
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thus we were able to develop interesting and exciting game scenarios 
depicting entirely different situations.
G6; Natural extraction of Experimental Data. Data is extracted 
from the subject in the natural course of the game in two w^ ays. Firstly, 
at regular intervals in the game the Divisional Commander sends 
information, advice and directives to his Task Force Commanders; analysis 
of these communications provides some information about his view of 
the game. Secondly, from time to '.time the Corps Commander requests a 
re^jort from the Divisional Commander; the Divisional Commander outlines 
his thoughts concerning topics in which the experimenters are interested, 
and he gives his assessment of the strategic situation. These 
communications, too, may be analysed.
Use of the Superior Commander System
The Organisational Control Game, with the experimental subject 
in the role of one of the Divisional Commanders, meets our requirements 
for a research game. I shall nowr show^  howf the Superior Commander 
system provides a technique for using the Organisational Control Game 
wrhile satisfying the three requirements for a research gaming 
methodology.
A Divisional Commander player believes himself to be playing 
in a hierarchical system composed of several other players (Figure 
3.1a). In fact he is not: all other players are played by Game 
Control, and the course of the game is entirely predetermined 
(Figure 3.1b). All communications from the Task Force Commanders, 
wrhose games constitute the action of the battle, are written 
beforehand, and the entire development of the scenario is controlled 
by the experimenters.
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Figure 3,1. The Superior Commander system applied to the hierarchy 
of the Organisational Control Game. (a) From the viewpoint of the 
ex^oerimental subject ( ), who believes Game Control to be responsible
only ^or communication links. (b) from the viewpoint of the experimenter, 
who knows all players but the subject to be played and controlled by Game 
Control. The number Oivisional Commanders and Task Force Commanders 
need not be precisely as shovn in the above diagrams.
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Thus the condition of replicability (Ml), is met: the same 
game may be played with different subjects as many times as the 
experimenters wish. The obvious problem is: if the Divisional 
Commander is sending directives to his Task Force Commanders, 
wdll he not become suspicious when he finds that there is no 
apparent reaction to these directives? With careful scenario design 
this is not a major problem. Scenarios can be designed so that the 
directives the Divisional Commanders give, provided that they are 
strategically sound, can reasonably produce the predetermined 
outcome. Discrepancies, even quite major ones, can be accounted 
for by explaining to the Divisional Commander that, given the 
state of the low^-level tactical battle not apparent on his map, 
his directives could not be implemented.
The important point is that the subject believes he is 
modifying the game as a player, rather than influencing it as an 
adviser. In addition to this, the apparent importance of his part 
in the game is increased by a dummy supply line maintenance task.
This dummy task, as was explained in Chapter 2, is designed so that, 
although it seems to be important to the game, it has no effect on 
combat results w^hatsoever.
In this way condition M3, requiring that a subject’s involvement 
wdth the game be maintained, even under stress, is met, and an answer 
to our major reservation concerning the Intelligence Man system is 
found. We do not claim that this methodology wdll entirely eliminate 
role separation effects (it is impossible to achieve this entirely 
unless the subject is unawrare that he is playing a game at all), but 
it is likely to reduce them considerably.
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This leaves recquirement M?, that the gaming system should permit 
a substantial level of complexity and detail. Clearly, this is the 
case. The Superior Commander system imposes no restriction on the 
detail of the game environment, nor on the complexity of apparent 
player interaction with it.
Initial Experience with the Superior Commander System
The first trials of the Organisational Control Game and Superior 
Commander system involved members of the Royal liollowray College Games 
Club, A scenario conprising six rounds w^ as devised depicting two 
Task Forces defending against an advancing enemy. (This scenario, 
wfhich later wras designated "Scenario 1", wdll be described in detail 
in the next chapter; here, I wdsh only to comment on the performance 
of the methodology. ) Subjects, in the roles of Divisional Commanders, 
had to advise two subordinate Task Forces and also decide on the 
deployment of a third Task Force which became available in Round 
Five (wrhen it would be too late to affect the course of the game, 
which, unknown to the subjects, ended on the next round).
The deception was complete and worked well. Subjects were 
convinced that the other commanders were real players and they felt 
that they were positively influencing the game. We felt confident 
that if the deception worked well with these experienced players then 
it would be likely to work with most subjects, and subsequent 
experience, as wdll be seen, seems to have confirmed this prediction.
Subjects felt that they were fulfilling a useful function in 
their communications wdth their Task Force Commanders, and they did 
not feel helpless and peripheral in their roles. The dummy supply line
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task was seen as important, and successfully gave subjects the 
illusion that the game w^ as affected by their handling of the task, 
even though it w^ as soon realised that it w^ as straightforwrard. The 
problems with game involvement that are inherent in Intelligence 
Man seem to have been reduced quite considerably.
Subjects reported enjoying the game. For experienced war 
gamers, it was a novel experience to be able to forget entirely 
about game mechanics and concentrate entirely on strategies. The 
piecing together of information from various sources to make a 
coherent picture was mentioned as being particularly interesting, 
and, in general, the idea of a hierarchical game was found to be 
very appealing.
3.5 War Game Design
Our early experiences with board w^ ar games led us to state nine 
requirements which should be met if these games are to be used for 
research. Six requirements related to the form of the game itself; 
the other three were concerned wdth the methodology to be employed 
to control and replicate the game. Subsequently, we developed a game, 
the Organisational Control Game, and a methodology, the Superior 
Commander system, which satisfied these requirements.
In this chapter the only commercial wrargame I have discussed in 
detail has been "Panzer Leader". However, we looked at and played a 
variety of board war games, exhibiting many different features, in our 
preliminary work. From the range of games we studied, we extracted 
those characteristics of physical design, layout and rules, which 
were most suited to our needs. I recommend that anyone seriously
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considering using a board war game for research, whether one that is 
commercially available or one, like ours, which is specially developed, 
should play a variety of different commercial games to obtain an 
understanding of their capabilities.
To assist in selecting appropriate games, I recommend Palmer (1977) 
and the Strategy and Tactics Staff Study (Strategy and Tactics, 1977). 
Palmer provides detailed notes on nearly 300 professionally-produced 
w^ ar games, and is, as far as I know, the only comprehensive book on 
board war games, their characteristics, and how to play them. The 
Strategy and Tactics Staff Study gives notes on a basic library of 
about 40 war games, and lists many others; the book is concerned mainly 
with conflict simulation games.
There are at least two methodologies for the control of research 
games, the Intelligence Man system of Sharp and Dando (1977) and the 
Superior Commander system of Cooper (1978, 1979) discussed here. With 
an appropriate system for their control, board w^ ar games can be used 
to examine decision-making in a variety of research contexts.
This chapter has been concerned wdth the practicalities of board 
wfar game design. I have essentially been attempting to specify the 
nature of the content of a research wrar game. In the followdng chapter 
I shall add substance to these specifications by describing the details 
of our Organisational Control Game. Some idea of these is necessary 
to fully appreciate the results to be described later.
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CHAPTliR 4
THli ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL GAME
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter 1 shall describe in detail the Organisational 
Control Game, which was developed by myself and Dr, Dale F. Cooper as 
a research game wrhich implemented the Superior Commander system. A 
complete description of the game, including copies of all administrative 
material, is given in our final project report (McDowell et al, 1979b), 
and it would, in theory, be possible to inplement and run the game 
entirely from the specifications given in that report. Some notes on 
the development of the game are included in a previous report (McDowell 
et al, 1979a). I shall not reproduce the entire contents of these 
reports here. Rather, I intend only to describe the game in 
sufficient detail to make the context of the results to be presented 
in subsequent chapters clear.
In the previous t(\o chapters, the Superior Commander gaming 
system wras introduced, and it was shown how? this system wras implemented 
in the Organisational Control Game, in this context, many ideas about 
the content of a research game were developed. This material should 
be borne in mind when reading the description of the Organisational 
Control Game presented in this chapter.
4.2 Overall Structure of the Game
The experimental subject in the game takes the role of a 
Divisional Commander in a hierarchy of players consisting of a Corps 
Commander, three Divisional Commanders, and six Task Force Commanders
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(Figure 4.1). As far as the experimental subject is concerned, he 
has as a superior the Corps Commander, and as subordinates two 
Task Force Commanders; no direct lines of command link him to any 
of the other players ("peripheral” players).
It wdll be recalled that, in reality, none of the other players 
exd-st, and the course of the game is entirely predetermined. The 
Divisional Commander is therefore told, in the course of an extensive 
briefing before play (McDowell et al, 1979b, Annex B), that he wdll 
remain isolated from the other players during play - all communications 
wdll be written, or tape-recorded - and, in fact, every attempt wdll 
be made to prevent him ever meeting the other players. This, it is 
explained (p.B-3), is "to keep personal interactions to a minimum".
The Divisional Commander is also told that his two subordinate 
Task Force Commanders wdll be played by "experienced graduate students", 
and that all other roles (Corps Commander, peripheral players, and 
the enemy) are played by manbers of the Game Control staff. No 
explicit information is supplied about the structure, if any, of the 
enemy team.
The "cover story" to this rather elaborate organisation is that 
the game is designed to aid the study of the effect of "information 
flowT within hierarchies" on decision-making ). It is pointed
out that "the information recieved by the decision-maker on the 
higher level is not rawf data taken direct from the environment, but 
has been collected and assessed at the lower level, and should 
therefore be in a form more immediately useful to the high-level 
decision-maker". Further, "because this information is reaching 
the higher level decision-maker second hand, it may present an 
incorrect or at least biased view of the environment, and the
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Figure 4.1. Structure of the friendly hierarchy in vhich the 
experimental subject ( (£) ) considers himself to be playing.
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decision-maker has no way of testing this information by direct 
comparison with the environment**
The game is a time-stepping game - that is, it proceeds in a 
series of rounds representing succesive game times (as opposed to 
real times). Each round represents a game time two hours ahead of 
that represented in the previous round. In a simple time-stepping 
game, players would make their moves for a period, and then the Game 
Controllers uould assess the outcomes of those moves, eventually 
presenting the consequent situation at the beginning of the next 
period. However, because of the structure of the Organisational 
Control Game, this simple system must be adapted somewhat. Each 
round is therefore split into two phases: the Divisional Commander 
is told that these are his Task Force Communication Phase and 
Corps Communication Phase.
In the Task Force Communication Phase, the subject receives 
reports from his Task Forces, giving details of their situations. 
Reconnaissance information is also supplied. On the basis of these 
reports, the Divisional Commander issues directives to his Task 
Forces.
In the Corps Communication Phase, the Divisional Commander 
receives a communication from his Corps Commander, to which he is 
ejqpected to r^ly. While this is going on, he is told, his Task 
Force Commanders are carrying out his directives and engaging in 
combat with the enemy, so that, at the end of the phase, it is possible 
to move to the beginning of the next round.
This two-phase system is further elaborated by the addition of
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two other phases, which, though not essential to the "logic" of the 
game, contribute importantly to the game in other w^ ays. These phases 
will be described shortly.
4.3 Mode of Play
The Organisational Oontrol Game is a board w^ ar game. The 
Divisional Commander is presented wdth a map board wrhich covers his 
area of interest in the game - the Divisional area. The map board 
shows broad details of terrain features such as rivers, woodlands 
and hills, as wrell as towns, roads and railw^ays. It represents an 
area of about 26 x 13 miles, on a scale of about 1:40,000.
As is conventional in board war games of this type, the map 
board is overlayed by a hexagonal grid, the hexagons (known to wrar 
gamers as "hexes") being used to specify positions of units. Each 
hex represents an area of approximately one ninth of a square mile.
Units are represented by means of small, square counters wdth 
identifying marks. Blue counters represent friendly fighting units, 
red counters represent enemy fighting units. Friendly units of supply, 
wrhich, as will be explained, have an inport ant role in the game, are 
green. Fighting units are represented at battalion level. Since 
just four battalions make up a friendly Task Force, it will be realised 
that combat cannot be represented in great detail at the Divisional 
Commander level.
Howrever, the Divisional Commander is told that the Task Force 
Commanders have a different viewr of the game: they are supposedly 
presented wdth detailed map boards showdng only that area of terrain
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immediately concerning their own units. Details of combat at the 
Task Force level are not supplied to the Divisional Commander; however, 
he is left in no doubt that it takes place at a significantly greater 
level of detail than that at which he perceives the game (for example, 
at company level or lower).
A Divisional Cbmmander is also supplied with maps which show his 
Divisional area in relation to surrounding Divisional areas, and in 
relation to the area of country in which the conflict is taking place. 
These aspects of the game environment are emphasised during the 
briefing prior to the start of the game.
Rules of Play
As explained in the previous chapter, the Divisional Commander 
need not concern himself wdth the details of combat, since ostensibly 
this is carried out by his Task Force Commanders at the lowest level 
of the command hierarchy. The Divisional Commander is therefore given 
only rules of play pertaining to the units as they are portrayed on his 
map board — that is, at battalion level.
The Divisional Commander is told that his Task Forces are 
predominantly infantry. In one time period, a battalion can move up 
to a maximum of six hexes on a road, but this movement capability is 
cut back on rough ground or wrhen the unit is engaged in combat, or 
under enemy fire. The fighting strength of a unit is increased if it 
remains stationary for sufficiently long to "dig in", and its fighting 
capabilities are also enhanced if it occupies a town or high ground.
It is made clear to the Divisional Cbmmander that the capabilities of 
enemy units are; not precisely known, although they are not likely to
,1
differ radically from those of the friendly units.
The course of the game is predetermined. We had decided that 
scenarios would be designed in which the component battalions of a 
Task Force would remain in close support of one another. It 
occurred to us that if a Divisional Commander were to issue a 
directive to the effect that a Task Force be split, failure to comply 
would be particularly difficult to account for in terms of obstructions 
at the Task Force level. To discourage a Divisional Commander from 
attempting to split either of his Task Forces, therefore, it is 
explained that if a Task Force is dispersed beyond a certain limit, 
its fighting strength becomes severely reduced, due to difficulties 
wdth communication and coordination of activities.
Dummy Task
It wdll be recalled from the previous chapters that an inportant 
part of the Organisational Control Game is a "dummy" supply line 
maintenance task wiiich, although it has no real affect on the game, 
gives the illusion of being essential and-thus increases the player*s 
involvement in the game. We decided that wre wanted to keep this task 
separate in time from other parts of the game, and so a Supply .Phase 
was introduced between the Task Force Communication Phase and the 
Corps Communication Phase in each round. The Supply phase is devoted 
solely to administration of the supply task.
Rules governing the administration of the supply task are simple. 
Combat units expand a certain amount of supply in each round; this 
amount increases in heavy combat. Supply is represented by supply 
unit counters on the map board. The Divisional Commander is told
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that the combat effectiveness of fighting units will drop if they 
exhaust all their supply. He therefore has to keep his Task Forces 
supplied with units originating at a supply depot in the rear of his 
Divisional area. For this task he is required to move supply units 
on his map board - this is the only part of the game in wrhich he is 
permitted to affect the position of counters on the board. The 
Supply Phase is relatively short - five minutes is generally more 
than adequate.
The supply task is straightforwrard: scenarios are designed so 
that there is very little danger of Task Forces running out of supply 
due to cutting of lines of communication or unexpectedly heavy combat. 
Consequently, the Divisional Commander is, in practice, never faced 
writh a situation in wrhich his forces have no supplies». This is 
essential, because, due to the predetermined nature of the game, even 
if forces did run out of supplies, no effect on the game would be 
detectable.
Research Phase
As a game, the Organisational Control Game is complete in its 
three-phase form, each round comprising a Task Force Communication 
Phase, followed by a Supply Phase, followred by a Corps Communication 
Phase. The communications wrhich the Divisional Commander sends out to 
both Task Force and Corps provide a considerable amount of output 
suitable for analysis.
Howrever, wre found that wre required output in addition to that 
supplied in the course of the game. We wranted to ask the Divisional 
Commander specific questions about his decision-making, the answrers to
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which would not, in general, be made clear in the "natural" output of 
the game.
To allow for this additional questioning, a Research Phase wras 
added at the end of some rounds, followring the Corps Communication 
Phase. In this phase the Divisional Commander is required to reply 
to direct questions from the experiments. It is made clear, of course, 
that this phase has no effect on the course of the game,
4.4 Scenarios
Two different combat scenarios have been designed for use writh 
the Organisational Control Game. They are both set writhin the contexrt 
of a broad general political scenario. I shall briefly outline this 
general scenario before considering the two combat scenarios in detail.
The general scenario is based in the Republic of Arachide, a 
fictitious developing country writh a strong agricultural economy 
(Figure 4.2). Arachide has two neighbours: the States of Basile and 
Give. Relationships betwreen Arachide and its neighbours have been 
relatively cordial until recently, wrhen the Seurat region of Arachide, 
the subject of a long-standing territorial dispute betwreen Arachide 
and Basile, wras found to contain a potentially large oilfield. What 
had preciously been a "largely academic argument" (from the game 
briefing as reproduced in McDowrell et al, 1979b, Annex B, p.B-5) 
suddenly "flared into a major political dispute".
The dispute escalated, diplomatic relations betwreen the two 
countries ceased, and Basile mobilised its.:forces, called iç> reserves, 
and requested foreign aid. Howrever, Arachide reacted to this activity
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Fiaure 4,2, Th(? fictitious Republic of Atachide,
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rather slowly, and consequently was caught with little defence when, 
a few days later, Basile launched a large-scale invasion.
The combat scenarios are set one wedc after the outbreak of 
hostilities, at which time Basile has made considerable progress into 
Arachide erritory, having met little resistance in some areas, but 
in others having run into considerable opposition from hastily 
deployed defensive forces. It seems that Arachide is now beginning 
to successfully check the advance of Basile's forces, although this 
is by no means certain.
The.tuo combat scenarios are located in widely separated regions 
of Arachide. Subjects are allocated the roles of Divisional Commanders 
in the Arachide army, taking part in defensive activities one wedc 
after the invasion by Basile. Despite the commonality of their aims, 
however, the players in the two scenarios find themselves in 
completely different situations.
Scenario 1 - A Defence Scenario
Scenario 1 takes place in an area to the West of Arachide, to the 
North of the town of Giscours (Figure 4.3). The area is predominantly 
hilly, and many small touTis are scattered among the hills. At the time 
the Divisional Commander starts play, the area is subject to a strong 
enemy thrust from the North-West, part of the enemy's overall push to 
the East. The thrust immediately threatens Giscours and important rail 
links to the North and West. The friendly Corps haé taken up 
defensive positions in the area, its aim being to prevent the enemy 
achieving its objectives for as long as possible - hopefully until 
friendly reinforcements arrive.
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The Divisional Commander * s division (Figure 4.4) is located in 
a central position, with a friendly division located on each flank. 
The Division consists of three Task Forces: two are deployed in 
f or wrar d defensive positions and are under the command of Task Force 
Commanders; the third is grouping, but is expected to become 
available later as a strategic reserve, with deployment under the 
direct control of the Divisional Commander,
At the beginning of the game, no contact has occurred between 
the Division and the enemy, though it is clear that this wdll occur 
very shortly. The Divisional Commander is issued with a directive 
(McDowell et al, 1979b, p.B-11) instrucing him to "delay the enemy 
advance ... for as long as possible", preventing "any advance towrards 
Giscours"; to "hold a defensive position" in the area wrhich his Task 
Forces currently occupy, denying the enemy access to towns West of 
the area; and to "prevent the enemy from reaching and blocking the 
railwray link to the North",
As the game progresses, the forward Task Forces make contact 
wdth the enemy and battle starts. The Task Force in the South comes 
under pressure, but it is the Northerly Task Force which suffers the 
heavier attack, wdth one of its battalions completely wiped out.
Both Task Forces attempt to break contact and withdrawr in order to 
stronger positions but find this a difficult operation to carry out. 
While the Task Forces are being kept engaged, fast-moving enemy units 
slip past their positions and begin to pose a direct threat to 
locations in the West of the Divisional area. By the time the game 
ends, and the Divisional Commander can deploy his reserve Task Force, 
as well as an additional Task Force which he has meanwhile been 
allocated, his forward Task Forcesj considerably reduced in size, are
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Figure 4.4. The subject's Divisional area in Scenario 1.
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defending positions against enemy units some miles to the west of 
their original locations, while other enemy units are still moving 
West wdthout opposition and threatening to cut the forward Task 
Forces* supply lines.
' The overall picture in Scenario 1, therefore, is of a defence 
against an eneny force which is clearly too strong to repulse - the 
best that can realistically be done is to delay the eneniy advance as 
long as possible. The true strength of the enemy, and the corresponding 
weakness of the friendly position, only becomes clear as the game 
proceeds.
Scenario 2 - An Advance-to-Oantact Scenario
. Scenario 2 takes place in the North of Arachide, in an area 
centred on the town of Olivier (Figure 4.5). The area is dominated 
by the valleys of the Harris River and its tributary, the Jackson. At 
the time the Divisional Gammander starts play, the enemy is advancing 
South-West down the Jackson Valley towards Olivier, and, indeed, its 
advance units have alreac^ moved virtually unhindered into Olivier.
The friendly Oorps is in the process of moving into the area from 
the South, its general objectives being to free Olivier and keep the 
railwray line through the area open. .
The Divisional Commander *s division (Figure 4.6) is once again 
located in a central position. Moving in from the hills to the West 
of Olivier, one Task Force is heading for Olivier with the intention 
of freeing it, while another is advancing towards the town of 
Bouscaut, from where it intends to move East to meet the approaching 
enemy. These two Task Forces are under the control of Task Force 
Commanders; a third Task Force is grouping in the hills West of
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Figure 4.6. The subject’s Divisional area in Scenario 2.
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Olivier, but is expected to become available as a strategic reserve, 
with movement under the direct control of the Divisional Cbmraander, 
later in the game.
A.t the beginning of the game, no contact has occurred between 
the Division and the enemy. The directive to the Divisional 
Commander (McDowell et al, 1979b, p.P>-ll) instructs him to "establish 
control of Olivier and the area immediately around it, making sure 
that the railway line between Olivier and Bouscaut is kept clear".
As the game progresses, the Task Force assigned to Olivier 
approaches the tov\»n. unemy forces in Olivier turn out to be greater 
than expected, but, after a fierce fight, the Task Force manages to 
occupy a considerable proportion of the tovsn. However, even by the 
end of the game, Olivier is not entirely free of the enemy, and the 
battle continues. Meanwhile the other forward Task Force, having 
reached and passed through Bouscaut, has met with enemy op^josition a 
few miles to the Bast, and by the end of the game is making some 
impression on the enemy’s strong hill position. The overall situation 
is made more serious by the fact that further enemy units are rapidly 
approaching the area. Once again, by the end of the game, the reserve 
Task Force, as well as an additional Task Force, can be deployed on 
the orders of the Divisional Commander.
Thus Scenario 2 is an advance-to-contact, in which what might 
at first seem a rather straightforward operation is complicated when 
it becomes apparent that the enemy are stronger than at first they 
appeared. Once again, the true situation only becomes apparent as the 
game proceeds.
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4.5 Playing the Game
In this section I describe briefly the practical arrangements 
for play of the OCganisationai Control Game. We had decided that 
the whole game, including briefing, debriefing, and appropriate 
refreshments, should fit into one working day. We had facilities 
prepared for t w  subjects to play simultaneously, one for each 
scenario - as a rule, all our games were played in this "parallel’* 
fashion. Such an arrangement can be fully administered by just 
two Game Controllers: each with responsibility for one scenario, 
and both sharing responsibility for other duties. Hovever, since 
it is intended to make the players believe that quite a large team 
is involved in playing the game, short "walk-on" appearances by 
any convenient colleagues are a useful aid. Indeed, such incidental 
events are probably quite important in maintaining the Superior 
Commander deception successfully.
A few days prior to the game, a player would have been sent 
a set of documents introducing the game which he wu l d  have been 
asked to read before coming to play. The set of documents consists 
of:
1. Introduction to the Organisational Control Game, 
describing briefly the hierarchical control system.
2. Brief summary of rules for Divisional Commanders in 
the game.
3. Background to the general scenario - a brief description 
of the Republic of Arachide and its recent history.
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4. General background to the player’s combat scenario.
5. Notes on the player’s combat scenario.
The entire set of documents covers ten sheets of A4 paper (typed and 
single-spaced), including maps. The documents are reproduced in 
McDowell et al (1979b), Annex A.
A typical timetable for the game is presented in Table 4.1. As 
can be seen, the game lasts for six rounds, and Research Phases are 
appended to the first, third and fifth rounds. The total time required 
according to the schedule is 4 hours and 40 minutes. A half hour 
coffee break is usually taken after the general briefing, and a break 
of an hour for lunch may be taken after the second or third round. If 
these breaks are taken, total running time will be 6 hours and 10 
minutes. Thus, if the game begins at 10.00, it should be over by 16.10.
Players from both scenarios attend the general briefing together. 
This briefing.(McDowell et al, 1979b, Annex B) first discusses the 
hierarchical control system. It then goes on to describe in detail 
the Republic of Arachide, and gives details of the escalation of the 
conflict with neighbouring Basile. The tv\o areas depicted in the 
combat scenarios are briefly discussed before the rules and mechanics 
of the game are described. A number of maps and diagrams are shov^ n 
in the course of the briefing.
Immediately before play begins, a player receives a short 
briefing in his ov^ n game room. This briefing is intended to 
familiarise him with the use of the equipment of the game room.
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Duration (Minutes)
General bricking 30
Individual player briefing 10
Round 1: Hoard update 5
Task Force Communication Phase 15
Supply Phase 5
Corps Communication Phase 10
Research Phase 10
Round 2: Board update 5
Task Force Communication Phase 10
Supply Phase 5
Corps Communication Phase 10
Round 3: Board update 5
Task Force Communication Phase 10
Supply Phase 5
Corps Communi cation Phase 10
Research Phase 10
Round 4; Board update 5
Task Force Communication Phase 10
Supply Phase 5
Corps Communication Phase 10
Round 5: Board update 5
Task Force Communication Phase 10
SU;.)ply Phase 5
Corps Communication Phase 10
Research Phase 10
Round 6: Board update 5
Task Force Communication Phase 10
Supply Phase 5
Corps Communication Phase 10
Debriefing 25
Total duration: 4 hour's, 40'minutes
Table 4.1. Specimen game timetable, with Research Phases in 
Rounds 1, 3 and 5.
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The equipment in the game room consists of ; a detailed map 
board of the player’s Divisional area, with counters representing 
combat and supply units; a wall map of the Corps area and a wrall 
map of the whole of Arachide; and a tape recorder and several 
cassette tapes wdth which to record all messages to Task Forces 
and to the Oorps (and also any reports made in the Research Phase). 
Small scale reproductions of the map boards, and a list of counters, 
are presented in Annex D of McDowell et al (1979b). The map 
boards for each scenario cover the areas shown in Figure 4.4 
(Scenario 1) and Figure 4.6 (Scenario 2).
Play proceeds in a series of rounds. Each round begins with a 
board update by a Game Controller, during which counters are moved 
on the map board to correspond with combat at the Task Force level 
in the prededing round. Then the Task Force Communication Phase 
begins. Written messages are brought, by the Game Controller, from the 
Task Forces, describing their situations, and the Divisional Commandeer 
responds by issuing a directive to the Task Force Commanders which 
he records on tape. A report also arrives from reconnaissance units 
in this phase. At the end of the phase, the tape which the Divisional 
Commander has prepared is taken away.
The Supply Phase occurs next, during which movement of supply by 
the player should be noted by the Game Controller. It is important 
that this is done, since the player must believe that the supply tatek 
is affecting the game at the Task Force level, though of course it is
not.
In the Corps Communication Phase, a written message is brought 
by the Game Controller from the Corps Commander. Once again the player
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records a response on tape, which is taken away at the end of the 
phase. (Howfever, if a Research Phase is played at the end of the 
round, the same tape can be used for both the report to Corps and the 
research response.) Overlays depicting movements of units in the 
Corps area are supplied for the Corps area map.
In the Research Phase, the player would be asked to respond 
to questions such as the following:
1. What different: plans did you actively consider before 
choosing the one that you did?
2. Were there any plans that you felt were not worth
serious consideration? What were they?
3. How did you select the plan that you did? What
factors in the scenario influenced your decision?
4. What different courses of action do you see as open
to the enemy at this stage? Which do you think he 
will choose? What factors influenced your appraisal?
All communications to the subject (including Corps area map 
overlays) are prepared before the game begins. The Communications 
are hidden in a control room until required. Messages from Task 
Force Commanders are handwritten; messages from the Corps Commander 
and reconnaissance units are typed. Copies of all messages, as well 
as instructions for movements of unit counters, are included in Annex 
D of McDowrell et al (1979b).
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The debriefing has no formal form. Players are not always 
immediately told of the Superior Commander deception, since they may 
be required to play again, and their colleagues may be future subjects. 
Essentially, therefore, most of the debriefing is concerned with 
asking them for their viewa and opinions of the game. The type of 
questions asked might include;
1. Howt adequate were the data coming from the Task 
Forces?
2. Howr adequate were the instructions from Corps?
3 .  Howt well do you think the Task Force Commanders 
played? Will they achieve their objectives in a 
reasonable number of rounds?
Notes for the debriefing are presented in Annex S of McDowell et al 
(1979b).
4.6 Notes on the Development of the Game
Development of the Organisational Control Game into the form in 
wfhich it has been described in this chapter took place in three series 
of games. The first were the "Student" games in which the e3ç>erimental 
players were students at Royal Holloway College. These games were 
intended to test the viability of the Superior Commander system and 
the overall plan of the Organisational Control Game and were not 
envisaged primarily as decision-making research games. These games 
were referred to in the previous chapter.
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The second series of games were the "Emergency Planning Officer" 
games, which were intended partially as development games, but were 
also envisaged as providing some research output. The e^q^erimental 
players in these games were Emergency Planning Officers from various 
counties. The research aspects of these games will be discussed in 
Chapter 7.
The third series of games were the "Major" games which were 
intended entirely for research purposes. These games were played by 
serving army officers wdth the rank of major, and wdll be discussed in 
full in Chapters 7 and 8.
The game as it has been described in this chapter is essentially 
that played in the final "Major" series. In this section I shall 
briefly mention some of the developments that took place in the 
first two series.
Design of Scenarios
The first combat scenario we designed wes Scenario 1, the 
defence scenario. Scenario 1 wras used for most of our "Student" 
games, but we soon realised that, if our research results were not 
to be "scenario-specific" we would have to have the ability to test 
our results across different scenarios. Consequently we designed 
Scenario 2, the advance-to-contact, as a deliberate contrast to 
Scenario 1.
We were concerned that in Scenario 2, where the friendly ëide 
have apparently greater freedom of action than in Scenario 1, there 
would be increased danger of friendly movements differing inexcusably
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from that specified in players' directives. In fact, this does 
not seem to be a great problem. We found that in the advance-to- 
contact, provided the tasks of the Task Forces are made sufficiently 
clear at the beginning of the game, difficulties arising from players 
developing totally different overall strategies from that which 
actually is played are small; indeed, it turned out that there was less 
variation in strategies than in the defence scenario. This seems to 
be because the instructions to the player can be far more precise in 
the advance-to-contact scenario. Objectives can be specified and 
time limits set in some detail. All this is acceptable when the 
eneny do not have the initiative. In the defence case, where the 
enemy ^  have the initiative, instructions must be more general.
There is a higher possibility of a player's strategy differing from 
that which occurs in the game.
Modifications to Scenario 1
We found it necessary to make some modifications to Scenario 1 
during our first two series of games, ^ecifically, we found that, 
although virtually all players recognised the need for a withdrawal 
of forces during the defence their opinions differed as to wben the 
wdthdrawral should be^ initiated, its speed, and its precise direction. 
This became particularly clear in our second series of games. To meet 
this problem w^ e modified the scenario in a way which seemed to conform 
most readily to the apparent e3ç>ectations of players. Thus the 
scenario wras developed from game to game using both the behaviour of 
players during the game and their comments afterwrards. This method 
of game development - that of feeding back information supplied directly 
and indirectly by players into the scenario - is essentially that 
described by Brewer (1978).
Ill
since players differed considerably in their styles of withdrawal, 
it was clear that any one type of withdrawral would not satisfy all 
players equally. It would conform more to some players* ideas than 
others. We had to make sure, therefore, that in the prepared 
communications from Task Force to Division, Task Force Commanders 
explicitly stated why they had behaved in the wray they had. In cases 
where players* directives were not carried out, these reports by the 
Task Forces were to serve as the only explanation the player would 
get about why this had occurred. Since the communications were 
written without any knowledge of an individual player*s intentions, 
every possible set of intentions had to be covered.
The present form of Scenario 1 differs very little from the 
original; it was only at the lowest level - the movement of individual 
battalions - that changes were made. Nevertheless, Scenario 1 in this 
form is very much more satisfactory to players than before, and events 
are questioned far less than in the original version.
We found that no modifications wrere necessary to the initial 
design of Scenario 2. This is probably due to the experience wre 
gained during the design of Scenario 1.
Alterations to Game Rules
We found that we had to make the rules of combat in the game 
more explicit, and make unit movement rules more complex, than wre 
originally intended. As far as these factors are concerned, it would 
seem that our e^gerience wdth student players in the first series 
of games positively misled us - student players accepted grossly 
sinplified rules, and, indeed, commented that they were thus enabled
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to concentrate more on game strategies rather than mechanics. We 
found this encouraging. However, players in the second series of 
games, who had military experience, did not accept that these tules 
provided anything like an accurate representation of the type of 
combat w% wrere gaming. Consequently, the rules wrere altered to 
their present form, reflecting in more detail such features as the 
effect of terrain on combat. We found that players with military 
staff experience had no difficulty in assimilating these more 
complex rules. We believe this to be because of the clear correspondence 
between the rules of game and the natural "rules of reality".
Dummy Task
In both scenarios as they now» are, the dummy task is a supply 
task, involving the maintenance of supply links from a depot to the 
Task Forces. This task has always been used in Scenario 1. In Scenario 
?. we originally developed an artillery allocation dummy task: players 
were required to allocate medium artillery fire support to locations 
within their Divisional area.
There w^ ere two main reasons why the artillery allocation task 
proved unsuitable. Firstly, since the task could have no real effect 
on the course of the game, we were unable to provide any feedback to 
the players concerning the success of their fire support. They would 
have grown suspicious and frustrated had we repeatedly told them 
that the artillery was having no effect - that they were, in fact, 
consistently missing their targets. Secondly, we found that the 
artillery task was interfering with the players* perception of the 
battle that wras being gamed. The decision-making involved in the 
artillery allocation became associated with that involved in
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controlling the Task Forces. The artillery task wras effectively an 
uncontrolled variable in the game.
Some brief experimentation with an air strike allocation dummy 
task indicated that .tbis too wras unsuitable, for similar reasons to 
those mentioned above in connection writh the artillery task. The 
supply dummy task has, howrever, proved suitable for use in both 
scenarios; an additional advantage of it is that it requires the 
Divisional Commander to think about lines of communication, future 
plans and enemy intentions, and encourages a strategic view of the 
game.
Other Notes
It wrill have been noticed, in the descriptions of the combat 
scenarios, that both scenarios end with the deployment of reserve 
combat forces by the Divisional Commander. At first sight this might 
seem to contradict a fundamental principle of the Superior Commander 
system; that nothing the Divisional Commander does can really affect 
the game. However, the scenarios are so designed that the reserve 
forces cannot engage in combat before the game ends. Thus, no real 
effect can occur. At the same time, the reserve deployment decision 
may be an interesting decision to examine. This final "free" decision 
is the single decision of the single-decision game structure being 
used (see Chapter 2).
The timing of phases as presented in Table 4.1 was arrived at as 
a result of the early game trials. These timings w%re found to give 
players adequate time to conplete their tasks in each phase, wdthout 
leaving them with unacceptably long periods of inactivity. Thus the
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timings in Table 4,1 are not likely to stress or disturb players and 
so affect their decision-making behaviour.
Tape recorders to record all communications sent out by experimental 
subjects were only used in the third "Major" series of games. In the 
other two series, all communications were written. It was felt, 
particularly in the "Emergency Planning Officer" games, that some detail • 
was being lost by requiring players to give written directives and 
reports - these communications were sketchier and less thorough than 
we had hoped for. The tape-recorded messages were undoubtedly a major 
improvement in this respect, and the players in the third series of 
games apparently felt unrestrained regarding the level of detail 
incorporated in their messages.
It should be noted that in the third series of games two 
alternative sets of reports.'from the Task Forces to Divisional Commanders 
wrere prepared. One set wras as described in this chapter - handwritten 
reports from tie Task Force Commanders. The other set contained the same 
data, but wras presented in the form of short handwritten reports from 
the individual battalions (a Task Force consists of four battalions).
Thus data from the subordinate level could be presented in one of two 
conditions: an aggregated condition (reports from Task Forces), and 
a disaggregated condition (reports from battalions). The reasoning 
behind the preparation of these two conditions, and their use, wrill 
be discussed in Chapter 7. Both aggregate and disaggregate communications 
are presented in Annex D of McDowrell et al (1979b).
I deliberately chose to describe the Organisational Control Game 
and its development separately rather than include these descriptions 
in the accounts of decision-making research wrhich are to. followr in
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Chapters 7 and 8. This split emphasises the fact that the material 
in this thesis is concerned not only wdth decision-making research 
but also some important aspects of the design and development of 
research games. So far it has been the game development aspect of 
my work wdth wrhich I have been mainly concerned.
In Chapters 7 and 8, I shall direct my attention to the use of
the Organisational Control Game for decision-making research. Before 
this, howrever, I wish to turn to another part of our research programme. 
The next two chapters wrill be concerned with our work on secondary
task methods for assessing mental processing load.
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g-IAPTER 5
. SEœNDARY TASK METHODS FOR ASSESSING MENTAL 
PROCESSING LOAD - A LITERATURE SURVEY
5.1 Introduction
This chapter and the chapter which follows describe our subsidiary 
research programme to develop a method of measuring the mental 
processing load imposed by complex problem-solving tasks. It will be 
recalled, from Chapter 1, that when we began our gaming research we 
felt that wre might wish to measure the processing load imposed by 
various game scenarios. Accordingly, wre decided to investigate the 
use of a psychological technique, the secondary task technique, as a 
means of doing this.
Our gaming research developed in a different direction to that 
which wre had initially envisaged, and consequently we did not find it 
appropriate to apply the secondary task technique to our game as we 
had originally intended. Howrever, wre carried out a substantial amount 
of work in developing a secondary task method suitable for our 
requirements, and, as wrill be shown, wre have achieved an encouraging 
degree of success.
Secondary task methods have been used frequently in ergonomic 
and psychological research for over twrenty years, and the majority of 
this chapter is concerned with reviewring the literature in this field. 
In Chapter 6 I shall describe an experiment wre carried out at Royal 
Hollowray College to adapt the secondary task methodology to the 
assessment of the mental processing load imposed by complex problem­
solving tasks.
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5.2 Secondary Tasks
Secondary task experiments are characterised as experiments in 
which human subjects are required to perform two tasks - primary and 
secondary - concurrently. In general, secondary task exqxeriments 
have been directed towards the investigation and measurement of the 
mental processing load inposed on subjects performing specific 
primary tasks (our own work is no exception to this general rule). 
"Mental processing load* is a concept which wre shall shortly consider 
in more detail; for the time being it may simply be regarded as a 
measure of the amount of "brain power" required by a task. Thus a 
task is said to impose a certain mental processing load upon its 
performer.
The reasons for measuring the mental processing load imposed by 
tasks have varied considerably. At one exctreme, ergonomists have been 
concerned with studying the load on subjects operating complex 
machinery, in which the positioning of controls and displays and the 
overall design may be crucial to satisfactory operation. In other 
experiments, the load has been due almost entirely to purely cognitive 
processes; psychologists have used such experiments to examine mental 
mechanisms in their subjects.
All secondary task experiments have been based on the assumption 
of a relationship between the imposed processing load and the standard 
of task performance. The nature of the relationship is derived from 
a capacity model of human information processing, which provides a 
theoretical basis for using task performance as a means of evaluating 
load. The capacity model postulates some "natural limit" to mental 
processing capacity: provided this limit is not excceeded, little 
decrement in task performance should be expected. Thus more often
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than not there may be no observable change in the performance of a 
task as its complexity, and hence the mental processing load associated 
with it, is varied. For example, differences in the quality of car 
driving under conditions of light and heavy traffic are subtle and 
difficult to detect unambiguously, yet it seems obvious that the 
processing load on the driver must differ considerably in the two 
situations.
The use of a secondary task offers two different approaches 
to the problem of evaluating the processing load in cases where the 
performance of the task wrhich is of primary interest does not vary 
under normal conditions. The first approach is to use the secondary 
task to increase the load on a subject, causing his performance on 
the primary task to deteriorate. This type of experiment, where the 
secondary task is a loading task, can be used to coup are the difficulty 
of various similar primary tasks: the more difficult the task, the 
greater the deterioration that results when the secondary task is 
imposed. We would expect the more difficult aspects of the primary 
task to be the most sensitive to deterioration, and these aspects may 
be pinpointed using a loading task of appropriate load.
The Alternative approach is to use the secondary task as a 
subsidiary measuring task. Here, the error rate in the secondary 
task is assumed to reflect the load due to the primary task, to which 
the subject is instructed to assign priority and which he should perform 
to the best of his ability at all times. This approach presents 
more experimental and theoretical problems than the loading task 
approach, but it appears to have a greater potential for studying the 
mechanics of processing associated with a wide variety of tasks.
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In all the secondary task experiments I shall consider in this 
survey (which I believe constitutes a fair proportion of published 
work to date) the primary tasks always tend to be tasks in which the 
subjects have at their disposal some experience of responses appropriate 
to the task stimuli with which they are presented. In general, such 
tasks are either very simple or they are well-learned, and in these 
circumstances the processing of data is essentially directed towards 
the selection of a response rather than towrards the construction of 
an appropriate "response model". The algorithms required to generate 
a response, if they do not already exist, can be created with little 
effort. In this respect the tasks differ considerably from complex 
problem solving or resolving tasks, in which solution paradigms do 
not exist already, and in which complex models must be created before 
a suitable response can be selected.
Reviewrs of secondary task experiments have been published at 
various times. Knowles (1963) described several secondary task 
experiments related to ergonomics and the operation of man-machine 
systems. Browh (1964) provided a more extensive survey of the ergonomic 
literature, emphasising the distinction between loading tasks and 
subsidiary measuring tasks, and highlighting the important differences 
between them. Rolfe (1971), in an extensive critique of secondary 
task exç»eriments, reviewed a wider range of work, reflecting the 
emergent interest of experimental psychologists in the techniques, 
although he, too, was mainly concerned with the ergonomic literature. 
Kerr (1973) reviewed the psychological literature relating to the 
use of secondary tasks in evaluating processing demands during mental 
operations.
The present survey includes much of the literature covered by
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these authors as well as more recent work. My approach is to consider 
individually the fields in which secondary task techniques have been 
applied. In the next section, I begin by describing the capacity 
model, which provides the theoretical basis for secondary task methods, 
and I outline briefly some recent developments to the model. Next I 
review experiments involving loading tasks, and then those using 
subsidiary measuring tasks. Finally, I discuss the interpretation 
of the results of secondary task experiments, and consider possible 
developments. This will lead into a consideration of our own 
secondary task work at Royal Holloway College, to be described in the 
following chapter.
5.3 The Capacity Model of Human Information Processing
Much of current thinking in the field of human information 
processing is based on some form of limited capacity model of the 
data and information processing mechanisms of the human brain. Broadly 
speaking, current versions of the model indicate that the concept of 
limited capacity is a valid and useful one, providing a framework for 
both theoretical development and experimental investigation of human 
information processing.
The capacity model is founded on the idea that effectively there 
exists in the human brain some kind of "central" information processing 
mechanism that is the location of some or all mental operations. The 
model is not concerned with physically locating the mechanism, or, 
indeed, with forming any hypotheses concerning its physical nature, but 
rather with elucidating the organisation of the processes involved in 
mental operations. In its present form, this mechanistic, computer­
like view of thought processes is intended to serve only as a useful
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integrated description of observed phenomena; the nature of the 
relationship betwreen processes in the model and physical processes in 
the brain is not specified.
The Single-Channel Limited Capacity Model
Weiford (1952) proposed a model of human mental processing as a 
single-channel system of limited processing capacity in order to account 
for phenomena associated wdth responses to stimuli closely spaced in 
time. He noted that when responses were required to two separate but 
similar stimuli, the response time for the second was longer than that 
for the first if the second followed the first sufficiently closely.
Weiford proposed that the central mechanisms of the brain required a 
finite "organising time" to deal wdth stimulus information, and that 
no two central organising times could overlap. As a result, information 
sometimes had to be held in store. This would cause an observable 
delay in the response to one stimulus which followed another sufficiently 
closely- A delay might also result due to feedback from the previous 
response, which itself would require cehtral organising time.
Weiford* s model is a single-channel one in that no parallel 
processing of information can take place. The central mechanism 
can handle only one information processing operation at a time, and 
the finite organising time required by each operation effectively 
limits the capacity of the system, which becomes "blocked** for that 
duration.
Weiford*s model was reinforced by Davis (1957), who showed that 
delays in response to the second of two closely-spaced stimuli; also loccur 
wfhen two'sensej modalities (in his work, auditofy and visual )^rather than
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one are used for the adjacent stimuli, indicating that the single- 
channel bottleneck is associated wdth central processing mechanisms 
rather than sense receptors: information from both sense modalities 
must pass through the same channel. Later Davis (1962) showed that 
it wras possible for information from a first stimulus to be stored 
and not processed until after a second stimulus had been processed, 
and his work also indicated that blocking of the single channel did 
not occur if a response to the stimulus could be so well learnt as 
to become automatic.
Broadbent (1958, 1971 ) modified the model by introducing a filter 
which would select only stimuli possessing some arbitrary common 
feature. These stimuli alone would be permitted to pass on to further 
processing. In this way selective attention phenomena would be 
accounted for : for example, the "cocktail party" phemonemon - the 
ability to attend to one individual's speech in the midst of several 
others. Broadbent*s theory, and subsequent developments of it, are 
discussed by Kahneman (1973).
The simple single-channel model wras considered unsatisfactory 
by Eli thorn and Lawrence (1955), wrho argued that the concept of 
blocking of the channel was "nonproven and uneconomic" (p.116).
They felt that evidence for Wei ford* s theory wras far from conclusive. 
Work by Adams and Chambers (1962) indicated that the single-channel 
model could not account for results obtained wrhen the stimuli to wrhich 
subjects were to respond were known by the subjects to be certain to 
occur. Creamer (1963) suggested that human data processing mechanisms 
operated as a single-channel system only wrhen subjects were uncertain 
as to the type of event to which they were expected to respond.
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Modifications to the Single-Channel Model
Since the single-channel model wras proposed, it has been developed 
in directions that have resulted in models which concur to a greater 
degree with experimental observation. Such models are generally 
based on hypotheses wrhich relax the stringent requirement of strict 
serial information processing while retaining the idea of limited 
capacity. Kerr (1973) identifies two such alternative hypotheses: 
that of Undifferentiated Capacity and that of Limited Capacity 
Central Mechanism.
The Undifferentiated Capacity hypothesis has been used by 
Kahneman (1973) as a basis for a study of attention and effort.
Processing capacity is not fixed, according to Kahneman, but 
determined by variables such as level of arousal, and it may be 
allocated to tasks in parallel up to the maximum level available 
at that time. Kahneman distinguishes two kinds of interference, 
manifested as a deterioration or decrement in performance, between 
concurrent tasks. Structural interference is caused by the inherent 
structural demands of the tasks: for example, it would occur when 
tasks require motor responses that are inconpatible to some degree. 
Capacity interference depends on the total processing load imposed by 
the tasks and is not related to their nature: rather, it is a consequence 
of attenpting'more than one task at one time. Kahneman argues that 
even such disparate tasks as walking and mental arithmetic can be 
observed to interfere.
In the Limited Capacity Central Mechanism hypothesis, 
processing capacity within the central mechanism is allocated 
according to the specific processing demands of the tasks. Not all
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mental operations require the mechanism. Keele (1973) suggests that 
operations such as rehearsal, response initiation, and movement 
correction do require the mechanism, whereas memory retrieval, for 
example, does not. Only if the operations related to two tasks 
simultaneously require capacity in the mechanism will interference 
occur.
Although the various processing models display different features, 
all have in common the idea that there is some definite limit to 
available processing capacity (although this limit may vary from time 
to time). It is this feature that is central to the use of secondary 
task techniques.
5.4 Secondary Tasks and Limited Capacity
The capacity model as it relates to secondary task techniques 
is illustrated in Figure 5.1. We consider a processing mechanism 
with a limited capacity C (Figure 5.1a). A primary task requiring a 
capacity P is now imposed on the mechanism. Provided the available 
capacity is not exceeded (that is, provided P is less than C) the 
primary task will be performed well (Figure 5.1b). The difference 
between C and P is knoim as the reserve capacity R (sometimes called 
the spare capacity). As long as P is less than C there will be little 
relationship between the processing capacity required by the task and 
its standard of performance, and it uould not be possible to distinguish 
between the task requiring capacity P and another requiring some 
different capacity Q (Figure 5.1c) in terms of performance. Doth 
tasks lie well within the capacity of the mechanism.
Now consider a secondary task requiring capacity S (Figure 5.Id),
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Figure 5.1. The capacity model and secondary task methods.
(a) Total capacity C. (b) Primary task requiring capacity P, leaving 
reserve capacity R. (c) Primary task requiring capacity 0- (d) Secondary 
task requiring capacity S. (e) (f) Secondary task used as a loading 
task. The amount of interference, sho^n by the overlap of the primary 
and secondary tasks, reflects the processing requirements o^ the primary 
tasks. (g) (h) Secondary task used as a subsidiary measuring task. The 
error rate on the secondary task, shovn as that portion of the secondary task
’diich 'does not Fit' udthin the limited capacity C, reflects the 
processing re^quinaments of the primary tasks.
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to be performed concurrently with the primary task. The secondary 
task should be chosen so that the combined loads P + S and Q + S are 
both greater than C. This secondary task may be combined with the 
primary task in tv\>o different ways.
We first consider the case in which the secondary task is to be 
used as a loading task. Its purpose will be to supply an additional 
processing load, effectively reducing the capacity available for the 
primary task. Interference between the tasks will show itself as a 
decrease in the standard of performance of the primary task (and 
possibly the secondary task as well); more interference, and hence 
a greater decrease, would be expected with the more demanding primary 
task (Figure 5.le) than with the less demanding one (Figure 5.If).
Alternatively, the secondary task may be used as a subsidiary 
measuring task. To use the secondary task in this way, the 
experiment is constructed so that the subject assigns priority to the 
primary task (usually he is instructed to do so), and he should, 
therefore, perform it as well as he can at all times. The secondary 
task is to be performed only when it can be ctone without detriment to 
the primary task. In this case the standard of performance of the 
secondary task gives a measure of the primary task processing load; 
the poorer the secondary task standard of performance, the higher the 
primary task processing load is deduced to be (Figure 5.1g, 5.1h).
It should be pointed out that in either mode of application it is 
not certain, nor is it assumed, that there is a precise quantitative 
relationship between the performance variable being measured and the 
primary task processing load. The techniques do have qualitative 
value, however, and would seem to permit ordering and comparison of
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tasks in terms of the processing capacity they require.
5.5 Loading Task Experiments
Loading task experiments are constructed so that when the 
secondary task is applied, the effects of processing capacity being 
exceeded are directed into the primary task. The effects may, in 
addition, also be directed into the secondary task. Brown (1964) 
calls those tasks in which deterioration in standard of performance 
is measured in both tasks dual purpose second task ejperiments; I find 
it adequate for present purposes to class them as simple loading task 
experiments. In most loading task experiments, in any case, the 
performance standard of the secondary task drops unavoidably when 
performed concurrently with the primary task.
Brov\in (1964) emphasises that loading tasks can be used for 
"pin-pointing" faults in design and effects of stress on specific 
systems" (p.49). In this context experiments can be conducted 
to provide guidelines for redesign of man-machine systems to increase 
the effectiveness of the human operator. Garvey and Taylor (1959) 
report an example of this: using two types of loading task, they 
showed that the deterioration in the performance of a simple one­
dimensional tracking task under load depended on the nature of the 
control system. Similar instances of loading tasks used in the 
evaluation of equipment are cited in a review by Rolfe (1971), which, 
together with reviews by Knowles (1963) and Brovn (1964), should be 
consulted for more detailed discussions of this kind of application.
In the remainder of this section, I shall be concerned with the use 
o-F loading tasks to investigate internal mental processing mechanisms.
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Memory
The study of various aspects of short-term memory has been 
approached using loading task techniques. Mitsuda (1968) showed 
that recall of pairs of single digits presented auditorily was 
adversely affected when pairs of tvo-digit numbers, presented 
alternately with the original pairs, had to be either v^ rritten dovm 
or classified according to a simple scheme. Both the waiting and 
classification tasks interfered with memory rehearsal to a similar• 
degree; the tasks may be deduced to have been competing with 
rehearsal for the use of processing capacity. McNicol (1971) found 
that recall of sequences of binary (0 or 1) digits, in which the 
sequences could be subdivided into several groups of one repeated 
digit (for example, 00011011 could be divided into four groups), was 
decreased when subjects were required to repeat each digit as ij: was 
presented (shadowing). This was attributed to the shadowing process 
interfering with the recoding of the repeated items into one item, which 
is considered to require some central processing.
Kelly and Martin (1974), using both a simple arithmetical 
secondary task and a reaction time secondary task, demonstrated that 
retaining visual information in memory appeared to require processing 
capacity. Subjects were shown a sequence of tv\o-dimensional shapes, 
and were required to identify certain shapes which had been shovm to 
them previously. It was found that although the complexity of the 
shapes to be memorized had no significant effect on identification, 
shapes to which verbal labels could be easily attached significantly 
improved performance, suggesting that less processing capacity is 
required to rehearse the identity of such shapes.
Doost and Turvey (1971) presented subjects with iconic (visual
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short-term sensory storage) memory tasks concurrently with secondary 
tasks in which either alphanumerics had to be repeated aloud and 
committed to memory, or letters had to be classified as vowels or 
consonants. Neither primary nor secondary tasks suffered significantly, 
■From which it was concluded that iconic memory was relatively 
independent of the central processing mechanism. However, Chow and 
Murdock (1975), using a similar iconic memory task in combination 
with t\AO types of secondary tasks, did detect some significant 
detriment to iconic memory, and hence drew the opposite conclusion.
As in most types of experimental work, the sensitivity of the 
experiment is a crucial factor in the interpretation of results.
In an experiment in which subjects had to identify, after delays 
of up to 30 seconds, the locus of tactile stimulation on the upper side 
of the arm, Sullivan and Turvey (1973) found some grounds for suspecting 
that tactile short-term memory requires processing capacity. They 
suggest, however, that their results may be due not only to a reduction 
in available capacity because of the loading task, but also to the 
subjects responding in what they unconsciously felt to be a manner 
acceptable to the experimenters. Such involuntary alteration of 
behaviour to "please" experimenters is, by its nature, difficult to 
isolate and identify (Silverman, 1977).
Using a secondary task in which subjects had to identify the one 
repeated letter in a set of ten, presented over 50 seconds, Broadbent 
and Heron (196?) showed that the performance of tasks involving even 
a slight menory load is susceptible to distraction, as opposed to the 
performance of similar tasks with no memory load. The main purpose of 
this experiment was to investigate the effects of age on memory; it was 
sho\Mn that, in general, the performance of older subjects was very
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much worse than that of younger subjects on at least one of the 
primary and secondary tasks, and the older subjects displayed far 
more variability in their standard of performance than the younger 
subjects.
The general feature of the memory experiments that have been 
described is that their main concern was to determine the degree of 
interference the secondary task causes in memory. When interference 
was detected, this suggested that.the secondary task was competing 
with memory for processing capacity. Such interference had been found 
both in short-term monory and short-term sensory storage experiments.
The mechanism of short-term memory is regarded as eehëarsal; to 
retain information a subject must constantly process it and return it 
to short-term memory store. It seems reasonable that this process 
should require central processing capacity. Short-term sensory storage, 
however, is traditionally believed by psychologists to take place 
peripherally to any central mechanism: consequently, to find that 
it apparently requires processing capacity is surprising. It is 
possible that in many memory experiments what is being measured is 
secondary task interference not only with the memory component of the 
primary task, but also with encoding and other mental operations 
associated with the primary task, although experimenters take 
elaborate precautions to avoid it.
The processes involved with the various types of memory (short­
term sensory storage, short-term memory, and long-term memory) are 
discussed by Keele (1973).
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Learning
Loading tasks have been used to investigate human learning 
processes. Baker et al (1951) observed the development in the 
learning of a complex motor skill when a secondary task was assigned 
to different groups of subjects at varying stages of learning. For 
all groups there was an initial phase of heavy interference with the 
primary task w4ien the secondary task was introduced. Following this 
phase, subjects* performance on the primary task continued to improve 
at much the same rate regardless of the stage at which the introduction 
of the secondary task had taken place. The secondary task lowrered the 
absolute standard of performance eventuadly attainable on the primary 
task, probably due to structural interference, but there wras little 
observable effect on the rate of learning the primary task. Howrever, 
this is not alwrays the case: Noble et ai (1967) found that a loading 
task which involved anticipation of the next number in a sequence with 
varying degrees of randomness inhibited the learning of a tracking task 
as well as its performance.
Bahrick et al (1954) have observed that there is a "widely held 
notion that with continued practice tasks become less susceptible to 
interference" (p. 298). By running a secondary task at three stages 
during training in a primary task involving motor responses to a 
series of stimuli, Bahrick and Shelley (1958) showed that as training 
continued interference effects tended to vary inversely with the 
degree of redundancy (the extent to wrhich one stimulus can be used to 
predict the next ) in the stimulus series. For highly redundant 
stimuli a high degree of automatisation wras possible, control of 
primary responses as training progressed changing from extroceptive 
to proprioceptive. The more automatised a task becomes, the less
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processing capacity is required, and interference effects will 
accordingly lessen. Thus, the degree of automatisation that is 
possible determines howr effectively practice of a task can minimise 
interference with it. This effect applied as much to the secondary 
task as the primary task: Broadbent (1956) has demonstrated that 
practising a variety of loading tasks involving simple responses to 
an auditory signal will lessen their interfering effect on a primary 
perception task. In cases where learning is not the phenomenon 
being studied, precautions should therefore be taken to minimise the 
effects o^ progressive automatisation of secondary task responses.
Stager and Muter (1971) investigated the effectiveness of 
different kinds of training for a primary decision task representing 
the interpretation of air traffic control radar displays. Subjects 
had to detect potential collisions in a series of strategic visual 
displays; as a loading task, they had to detect odd-even-odd sequences 
in random digits presented auditorily. As previous work had suggested 
(Stager, 1970), subjects who had been trained with instruction 
technicfues involving pictorial displays processed information more 
effectively that those trained wdth apparently simpler verbal 
instructions. This w^ as attributed to the differences in the 
processing procedures they acquired in training. Stager and Zufelt
(1972) went on to confirm that method of instruction can substantially 
affect the required processing load; differences in processing 
procedures lead to differences in the load associated with a given 
information processing task.
Interference Effects
Schouten et al (1962) conducted an experiment to detect the
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mutual impairment of two tasks due to limitations of perceptual 
capacity, running a variety of different tasks concurrently wdth a 
simple two-choice stimulus-response secondary task. For high 
standards of performance on the loading task, performance on the 
other tasks became very poor indeed: maze-tracking relapsed from 
adult standard to that of an eight-year-old child, and handwriting 
on a freely chosen subject deteriorated markedly both in technique 
and content, indicating interference with both motor control and 
reasoning. Kalsbeek (1971) comments that "it is amazing that the 
complete disintegration of both can be brought about exqxerimentally 
simply by increasing the rate of binary choices in the distraction 
task" (p.109). In an experiment in which both the primary and the 
secondary taslc involved dual-choice reaction to stimuli, Kalsbeek 
and Sykes (1967) observed that performances on the tasks were inversely 
related. If a reduction wras recorded in the degree of interference in 
one task, a corresponsing increase would be recorded in the other, 
indicating different allocations of limited processing capacity to the 
two tasks.
Trumbo and Noble (1972) demonstrated that the greater the response 
uncertainty in the loading task (they used a response selection loading 
task writh the number of possible stimuli ranging from one to five) the 
greater the interference in the primary task. The experiment indicated 
th&t the mental operation of response selection required processing 
capacity in proportion to the number of available alternatives. White 
et al (1975) show^ed that inserting a sinple secondary task involving 
counting-backwrards by threes in the intervals between successive 
trials of a concept identification task interfered with the task in 
cases when theory suggested that a large number of hypotheses were 
present for evaluation by the subject. They did not attanpt to examine
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which aspects hypothesis evaluation were susceptible to the 
secondary task interference.
5.6 Subsidiary Measuring Task Experiments
Subsidiary measuring task experiments are those in which a 
secondary task is enployed as a measure of the processing capacity 
which is not required by the concurrent primary task. Efrors due to 
processing overload should occur only in the secondary task; the 
primary task should be performed wdthout detriment at all times.
Brown (1964) claimed that, in comparison with the loading task 
technique, the subsidiary task technique appeared "to provide the more 
powerful tool in the evaluation of perceptual load and reserve 
capacity" (p. 49 ), but he also noted that it was the "more controversial 
method" of the two (p.45).
The subsidiary task technique appears to offer a means of 
measuring the processing load associated wdth a task while keeping 
the disturbance due to the measurement at a minimum. The important 
point is that the primary task should be performed normally and should 
not be affected by the presence o^ a secondary task. Since 
measurement is occurring during times when the primary task does not 
present a processing load so great that breakdown of the task begins to 
take place, use of a subsidiary task should allow a better estimate of 
the processing load associated with a^  task under "normal" conditions.
Vehicle Driving
One area where subsidiary tasks have been used effectively is in 
the measurement of processing load associated with vehicle driving.
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In such experiments the metliodological constraint that the primary 
task be performed without detriment at all times is imposed also 
by safety considerations, and cleaorly it would be unwise to attempt 
to carry out a loading task experiment on driving.
Brown and Poulton (1961) showed that error rates in both simple 
digit checking and mental addition subsidiary tasks increased when car 
drivers were required to drive in "shopping" as opposed to "residential" 
city areas, and they concluded that this was indicative of the 
different mental loads imposed by the driving conditions. Various 
subsidiary tasks were used by Quenault (1968) in an attempt to detect 
differences.in performance between a group of drivers convicted of 
careless driving and a group of drivers chosen at random. No 
significant difference betw^een the two groups was found, although 
effects due to the driving environment, similar to those detected by 
Brown and Poulton, were observed.
In studying fatigue effects on driving. Brown (1962a, 1962b) 
used both attention and memory subsidiary tasks to measure the reserve 
capacity of two groups of patrol policemen, one finishing an eight-hour 
spell of duty in the afternoon, and the other starting a spell of duty 
at the same time. Surprisingly, performance was consistently better 
for those finishing duty than for those starting. Attempting to 
account for this. Brown noted that those subjects w^ ho were starting 
duty had been aw^ake for much the same length of time as those finishing, 
and had filled their day with various activities which might have had 
more tiring effects than driving. Another factor might be that policemen 
finishing duty might be more willing to co-operate fully with the 
experimenters than those starting.
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Using a subsidiary task in which subjects were required to call 
out at a regular rate, the degree of regularity being a measure of 
the spare caixacity available. Brown et al (1967) showed that 
continuous city driving for long periods does not necessarily affect 
driving performance adversely. In the same experiment, performance 
on a subsidiary vigilance task, involving detection of light signals 
through rear-view^ mirrors, wras observed to improve over the long 
periods. This wras attributed to the automatisation of driving, 
leaving more capacity for perceptual skills. It seems possible that 
automatisation of this type could also at least partially account for 
Brown’s (1962a, 1962b) results.
Brown (1966) showred, using a digit checking subsidiary task, that 
in a class of trainee bus drivers, those wrho wrere ultimately successful 
in their five-wreek course had significantly greater reserve capacity 
while driving at the seventh day of training than their unsuccessful 
colleagues. ' At that early stage these two groups of trainees could 
not be distinguished by direct measures of driving performance. However, 
at the end of the course there wras no longer a significant difference 
betwreen the reserve capacities of the two groups. Similar followt-up 
work (Brown, 1968) confirmed that a subsidiary task method wras a 
sensitive means of identifying drivers likely to be suitable for 
continued training.
Mental Processes
Possibly the most ambitious use of subsidiary task techniques 
has been in the investigation of mental processes and operations.
Using a subsidiary task involving sorting nuts and bolts by touch only, 
Dimond and Beaumont (1971) carried out an investigation of the
137
perceptual analysing systems of the individual cerebral hemispheres 
of the brain. Subjects were required to report on random pairs of 
digits perceived visually by individual hemishpheres, a system of 
screens being used to direct information to the hemispheres independently. 
The left hemisphere, which controls speech, performed faster; to report 
digits perceived by the right hemisphere, it was a;Dparently necessary 
to transmit the information to the left, causing delay. However, no 
significant differences in performance on the sorting task were 
observed for these two conditions, suggesting that similar capacity is 
required by the primary task in both cases.
Several experiments have attempted to subdivide mental processes 
into component operations and analyse the ca^oacity required for each 
operation by the use of subsidiary tasks. Johnson et al (1970) 
attempted to split a verbal task into encoding, retention and recall 
components and they suggested tentatively that encoding requires more 
processing that retention, but less than recall. Martin (1970), 
performing a similar exqxeriment to study organisational processes in 
memory, also found that retrieval required more processing than 
encoding, possibly because the organisation of memory was occuring at 
the retrieval stage. In an investigation into how the type of 
information affects the load involved wdth processing it, Martin et al
(1973) showred that memory rehearsal required less capacity for lists 
of words which could be easily organised into categories compared 
with lists of words which could not.
The results of such experiments as those above, together wdth 
the loading task experiments that have been carried out on memory, are 
undoubtedly im^jortant. Mental processes are extremely difficult to 
investigate, and to bring "hidden" aspects of them into the open, as
138
these experiments appear to have done, is a valuable contribution to 
their understanding. All such experiments must be regarded carefully 
and critically, however. The elaborate precautions taken to ensure 
that mental tasks ate correctly subdivided into their components, and 
the possibilities of structural interference effects, all permit more 
than one interpretation of results.
Other Examples
Subsidiary tasks have also been used in a variety of other 
exqxerimental contexts. Zeitlin and Pinkelman (1975) presented subjects 
with a tracking task in which two different types of tracking control 
were used. They showed that a random digit generation subsidiary task 
wes not sufficiently sensitive to pick up any load differences between 
the two conditions, but a delayed digit recall task indicated that a 
velocity control required more capacity than a position control.
Another common type of experimental task, the vigilance task, is 
exemplified by Poulton (1958), w^ ho recfiired two groups of subjects to 
monitor two and six dials respectively. Although performance betwoen 
the two groups w^ as comparable, a subsidiary memory task indicated 
clearly that the six-dial task wras more difficult, requiring more 
capacity than the two-dial task.
The effects of noise on spare capacity have been investigated 
using subsidiary measuring tasks. Boggs and Simon (1968) showed that 
noise (recorded half-second bursts of a bandsawr cutting aluminium) had 
no significant effect on a reaction time primary task, but caused a 
subsidiary digit-checking task to be performed less accurately. 
Differences in subsidiary performance due to alterations in the 
complexity of the reaction time task were exacerbated by the noise,
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which, Boggs and Simon suggested, "used up" spare capacity. Finkelman 
and Glass (.1970), using both predictable and unpredictable bursts of 
white noise, found broadly similar results, and concluded that the 
"effort involved in noise habituation contributes to the loading of 
the organism’s channel capacity" (p.213).
Brown (1964) emphasises that subsidiary tasks can measure the 
efficiency of information transmission in a task. The more reserve 
capacity available for a given task, the more efficient are the 
mental processing "programs" dealing with the task. Learning and 
automatisation of tasks may be regarded as processes of developing 
and streamlining the efficiency of these programs. Bahrick et al 
(1954), in an experiment concerning the learning of a motor task, 
found that the scores on repetitive and random versions of the task 
were comparable. However, a subsidiary mental aritlimetic task showred 
that the repetitive version, after a period of learning, required 
less capacity and was therefore being dealt writh more efficiently 
than the random version, for wrhich no learning effect could be 
detected. Knowrles and Rose (1963), in a two-man lunar landing 
simulation task, showred using a subsidiary task that the degree of 
mental efficiency writh wrhich the operation could be dealt wras 
dependent on the initial conditions of the landing, and that, most 
importantly, both crew members were dangerously close to overload 
during the final few seconds of the landing, an effect wrhich practice 
could not remove.
It is clear that it is important for the success of a subsidiary 
task e5ç>eriment that subjects <±) not permit the subsidiary task to 
affect their performance on the primary task. Any such effects should 
be belowr the level of significance if the experimental results are to
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be acceptable. I'iaJirick et al (195?), using monetary incentives, 
concluded that subjects tend to give priority to the task they perceive 
as most important, and try to minimise interference due to other 
tasks. Thus it is necessary for the experimenter to ensure that the 
subjects consider the primary task to be the most important. In an 
experiment in which the primary task involved ansv^ering questions aboout 
a visual display, Broadbent (1956) found that his subjects consistently 
regarded the secondary task, involving various simple reactions to a 
buzzer, as the more important, and the ex^Deriment was therefore 
effectively a loading task experiment. Rolfe (1971) has argued that 
secondary task interference seriously wealcens the applicability of 
subsidiary measuring tasks, pointing out that "early,studies in series 
of experiments have often claimed to be successful in this respect, 
but as the measuring techniques have been improved so an irqxairment 
in primary task performance has become apparent" (p.145).
5.7 Discussion
Secondary task techniques have been onployed with some success 
to investigate the degree of processing ca^xacity required in the 
performance of various tasks. Following the categorisation of the 
bulk of such work by Brown (1964) into loading task experiments and 
subsidiary measuring task experiments, it can be seen that these two 
teclmif]ues each emphasise a different aspect of human information 
processing. Loading task experiments tend to show the effectiveness 
with which a task may be performed under load, highlighting points at 
which performance may break down. Subsidiary task experiments, by 
measuring reserve ca^xacity, indicate, for a given level of 
effectiveness (usually optimal), the efficiency with which the 
appropriate processing operations are carried out.
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The theoretical background to many loading task experiments'is 
intuitively reasonable. The loading caused by the secondary task can 
often be readily regarded as effectively écrivaient to real-life 
loading by a variety of attention-demanding stimuli, and its effects 
seem likely to be the same operationally. Certainly, loading task 
investigations of learning and man-machine systems would seem to lead 
to straightforward, clear results (Rolfe, 1971). Regarding the loading 
task experiments involving various types of memory, however, theory 
is less straightforward and the conclusions are consecfiently weakened 
to some extent. The rationale behind such work is that if the loading 
task can be shown to interfere with the primary memory task, then this 
is an indication that the memory task requires central processing 
ca^xacity for which the loading task is comj^eting. Extremely careful 
experimental design is recjuired before the experimenter may be 
reasonably sure that the pirimary task is solely a memory task. In 
work involving iconic memory (Chowf & Murdock, 1975), for exanple, the 
ejqxeriment must be constructed to minimise the encoding of visually 
presented information, since encoding is a different process.
The problem is just as serious with subsidiary measuring task 
experiments involving various components of mental processing. Methods 
of subdividing processing into non-overlapping components are often 
elaborate, and the results, although valuable, need to be treated 
critically. Kerr(1973) identifies five categories of mental operation 
(encoding, multiple input, rehearsal, transformation-and responding).
In reviewing secondary task studies of these individual operations, she 
reports consistent trends in results which indicate that such 
techniques are illuminating otherwise inaccessible structures of mental 
processing. However, the problems of the interpretation of results 
are considerable. The apparent lack of processing demand during
142
encoding, for example, may be due to insufficiently sensitive 
experiments rather than the nature encoding itself.
Subsidiary measuring task experiments tend to be less well backed 
up by theory than those involving loading tasks. In essence, the 
interpretation of subsidiary task experiments requires a more 
sophisticated model of mental processing capacity. Although, when 
simply stated, the idea of directly measuring reserve cajxacity by 
means o'^  a secondary task is elegant and looks promising, there is 
no general agreement among psychologists concerning the exact nature 
o ’" mental processing and its capacity limits, and this has consequences 
for the interpretation of at least the more anbitious subsidiary 
measuring task exqxeriments. A fundamental problem lies in deciding 
whether processing is totally serial in nature, or if parallel 
processing is possible and, indeed, the norm. Kahneman (1973), 
relating degree of attention to processing effort, considers that 
attention is certainly limited, but that the limit is variable, and 
the allocation of attention is divisible: that is, parallel 
processing indeed occurs. Attention may be regarded as being allocated 
in units, and concurrent tasks will interfere when there are not sufficient 
units to be allocated to both tasks. Then, depending on allocation 
policy, which may or may not involve a conscious decision, one or other 
or both tasks will suffer.
A thorough investigation of the microstructure of the interaction 
of two concurrent tasks by Fisher (1975a, 1975b, 1977) has tended to 
supjjX>rt the concept of a limited capacity central processing mechanism, 
but her results indicate that what in fact takes place is processing 
in sequence wdth rapid switching between the two tasks rather than true 
parallel processing. The nature of the switching process, however, is
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not clear. Fisher emphasises that her results do not invalidate 
Kahneman’s model of parallel processing, and show merely that "in 
some situations involving the combination of quite difficult tasks, 
a sequential strategy would be the best operating procedure" (Fisher, 
1975a, p.283).
Thé difference between sequential and parallel processing may 
have important consequences for the interpretation of the more 
sophisticated secondary task experiments. In the parallel model, 
reserve capacity would be a measure of how; much processing s.xace is 
not actually utilised during the continuous performance of a task.
In a sequential model, reserve capacity would quite simply be a 
measure of the processing time not allocated to the primary task.
It is not clear that in all cases, particularly those involving the 
study of the components of mental operations, these would be 
operationally equivalent.
Kahneman (1973) drawls attention to structural interference, 
which causes the processing demand of two tasks performed jointly 
to be. greater than the sum of the individual demands of the tasks 
performed separately. This will occur when selected performance 
modes are incompatible or antagonistic or wiien both tasks require the 
same perceptual or res^xonse mechanism. Experiments should be constructed 
to aviod such interference as much as possible. Stimuli for different: 
tasks should be presented via different modes (for example, visual 
and auditory) and responses sliould be similarly separated. Even so, 
it is doubtful that structual interference can ever be entirely 
eliminated in an experiment.
Rolfe (1971) has criticised the secondary task technique and its
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exponents on three main points. Firstly, he suggests that often 
"e)geriments have been degraded by poor experimental procedures" (p.144). 
In particular ]ie notes that detailed analysis of secondary task 
performance and its effect on primary task performance is often lacking. 
This is undoubtedly true of earlier, less sophisticated, work, but, 
in general, recent experimenters have considered these aspects in more 
detail. Secondly, Rolfe notes that there have been few attempts to 
"validate the technique and its findings outside the laboratory". T 
would agree that in cases where the secondary task "acts as a substitute 
for the additional load encountered or anticipated in the actual 
situation" (p. 145), there is a need for "followi-up trials to check that 
the laboratory results are correct". However, this criticism seems 
inappropriate to the many recent expieriments investigating mental 
operations.
Rolfe*s third 'xxint is that in most subsidiary measuring task 
experiments the subsidiary task does seriously interfere wdth the 
primary task. Interference may be structural, or caused simply by the 
stress of introducing a second task. A similar point is raised by 
Brown (1973), following experimental work by Neisser and Becklen (1975). 
Brown states that "work-load may be largely a function of the 
characteristics of a task, rather than of the informational load imposed 
by its component parts" (p.222). The inherent structure of tasks 
"does not permit a reliable sharing of attention betwreen inputs". This 
can be regarded as a form of structural interference. In general, 
then, most critics agree that some non-trivial form of interference in 
a subsidiary task ejç>eriment is unavoidable. Does this invalidate 
the subsidiary task method?
I would argue that it does not, although often it must weaken 
experimental conclusions. For some purposes subsidiary tasks would
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still seem to be appropriate. For example, if the loads of two 
similar tasks are to be compared, careful construction of experiments 
permits subsidiary measuring tasks to be used with a reasonable 
degree of confidence in their validity.
Some work in recent years has suggested that the capacity model 
may require some further sophistication. Stager and Laabs (1977), 
in work concerned with performance on three simultaneous tasks, 
obtained results which led them to doubt the validity of reserve 
capacity as a direct indicator of processing load. There is not yet 
sufficient evidence, however, to recommend discarding all secondary 
task tecliniriues on these grounds. It would, on the other hand, be 
extremely unwise to regard the tecliniques as proven beyond all 
reasonable doubt, or to approach each application with anything other 
than a critical frame of mind.
5.3 Extension of Secondary Task Ajj plication
In looking at the overall picture of secondary task e^q^eriments, 
it becomes apparent that all the primary tasks that have been studied 
can be categorised as tasks in which, to a large extent, response models 
appropriate to the task decisions are already available to the subject. 
In other words, given a set of input stimuli, the subject already 
possesses the essentials of a suitable response because he already 
possesses a mental model of the task which can generate such a response. 
To identify the response he need only consult the model. Little, if 
aiy, model construction or development is involved in the task process.
This survey has considered some experiments in which, clearly, 
some development of mental models as time progressed must have occurred.
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Any experiment which displays a learning effect is an instance of this. 
Automatisation such as that reported by Bahrick and Shelley (1953) 
indicates that the mental models of their subjects w^ ere becoming more 
efficient as the redundancy in the task stimuli were incorporated in 
them. In general, too, it seems likely that the operation of a model 
becomes more efficient with continued, use; its structure becomes more 
fixed and. its manipulation more well-learnt. As the efficiency increases, 
less processing capacity is required - for reasonably simple tasks, 
therefore, performance can be seen to become almost entirely automatic.
Yet although gradual model development over repeated trials 
a primary task can often be detected, no primary tasks have been 
investigated in which the construction of a model is inherent in 
each individual trial. Sucli tasks would be problem-solving tasks, 
where, due to the complexity of the problems, straightforward mental 
models which provided ajq^ropriate immediate responses to inputs could 
not be available to the subject. ,-\n example of such a problem-solving 
task which might be investigated experimentally would be the planning 
of a move in a coiqxlex game such as chess or, indeed, the Organisational 
Control Game described in earlier chapters. The player would presumably 
be familiar with the rules of the game, but a solution would not 
• involve simple reference to a prepared model. Rather, the situation 
would have to be assimilated from "first principles", and a model 
appropriate to that particular situation constructed. The investigation 
of such a problem-solving task by a secondary task teclmic.jue, in 
particular a subsidiary measuring task technique; might give 
valuable insight into the processing load presented to a subject by 
the task.
Many decision-making or problem-solving processes can be regarded
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as aggregates of simple mental processes, just as simple operations 
in a computer program can be combined to solve extremely complex 
problems, but this kind of reductionist aj^proach to assessing 
processing load does not seem fruitful. If we were interested in 
assessing the processing load the problems might present to a 
non-intelligent machine this would undoubtedly be the way to proceed. 
In complex problems, though, it is doubtful that a person behaves as 
a machine; data and information may be missed, ignored, or treated 
preferentially; short cuts may be identified and taken; innovation 
and risk may be employed to a greater or lesser extent. An analysis 
of comjxonent operations would be unlikely to provide more than a 
rough approximation of the processing load imposed by the problem.
A subsidiary task e^qoeriment, by measuring the reserve capacity of 
the individual throughout the problem solving process, has far 
greater potential for assessing the processing load.
■ IVhat type of subsidiary measuring task would be most suitable 
fox such a purpose? A problem-solving primary task would be carried 
out over a period of minutes rat lier than seconds, and it seems that a 
secondary task of a similar, continuous, nature might be most useful. 
In particular, it might be desirable to avoid the sort of task which 
requires nothing other than an almost immediate response to a stimulus. 
For such a task, a suitable strategy could be to switch from primary 
to secondary when the stimulus occurs, and swdtch back to the primary 
after the response has been.made. The effect of this serial strategy 
on the performance of the primary task would probably be detrimental. 
The secondary task would be dependent on two decisions by the subject: 
a deci sion about whether to switch from the primary to the secondary 
task and a decision about the time to be spent on the secondary task 
before returning to tlie primary.
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For this reason J would prefer a subsidiary task which is in 
some sense continuous, so that parallel, processing is necessary if 
both tasks are to be attempted. 'it is likely that, when secondary 
task responses are re<]uired, the sane type of decisions as for the 
serial case will be involved, but the <|uality of responses should be 
related to the anount o'" reserve capacity available for parallel 
processing o^ the secondary, task over the duration o^ the primary task 
interval.
It seems possible that a task which involves a high degree of 
memory rehearsal (carrying information from a previous stimulus to 
a subsecjuent one) is likely to encourage parallel processing, and 
thus tasks which are predominantly memory tasks involving minimal 
motor or transformation processing (which would encourage a serial 
strategy) arc se.?n as being suited to investigation o'" lengthy 
probleri]-solving tasks. Such a task has been used by Poulton (1958): 
messages involving numbers are presented auditorily every five 
seconds, and after ten messages, subjects were asked which number had 
been mentioned most frequently. This task recpiires continuous storage 
of information, and we might ex^ject the quality of storage to 
deteriorate wdth a reduction o'" reserve capacity. The low response 
rate (ance a minute) decreases task switching, but also decreases the 
amount o^ data available for statistical analysis. Zeitlin and 
Finkelman (1975), with their delayed digit recall task, in which 
subjects had to recall the digit before last in a sequence of random 
digits presented every two seconds, have avoided this problem at the 
exqxense of comparatively short (four second) recall intervals.
Other approaches to the problem of finding a continuous subsidiary 
task are possible. The interval production test successfully used by
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ni chon (1966) as a subsidiary measuring task seems worth consideration, 
if as seems indicated there is a relationship between the results of 
the test and processing load (discussed by Vroon & Vroon, 1973).
Sorting unseen nuts and bolts, used by Dimond and Beaumont (1971), 
also can be regarded as continuous under certain circumstances.
Zeitlin and Finkelman (1975) have noted that the '* integrative nature" 
of random digit generation which tends to be insensitive to "moments 
o'" difficulty, averaging them over the entire duration of the digit 
sequences" (p.'’90) may be of particular use "in evaluating the effect 
of general loading conditions or steady-state environmental stressors". 
The integrative nature of tlie task may make it useful as a means of 
assessing long-term problem-solving load.
It seems that with careful choice of tasks, the use of secondary 
task techniques to measure the load associated with complex problems 
is a distinct possibility. In the next chapter, 1 describe in 
detail an e>q)eriment, conducted at Royal Holloway Collt3ge, in which a 
subsidiary measuring task was used successfully to compare the load 
irqjosed by a number of problem-solving primary tasks.
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6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I concluded that a secondary task 
experiment might well be a suitable means of measuring the mental 
processing load associated with a complex problem-solving task. .An 
exjjerimental technique oF this type could be of value in the practice 
of Operational Research. Situations are often found in Operational 
Research in which it would be useful to have some objective measure of 
the complexity of a problem facing a decision-maker.
It seems reasonable to define a decision-making load to be the 
mental processing load associated with a complex decision problem. 
Different problems might be expected to present different decision­
making loads to a decision-maker, and it would be of interest to knowr 
how decision-making load varies according to the precise features of 
the problem. In particular, it might be useful to be able to identify 
those problems which present decision-makers with particularly high 
decision-making loads. In the case of large-scale decision-making 
systems, this would allow the decision points at which satisfactory 
decision-making is likely to break down to be located. These points 
are not necessarily easily identifiable, either by inspection or by 
theoretical analysis of the systems.
An objective method of assessing problem complexity might be 
extremely valuable in a variety of areas. In problems of medical 
diagnosis, for example, where diagnoses based on a limited quantity 
of data are often required in a short time, an objective technique
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would permit investigation of the way in which ease of diagnosis 
varies according to the tjuantity and quality of the data, its nature, 
and the way in which it is presented. Similar considerations apply 
to military decision-making in battle, where once again time is 
likely to be a severe constraint- i\hat types of decision tend to 
overload military decision-makers, causing their decision-making to 
deteriorate? Identification of the critical features of decisions 
might indicate guidelines for the design of suitable decision rules 
and decision-making systems which would avoid, to some extent, the 
worst effects of unexpected overload.
A technique for assessing problem complexity would also have 
potential application in operational and experimental gaming such as 
that described elsewhere in this thesis. Indeed, as noted in the 
previous cha^ -jter, our interest in the measurement of problem complexity 
arose early in the course of our gaming \Aork, when we began to sedc 
a means of measuring and com^Daring the decision-making loads that 
would be imposed by different scenarios in the Organisational Control 
Game. Subsequently, as will be explained in Cha[)ters 7 and 8, the 
direction of the gaming work changed and this particular aspect was no 
longer of immediate interest to us. However, our general interest in 
the field of assessing problem complexity remained, and the work 
described in this chapter is the result.
This chapter describes and discusses a secondary task experiment 
which we conducted at Royal Holloway College. The aim of the 
experiment was to evaluate the jxjtential of a secondary task technique 
as a means of assessing problem complexity. As will be seen, the 
results are encouraging. , They have already been reported in the O.R. 
literature (Klein & Cooper, 1981).
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In the following section, I shall briefly recount relevant 
features of secondary task methods encountered in the previous 
chapter. This is followed by a consideration of the nature of complex 
decision problems, explaining the thinking behind our choice of 
decision problem. 3 then describe in detail the experiment and its 
results, before finally discussing the work and our conclusions.
6.2 The Secondary Task Technicfue
As we have seen in Chapter 5, the secondary task is based on a 
model of mental processing as taking place within a system of limited 
capacity. According to the model, any mental load lower than the 
capacity of the system will undergo satisfactory processing and errors 
due to overload will not occur. However, if capacity is exceeded, then 
overload occurs, and mental processing consequently deteriorates; 
additional errors in performance will occur in this case.
The Subsidiary Measuring Task Technique
For the y>resent purposes, the subsidiary measuring task technique 
is considered to be more suitable than the loading task technique. 
Essentially this is because the effect that is actually measured in a 
loading task exj^eriment is the degree of detioration in performance 
of the primary task itself. Most complex problem-solving tasks do 
not lend themselves obviously to an ordinal scale.of performance 
measurement. It is often impossible to state whether a given solution 
is "right" or "wTong", let alone whether one solution is better than 
another. In Broun*>s terms (Broun, 1964) we are not interested so much 
in the effectiveness of problem resolution - effectiveness may be 
impossible to define appropriately - but rather with the efficiency 
with which the process of problem resolution is carried out.
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v.’e shall briefly recapitulate the principles of the subsidiary 
measuring task technique. Consider tuo tasks, the loads of which are 
to be com^jared (Figure 6.1a). 3f neither task individually overloads 
the system, they will both be carried out properly, and no direct 
measure Qf load will be jXDSsible. We now add a secondary task of 
constant difficulty, which the subject is asked to perform at the 
same time as the main task (Figure 6.1b). This task is such that 
the combined loads of main and secondary tasks together exceed the 
capacity of the system. Mow overload does occur, and processing errors 
are observed.
Subjects are asked always to give priority to the main, primary, 
task, so that this task is not affected by overload. The deterioration 
of performances is directed to the secondary taslc. The greater the 
deterioration of the secondary task, the greater must be the mental 
processing load presented by the main task.
In the last chapter it was established that the most suitable 
types of secondary task for the present application would have a strong 
"continuous" element - that is, they would necessitate a significant 
degree of processing in parallel to the primary task, rather than 
intermittent switching from primary to secondary and back again. At 
the same time, a high number of secondary task responses is desirable, 
in order to maximise the quantity of data available for statistical 
analysis.
6.3 The Nature of Complex Decision Problems
The nature of the complex decision problems in which Operational 
Research scientists are likely to be interested differ in important
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Figure 6.1. (a) The loads due to ti\o primary tasks, neither of which
overload the processing system. (b) The loads of the primary tasks, 
combined v»dth a secondary task o^ constant load.
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ways -^roïïi the types o'" task that have been investigated by psychologists 
using secondary task technirjues. In virtually all the studies reported 
in the psychological literature, the primary tasks can be categorised 
as short-term tasks in which complete or nearly complete solution 
models for decisions are already available to the subject (Figure 6.Fa). 
In other uords, for a given set of input stimuli, the subject already 
possesses the essentials of a suitable response. The response is 
implicit in his model. After perceiving the input stimuli, the 
subject consults his mental model of the situation, which he already 
has mentally available, and he generates the appropriate response.
This process rarely takes more t h ^  a matter of seconds.
The types of mental process of interest here are different. Being 
those necessary to solve complicated problems, they are generally far 
more complex, and possibly less easily formulated. Straightforward 
solution methods will not be immediately available. A different process 
talc es place to solve the problem (figure 6.2b). Following the 
perception of the input stimuli, the subject haÉ to construct a model 
of the situation. Only then can he use this model to generate a 
response. The important point is that the subject must construct his 
model as an integral part of the complex decision process. Ry 
constructing the model he is teaching himself how to solve the problem.
Jn this type o^ problem, there is unlikely to be a unic(ue "best” 
solution. indeed, it is often impossible to compare the quality of 
different solutions. Correctness may depend to a greater or lesser 
extent on subjective factors as well as on objective factors. In 
general, as already pointed out, solutions to complex decision problems 
can rarely be considered as "right" or "urong", and the quality of the 
decision cannot be used as a guide to the load imposed by the problem, 
or its difficulty.
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Figure 6.2. Solution processes for (a) simple and (b) complex problems.
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]t may be appropriate at this stage to mention a '’resources’* 
model of the decision-maker (Sharp & Dando, 1979). This model is, 
quite explicitly, a model o^ a decision-maker as a ’limited caj[>acity 
information processor'' (p. '^ S?) and resources are defined ('’metaphorically'’) 
as the integral o*^  capacity over time. Sharp and Dan do suggest that 
resource use for a problem is proportional both to the complexity of 
approach to the problem and to the creativity required by the approach.
This resource use is, of course, the mental processing load imposed by 
the problem over time, and, similarly, it can be seen that a subsidiary 
measuring task experiment will be using ''spare resources’’ in order to 
measure this load.
6.4 A. Secondary Task n:x;)er iment
in this section 1 describe a subsidiary measuring task experiment 
to evaluate the application of the technique to the measurement of the 
mental processing load associated with complex problems. This 
description is somewhat more detailed than that which has already 
appeared in the literature (Klein & Cooper, 1931).
The 'Primary Task
A set of chess problems were used as the primary task. In 
comparison to many complex decision problems, a chess problem will 
clearly have a far more well-defined and formal structure. Nevertheless, 
provided the problems are of an appropriate level of difficulty, the 
solution process would seem to be of the type illustrated in figure 6.2b. 
The chess-playing subject has a thorough grasp of the fundamentals of 
the game - that is, the 'rules, and certain other relatively simple 
concepts. However, these, in themselves, are insufficient to solve
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the problems. '^ or each problem, the situation on the chess board 
must be combined with the fundamentals to produce a model which is 
sufficiently sophisticated to generate a viable solution. Tn the 
case of chess, or in any complex decision environment, the construction 
and manipulation of an appropriate model is the main component of 
the problem-solving task, and is decidedlynon-1rivial. The outcome 
which the model generates is bound to be dependent on the way in which 
the model is put together.
We had originally intended to use chess problems of the classic 
’’Meredith’’ form: ’’white to play, and mate in tvio moves", the subjects 
being asked to identify just the next move that white should make to 
proceed towards that mate. A collection of problems was selected from 
a published compilation (Barnes, 1976). It rapidly became clear, 
however, that these problems were very much beyond the ability of 
the subjects we were able to find (and also beyond the ability of the 
experimenters). effectively the problems were all equally impossible: 
subjects would not even know how to go about constructing appropriate 
Solution models. Jt was pointed out to us that as well as being 
difficult problems, this particular type of problem required skills 
not necessarily identical to those that might be developed by a player 
interested only in normal chess playing.
Accordingly, we devised our oun chess problems. Tvno of these 
are reproduced here (figures 6.3 and 6.4) in a similar form to the way 
in which they were presented to the subjects. Subjects were asked to 
select the move they would make next in order to wdn as quickly as 
possible, or, where appropriate, they were told that a mate in one 
move or. two moves w'as possible, and asked to find it. To an expert 
chess player, most of the problems .would be trivial. In many cases, 
they involved nothing more than identification of an immediate
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Figure 6.3. Chess problem 6 in the experimental set. Abite to 
move, playing up the board. K to E4 gives a mate.
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Figure 6.4. Chess problem 12 in the experimental set. White to 
move, playing up the board. N to R5 is the first move in a mate-in-two,
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check-mate move, /\]i e>q,)ert player would be expected to have already 
available, stored as "’fundamentals', models immediately a^jplicable to 
these problems. Our subjects did not, as the results will show.
The subjects were six undergraduate students at Royal Holloivay 
College. They were presented with a series of fourteen chess problems 
(Klein & Cooper, 1979) on separate sheets of paper in a predetermined 
order. Subjects were allowed two minutes to atterq)t each problem.
At the end of each two minutes they were asked to write down their 
solution before proceeding to the next problem. The first five 
problems were ''learning' problems, to familiarise subjects with the 
experimental format; only the results from the final nine problems 
were analysed.
The Secondary Task
The secondary task w'as a mental addition task involving short-term 
memory. A tape-recording of a female voice reciting a list of pseudo­
random digits, from two to nine, had been prepared for playback during 
an experimental run. The digits were read out at five-second intervals. 
Subjects were asked to call out the sum of each pair of digits, ^or 
example, if the first two digits were ''two" and "'seven", the correct 
resjXDnse would have been "nine"’, and if the next digit was "three’", 
the next response ought to have been "'ten'.
The task requires that the digit prior to the last response be 
retained. The most common error subjects make is to add the latest 
digit to their own previous response, rather than the digit heard 
prior to it. Thus the tasl< requires some conscious use of memory 
to be performed correctly. This, I believe, gives it a "continuous"
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characteristic which T have already identified as being desirable. At 
the same time, a response rate of once every five seconds gives a 
high amount of data for analysis.
In addition to the digits, also recorded on the tape was a male 
voice giving all instructions necessary for the running of the 
experiment, such as instructions to write down an answer to a problem, 
or to start the next problem. Thus an experimental run was controlled 
entirely by the tape-recording, although an exqjerimentor w^ as always 
present to supervise the procedure.
An experimental run proceeded in the following manner. To begin 
with, the first chess problem was presented to the subjects without 
any digits. Then .a two minute session of the arithmetic task alone 
w'as presented, f^ or the second problem, the digits were available, 
but no arithmetic was required, ’^or the rest of the problems, subjects 
were asked to perform the mental arithmetic while considering the 
problems. At the end of the experiment subjects were once again 
asked to perform tiAO minutes of the arithmetic task alone. The 
number of mistakes and omissions in the arithmetic task was noted, 
and a total error score for each t\:o minute sequence of digits was 
obtained.
Results
The problems were ranked for each of the six subjects according 
to the number of errors occurring in the concurrent mental arithmetic. 
Assuming that the fewer errors that are made in the secondary task, 
then the less complex is the associated main problem, this gives a 
rank ordering of problem complexity for each subject. Agreement
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between the rankings for individual subjects was found to be
2
significant at the level (Kendall concordance test, = 19*7, 
K -  8, p < O'O", Kendall, 1975). This indicates that the secondary 
task-technique is measuring a property of the problems which is 
consistent from subject to subject.
The individual error rates were combined to produce a total 
ranking of the j)roblems in order of increasing complexity. This 
ranking is shoiA-n in Table 6.la. To produce this ranking, a subject's 
error rate for a given problem was expressed as the proportion of errors 
during that problem to his total errors over all the jjroblems of 
interest. These proportions were then summed, for each problem, over 
all subjects. This procedure ensures that the proportional contribution 
from each subject to the overall result is the same.
As noted above, the individual rank orderings, showing a high 
degree of concordance, clearly indicate that the orderings correspond 
to a meaningful property of the problems. It has been assumed that 
this property is the complexity, or difficulty, of the problems. This 
seems a reasonable assumption, but undoubtedly an independent test of 
the meaning of the orderings would be desirable. In the case of these 
chess problems, such a test is possible. Most of the chess problems 
have one solution which is very clearly better than all other possible 
solutions (note that this property is not typical of complex problems 
in general, though I do not believe that this weakens the arguments 
presented here to any significant extent). In all, sixteen subjects 
have attempted the chess problems (as well as the six involved in this 
ex^Deriment, ten other subjects attempted the problems in the course of 
an experiment which will be briefly mentioned later). It seems 
reasonable to suggest that those problems which are correctly solved
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Rank 1 ■ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(a) by secondary task 14 9 10 8 (6 13) 11 7 12
(b) by solution rate 14 13 (8 10) 9 6 11 12 7
Table 6.1. Problems ranked in order of increasing difficulty. idroblaii 
numbers in parentheses are of equal rank. ■
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most often are the simplest, and present the least processing load, 
while those which are seldom solved are the most difficult, and 
present the greatest load.
The problems are ranked according to the number of times the 
correct solution was given in Table 6.1b. This ranking is significantly 
similar at the 5% level to the secondary task ordering (Kendall's 
X = O'63, p < O'05, Kendall, 1975). Problem 14 was solved more often 
than any other problem, and the arithmetic task indicates that the load 
it presents is less than that presented by any other problem. At the 
other end of the scale, problems 7, 1? and 11 were solved least often, 
and they seemed to be the problems which presented the greatest load 
to the subjects. The five problems in the centre of the scales, 
however, display little apparent agreement in ranking.
Figure 6.5 gives some suggestion of why this might be so. Each 
point on the graph represents a problem. The scale on the horizontal 
axis represents' the number of times (out of a possible maximum of 
sixteen) that each problem was incorrectly answered. The scale on 
the vertical axis is the aritlmetic task error proportion for each 
problem, summed for all subjects. In other words, the scales are 
the interval equivalents of the ordinal rankings of Table 6.1.
At the bottom left hand corner of the graph is problem 14, 
often solved, and with a low processing load. At the top right are 
problems 7, 11 and 17, seldom solved, and with a high load. The 
central group consists of the other five problems. These problems 
cluster together on both scales. For these problems, the solution 
rates are all relatively similar, and so are the arithmetic error 
scores. This indicates that the tvio rankings of these problems showr
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Figure 6.3. Total proportional secondary task error rate plotted 
against the number of incorrect answers, for problems 6 to 14.
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agreement because the problems are of relatively similar complexity.
Neither ranking method can differentiate between these problems. This 
effect may also account for the difference between the ti^ o rankings 
of the ’’high load, seldom solved" problems (problems 7, 11 and 11).
6.5 Qonclusions and Pi scussion
The significant agreanent in ranking of the problems by secondary 
task error rate and by solution rate clearly indicates that this type 
of mental arithmetic secondary task is suitable for measuring problem 
C0mple:d.ty as intended. This contusion is pictorially reinforced by 
the graph in figure 6.5, in which the points lie within a well-defined 
band running from bottom left to top right, as uould be expected if 
the secondary task is measuring the load associated with the problem.
I therefore believe that secondary task techniques of the type presented 
here can be applied in the general area of assessment of problem 
complexity.
I think it is worth pointing out explicitly that at present all 
measurements of the complexity or difficulty that a problem or task 
presents to a subject must be of an ordinal type. That is, it is 
cpiite meaningful to order tasks according to difficulty, but one would 
be treading on dangerous ground if one were to try to make comparisons 
of task difficulties according to some kind of interval scale. At 
present there is no interval scale of difficulty or mental processing 
load. Work such as that described in this and the previous chapter 
may ultimately lead to the setting up of one, but little of the 
literature reviewed in the previous chapter is concerned with this 
issue, and none considers it to be critical for immediate purposes.
Ordinal comparisons suffice for the time being. It is plain to see^ that to
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attempt to set up an interval scale of problem difficulty immediately 
raises questions as to what, precisely, is meant by problem difficulty. 
Does it, indeed, have any more than an ordinal meaning? If it does,
1 suspect that it would best be interpreted in terms of processing 
load in a limited capacity model. But at the moment this is of little 
practical assistance since, as far as secondary task techniques are 
concerned, it is neither certain nor assumed that there is a precise 
quantitative relationship between the performance variable being 
measured and the primary task processing loads. The secondary task 
measuring techniques must thus remain ordinal in nature.
^or this reason, I have confined statistical measurements in 
this chapter to ranking tests. Similarly, the graph in figure 6.5 
should not be interpreted as anything other than a comparison of the 
data on which two rankings were based. It was invoked to illustrate 
the clustering of certain points on both scales, indicating that a 
ranking of these points alone by either method is unlikely to be 
meaningful. In this sense, the corresponding problems may be said 
to bé "relatively similar" in complexity. It would be unwise to draw 
any further conclusions concerning magnitudes of differences between 
the complexities of the problems on the basis of the graph. It should 
be regarded only as an illustration of the significant concordance of 
rankings.
Improvements in Sensitivity
In future work of this type, steps might be taken to make the 
secondary arithmetic task more sensitive. It is felt that some such 
modifications are possible. In the experiment I have described, a 
maximum of twenty-three responses to the secondary task could be made
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by a subject in the course of a two-minute problem. A subject rarely 
maJ<es more than ten errors, however, and the average is considerably 
less. This leads to ties in the ranking of a subject’s arithmetic 
task score, and indicates that the method may lack sensitivity. T 
suggest that by increasing the digit presentation rate from one every 
five seconds to one every four (or perhaps even three) seconds the 
sensitivity would be increased because the task would be more difficult, 
and because the maximum number of possible responses wmmld be greater. 
These factors would lead to increased total error rates and a greater 
spread of errors. Similar effects might also be produced by use of a 
different, more difficult, type of arithmetic task.
With such improvements, the sensitivity of the secondary task 
experiment I have described might be improved to a degree at which 
the resolution of the technique would be great enough to separate 
significantly the complexity of problems such as those that appear in 
the central group of figure 6.5. Ilowever, it may be that an arithmetic 
(or similar) tas!< wdll ultimately prove not to be the most suitable 
type of secondary task.
The most worrying aspect of the arithmetic secondary task 
techniipie is the lack of control over the time-sharing strategy of 
the subjects. Although subjects are instructed to giVe priority to 
the primary task, it is impossible to ensure that they do this, even 
with their full cooperation. A subject presented with a particularly 
difficult problem, for example, may simply give up and turn to the 
arithmetic task instead, consequently obtaining a misleadingly 
high score on the arithmetic. For reasons of this nature, w% looked 
briefly at the use of a secondary task which had a far smaller 
overtly cognitive aspect than the ar'ithmeti'c- task.
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>\ mpot-Tapping Secondary Task
Subjects were asked to tap a foot pedal at a constant rate, while 
concentrating on the primary task. Such a secondary task is an example 
of an interval production test. It has been found (for example, Michon, 
1966 and Vroon & Vroon, 1973) that both the regularity of interval 
production and mean interval production rate have corresponded 
significantly to the independently assessed complexity of primary 
tasks in such interval production tests. Such a secondary task would 
eliminate to a large extent the probi eus of time-sharing decisions: 
the w^ ay in which foot tapping is regulated seems relatively independent 
Qf other thought processes.
Seven subjects attempted the same sequence of chess problems as 
used fpr the experiment already described but using foot tapping as the . 
secondary task. A further three subjects were presented with tJie series 
wdth problems 7 to 14 in reverse order. As before, only problems 6 to 14 
were considered in analysis. To detect possible fatigue effects, the 
subjects were required to carry out the tap^o'ng task without any chess 
problem at the beginning and end of an oqierimental run. It was suggested 
that subjects tap one of their feet (whichever they preferred) at a rate 
of about one tap every 1.5 seconds. The actual rates varied 
considerably from subject to subject. As in the arithmetic task 
e>qaeriment, two minutes were allowed for each problem.
The tapping was recorded using a foot pedal connected to a 
microprocessor-based data collection system (described fully by Storr 
et al, 1979), which stored data on cassette tape for future analysis.
For each subject, the ta^^ping associated with each problem w^ as scored 
according to several parameters: mean tapping rate; deviation from the
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mean; and various running mean measurements to show up any gradual 
consistent changes. Thus toth tapping rate and regularity were 
considered in the analysis. Banlcings of problems for each subject 
were produced for all measures.
None of the rankings showed significant concordance over all 
subjects. The experiment did not indicate that a foot tapping interval 
production test w^ as likely to be useful in assessment of task complexity. 
It is quite possible that an interval production test is not a 
suitable type of secondary task to assess the load due to complex 
problems. The problem may be that the primary and secondary tasks 
do not in this case coiq^ete sufficiently for processing capacity, or 
it may be that the technique is simply not sensitive enough. The 
problem is unlikely to lie with the measuring equipment, which was 
extremely accurate.
I would be reluctant, however, on the basis of this one 
experiment, to discard all interval production test teclinicjues as 
secondary tasks for assessing problem complexity. The interaction of 
a primary task with an interval production test is in general less 
well understood than with other secondary tasks, and it seems possible 
that an e>periment constructed after more lengthy consideration of 
the.theoretical aspects might show a positive result. Certainly, the 
advantages that an interval production test appears to offer make some 
further effort in this area worthwhile.
Concluding Remark
The arithmetic secondary task experiment that has been presented 
in this chapter indicates that secondary task techniques can be used
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to measure the complexity Qf "difficult" problems for which no 
obvious solution is available. The chess problems with which this 
work has been concerned are similar in important ways to the complex 
decision problems with which decision-makers are likely to be faced, 
and which arise frequently in the practice of Operational Research.
I firmly believe that the method has potential for extension to 
"real" decision problems, the precise nature of which may be difficult 
to define, and where unique "best" solutions do not exist. The 
secondary task method can provide a new technicpie for Operational 
Research scientists to use in the investigation of a variety of 
complex decision-making tasks.
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CHAPTER 7
■ TENGE t'-HTH THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL GAME
7.1 Introduction
This chapter, and that following, is concerned with describing 
and discussing the research carried out in our programme using the 
Organisational Gontrol Game. ]t will be recalled from Chapter 4 that 
in total three series of games were played. These were:
I. The ’’Student - games, in which the players were 
students at Royal Holloway College.
II. The himergency Planning Officer’ games, in which 
the players wrere Emergency Planning Officers from 
various counties.
III. The "Major" games, in which the players were
serving army officers, all with the rank of major 
at the time of play.
The primary aim of the first series of games, played with students, 
was to test the Superior Commander system and the Organisational Control 
Game. This testing has already been covered in Chapters 3 and 4, and 
I shall not refer to the "Student" series in this chapter except to 
compare it with later games. This chapter will consider the research 
output of the second and third series of games. I begin by describing 
and discussing the "Emergency Planning Officer" games, which were 
intended partially as development games, but were also envisaged as 
providing some research output.
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7.? Games Played with n^ergency Planning Officers
The players in the 'himergency Planning Officer’’ series games 
were eight retired military officers, all of whom held senior positions 
in United Kingdom local government at the time of play. All these senior 
positions were to do with local government emergency planning: indeed, the 
majority players were County Emergency Planning Officers. Thus, the 
players all l^ ad had previous military experience, and were, at the time 
o^ play, professional decision-makers. We could expect, therefore, to 
learn more from their comments than we could from the students who had 
played previously. As a result, we would gain more confidence about the 
realism o^ the military scenarios and of the decision-making environment.
experimental Procedure
T/'O players were invited each week to Royal ilolloway College to 
play the Organisational Control Game. One player played Scenario 1 and 
the other Scenario 7. They were briefed and debriefed together, and 
played as if they were two separate Divisional Commanders within the 
same army. During.play there was no contact between them. In total, 
four players played Scenario 1, and a different '^ our players played 
Scenario P. A research phase was run at three stages in each game 
(in rounds 1, 3 and 5) in which each player was asked to list the 
decision options he saw open to himself and to the enemy.
On no occasion did a player e>qjress disbelief about the reports he 
received from his Task ^orce Cbmmamders, or suggest in any way that it 
seemed automatic and not a response to his suggestion or directives.
We were able to conclude, therefore, that the Superior Gammander deception 
can be made to work not only with students but also with e>qDerienced 
professionals.
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A Counter Replacement Test
f'or some of the players an additional experiment was devised.
At the end of rounds 4 and 6, four of the players (two playing 
each scenario) had the counters representing all the units removed 
from the ma^ j board and they were asked to replace them as accurately 
as they could remember. Notice was given in the briefing of this 
subsidiary experiment though neither the exact timing nor its 
purpose was specified. The first replacement was designed as a 
control, to allow for learning, and the other '.two as measures of 
^)erformance. The purpose was to attempt to measure player
involvement in the game by investigating whether errors in replacement
or the change in error with time varied from one part of the map to 
another. In particular, counters that were a more prominent 
feature of the game might be replaced more accurately than others 
not so heavily involved.
For each group of counters (representing a Task Force or combat 
unit of similar size) the distance in hexes between the true position 
and the player * s estimate of it was measured for each counter. 
Individual counters within a group were not distinguished; errors w^ ere
recorded so as to minimise the error sum of squares in the group.
In Scenario 1 the two players tested taken together made a 
significant improvement in their overall accuracy between rounds 2 
and 4 and between rounds 2 and 6 (significant at the 5% level,
Wilcoxon Test, in Siegel, 1956). The players replaced the counters 
representing one of the friendly units significantly less w^ ell than 
those of the other friendly units, using the same test and criteria 
as above. This unit was moving independently to engage with the enemy
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later, while the others were heavily involved in battle. Similarly, 
with the enemy forces, a unit which was moving to a supporting 
position was less accurately replaced than enemy units which were 
heavily engaged in battle.
No such relationships could be found for Scenario 1, however.
There could be a number of ex^ :)lanations for this, the most plausible 
perhaps being that in this case even the units engaged in battle 
move a substantial distance each round. The red units not in contact 
are quite close to those that are, which could be confusing to the 
players. Further, there are no specific named geographical features 
associated with each part of the battle. However, in Scenario 2, two 
units get locked together in battle in the small area of Harris Hill 
and a further two fight it out in Olivier. These two features 
obviously aid accurate replacement.
The results of this test indicate that specific scenario effects 
wfere more important than intrinsic player aptitude in the counter 
replacement task, and the test serves to highlight these scenario 
differences. We did not continue with these tests as they were clearly 
very likely to interfere wdth the smooth running of the game, and our 
main aim was to extract data concerning the perception of decision 
options. Further details of the counter replacement test may be found 
in our second progress report (McDowell et al, 1979a).
Perception of Options
£ach player was asked to list the decision options he saw open 
to himself and to the enemy in a research phase at the ends of rounds 
1, 3 and 5. The number of listed options are shown in Table 7.1 for
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;1 ayer Scenario Round
1 3 )
B R F R B R
1 1 2 3 4 2 3 2
2 I 2 3 1 2 1 2
3 1, 5 . 4 2 3 3 3
4 1 2 3 1 1 1 1
5 2 2 1 2 2 4 3
6 2 6 4 5 2 5 2
7 2 2 3 3 2 6 4
3 2 3 3 5 2 4 3
Table 7,1, '^layer’s perceptions of number of options open to 
Blue (B) and Red (R) forces.
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friendly Blue forces (B) and enemy Red forces (R). A form w'as 
used which had numbered spaces provided and the figures quoted are 
the number of separate spaces filled in. Seme players tended to list 
alternatives as a single option and others listed as separate options 
what were in fact minor variations of a single one. îbwever, these 
• effects can be taken into account by the method of analysis described 
belowf, assuming players were consistent throughout a game.
At first it is difficult to see any trend in the results at all. 
Consider, however, whether a player sees more options open to himself 
than the enemy or vice versa. Taking each round in turn, the ratio 
of Blue to Red options may be assigned a positive grade (f, where 
B>R), a neutral grade (O, where B - R), and a negative grade 
(-, where R<R). These grades are shown in Table 7.?. Using values 
o-f +1, O, and -1 for the three types of grade, the grades are summed. 
Then the players can be ranked from 1 to 8, assigning the value 1 
for the most positive set o^ ratios. In Table 7.7 the ranks for 
each player are shown, mid-ranks being used for equal scores. Using 
the Wilcoxon Test (Siegel, 1956) the ranks show a significant 
difference betw^een the two scenarios at the 5/n level, indicating that 
in Scenario 1, the Defence, players see less options open to themselves 
compared to the enemy than in Scenario 7, the Advance-to-Contact. This 
confirms w^ hat might be expected: in the Defence, players would tend to 
perceive the enemy as having the initiative, whereas in the Advance- 
to-Contact, players would tend to perceive the friendly forces as 
having quite a high degree of initiative.
Considering changes in perceptions of options perceived during 
the game, the ratio of options seen for Blue forces for Period 3/period 
1, for Periods 5/,Period 3, and for Period 5/Period 1, were graded
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Player Scenario Period Rank
1 3 5
1 1 - ■h 4»5
2 1 - - - 3
3. 1 •r - 0 6
4 1 - 0 0 7
5 2 0 2*5
6 2 + 1 .
7 2 - -h 4.5
2 0 +- 2.5
Table 7.2. Ratio Blue to Red options (+, where B>R; O, where 
E - R; -, where B<R), and ranks of players by these ratios.
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as above. This was also done for the Red options, and the results 
are sWwn, together with their ran)<ings, in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. Foi" 
the friendly options differences between scenarios would only be 
significant by the Wilcoxon Test if we took 15% as the criterion, 
and for the enemy options 7%,instead of the usual 5%. 1 do not
feel that this demonstrates any effect conclusively.
This type of analysis, based on the counting of decision 
options, was what we had orginally envisaged as being the primary 
method of analysis of the game output. It may nowf be clear, however, 
that it was not showing itself to be the fruitful approach we had 
orginally imagined it to be. Thi s practical disappointment with our 
analysis techniques coincided with some theoretical misgivings about 
our approach which we developed during the play of this second 
series of games. I shall describe these misgivings, and the consequent 
reorientation of our approach, shortly.
First of all, however, it wall be of value to cor%:>are the general 
decision-making behaviour of our emergency planning officers, whom 
we iriay designate "e^q^eriencècTt' commanders, with the student players 
in our previous series of games, who are clearly "inexperienced" 
Commanders. Such an analysis is qualitative and subjective, but 
nevertheless important, since it indicates a direction in wiiich such 
decision-making research as ours might usefully proceed. We have 
already commented on this analysis in the O.R. literature (Cooper 
et al, 1980).
experienced and Inexperienced Commanders
The difference in the behaviour of the two groups of players can
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Player Scenario ’^ riendly Options Rank
Round 3 
Round 1
Round 5 
lîound 3
Round 5 
Round 1
1 1 ■r* + 3-5
2 1 - 0 - 7
3 1 - - 5
4 I - 0 - 7
5 0 + + 2
6 2 - 0 - 7
7 2 + + 1
3 2 - 4- 3"5
Table 7.3. .Ratios of Elue options in different rounds,
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Player Scenario Sneny Options Rank
Round 3 
Round 1
Round 5 
Round 3
Round 5 
Round 1
1 1 - 0 - 6
2 1 ■ - 0 - 6
3 1 - 0 - 6
4 1 - 0 - 6
5 2 + {- H" 1
6 2 0 - Ô
7 2 - 4- + 2
8 2 - 4- 0 3
Table 7.4. Ratios of Red options in different rounds.
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be grouped into three categories, although these categories are 
inter-related and should not be considered in isolation.
1. The officers who played the game used their previous 
experience of command. They considered factors 
wrhich they had found valuable in practice, even 
though these factors were not mentioned e>plicitly 
in the game rules or briefing. They injected 
their own ideas, assumptions and preconceptions 
into the game; to an extent they "built their own 
scenarios" using the one we had provided as a basis. 
The students, on the other hand, tended to accept 
the scenario as presented, probably due to their 
experience with commercial w^argames (in which 
game rules aire more rigid and there is less 
flexibility).
7. The officers had a more developed knowledge than 
■ the students, performing equally well on both the 
Defence scenario and the Advance-to-Cbntact. They 
were more conscious of the losses that were possible 
in each case, and they had a better grasp of the 
principles of war (although these were violated 
on occasion). The students preferred attack to 
defence, and showed little appreciation of 
possible losses. While they managed advance-to- 
contact quite well they had almost no idea about 
the way to conduct a defence^
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3. The experienced players viewed the problems 
posed by the scenarios as complex and ill- 
defined, wdth no "best" solution. In reports 
to superior and subordinate commanders in the 
game they assessed situations more fully and 
formed better strategic views of the scenarios.
In contrast, the students made rather cursory 
assessments, looking for unique "best" solutions.
They tended to see situations in uncomplicated 
terms, viewing all data as known with certainty, 
with no "fog of war". They also tended to 
regard all data as equally important, whereas the 
experienced players were more selective in their 
approach.
Both groups of players exhibited a wide range of playing styles, 
and both groups appeared very involved in the game. As commented on 
earlier, the deception inherent in the Superior Commander System, which 
wfas known to work for student players, was also achieved with the 
e>ç>erienced players; they were convinced that the game was interactive. 
As noted above, the experienced players made assumptions which 
"ejç^anded' the original scenario, perhaps to make it more lifelike; 
it is suspected that this process, together with the preconception that 
no attempt would be made to deceive senior managers w^ ho were doing the 
experimenters a favour by playing the game, is important to the success 
of the deception.
It seems clear that, altliough student players are very useful 
in the initial process of designing the general structure of a game, 
planning experiments and testing for gross breaches of validity,
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experienced players must be involved in the final detailed design 
(see also related comments by Hartley et al, 1979). After each of 
the second series of games a debriefing session was held, when the 
players themselves made valuable contributions and suggestions for 
improving the realism and level of detail of the scenarios, the 
mechanics of representing units and transmitting information, and 
metlTods for extracting research data. The conceptual abilities and 
verbal skills of the ex^^erienced players were decisive in this 
process. Thus scenario creation should be a(dynamic, interactive 
procedure, involving both the game designers and players with 
suitable background and experience, and this procedure should be a 
continuous one. Bach series of games then becomes a learning process 
for the game designers, who benefit by having their scenarios probed 
each time the game is played (see also Brewer, 1973).
A simple but nevertheless important point demonstrated by the 
games so far described is that students do not behave in the same 
way in a game environment as exq^erienced decision-makers. Therefore, 
it would be unwise to generalise game results obtained wdth student 
players to professional decision-makers. Differences in behaviour 
are both quantitative and qualitative. We expected to find 
quantitative differences in the alternative options considered and in 
the levels of skill displayed. However, we also observed important 
qualitative differences. The students approached the game differently 
From the experienced players, and exhibited a different range of 
decision-making styles. The (quantitative and qualitative differnces 
are apparent in all three of the categories identified at the beginning 
of this section.
Many behavioural studies in the Operational Research and
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management literature have used student subjects to derive conclusions 
about professional decision-making. It is clear that extreme care is 
required in making such derivations. This point had been demonstrated 
before, notably in accounting and financial contexts (see Abdel-Khalik, 
1974; .Alpert, 1967; Copeland et al, 1973; Fleming, 1969). Birnberg 
and Nath (1968) identify two ways in which student and professional 
decision-makers are likely to differ: in "common skills and exq)erience" 
and "basic personality traits" (p.40). These factors are likely to 
result in the iquantitative and qualitative differences noted above. 
Students, having considerably less experience and training in the 
decision-making environment, display less quantitative skill when 
required to work in that environment. Their different personality 
traits, including cognitive styles, values and beliefs are bound 
to have a qualitative effect on their decision making.
In general, qualitative differences in decision-making styles 
are likely to become apparent in comparisons between any distinct 
groups of individuals. This is seldom explicitly recognised in 
Operational Research, although instances where it is imq^lied can 
readily be found. Bowen (1978), for example, notes the limitations 
of having a Royal Navy Officer representing an enemy submarine 
commander (p.43). Tims, the recognition and study of different decision­
making istyXes,.. is essential to the understanding of decision-making.
7.3 A Re-examination of Research Strategy
Consideration of our first and second series of games have led 
to the explicit realisation that different types of player approach 
a decision-making environment in different ways. This may seem to be 
a rather self-evident finding. However, the difference between
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different types of player is not the whole point. Rather, as I 
tried to emphasise in the last section, different types of 
decision-maker appear to differ from each other in systematic ways 
which are related to their backgrounds and skills. The problem is: 
how can we describe the differences usefully, and determine measures 
o-F the differences? The comments o-f the previous section should be 
regarded not so much as results, but as statements of the characteristics 
which w^ e should be studying and attempting to (quantify, in some sense, 
or at least demonstrate.explicitly.
It should be realised, too, that despite our declaration that 
different types of decision-makers - in this case, experienced and 
inexperienced - differ in their behaviour in a decision-making 
environment, we are definitely not trying to say that all decision­
makers of one type behave in precisely the same fashion. To state 
this would be a parody of our results. It is very clear that 
decision-makers are individuals, who come to their decision-making 
environments from their own idiosyncratic - backgrounds and provide 
their own skills, peculiar to themselves. Although similarities 
between members of a group of decision-makers of one type may exist, 
these should not blind us to the fact that each individual decision­
maker approaches his decision-making environment in an entirely unique 
way.
It seems that any useful study of decision-making must attempt 
to a^ j^proach the process of decision-making in terms appropriate to 
the individual decision-maker. Such an individualistic approach would 
enable us to develop a deeper and more valid understanding of decision­
making than it would seem that w^ e are likely to achieve by attempting 
to fit decision-making processes into a rigid model that concentrates on
rather arbitrary indicators as a guide to the processes,
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It wdll be recalled from Chapter 1 that our initial research 
strategy was to select a decision-making hypothesis, and test it using 
the game. This would lead to the formulation of a decision-making 
rule, and its possible subsecjuent testing using the game. The 
primary measure of the decision-mkaing hypotheses in which we were 
interested were the players’ perceptions of the number of decision­
making options open to both the players and the enemy. The way in 
which the hypotheses were formulated (see Milburn, 1972) led 
naturally to a measure which would be intimately related to enumeration 
of options.
Hawrever, it now becomes clear that what one player considéré 
to be describable as a valid and distinct option may be entirely 
meaningless to another player. Players may differ in the detail they 
feel should be ascribed to a distinct option, the degree of forw^ard 
planning incorporated in its formulation, the constraints imposed on 
its formulation by the decision-making environment, and the features 
which characterise it is an individual entity to be considered 
separately from other courses o-f action. In short, the processes of 
thought by which a set of possible courses of action are formulated, 
and then considered, are likely to differ between even two apparently 
similar decision-makers.
Differences in this decision-making style are likely to be 
related to^personality characteristics (or, indeed, to define them) 
as woll as criteria such as professional experience. For example, 
Hudson (1972) describes a dimension of personality which ranges from 
"convergent’’ to "divergent". He explains (p.67); "divergers are more 
open to the irrational elements in their own mental functioning"; 
Convergers "construct robust ’ego-boundaries’, and include within
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them only what is rational", whereas divergers "form relatively weak 
ego-boundaries and allow their own irrational impulses to suffuse 
their perception of who they are". It seems unlikely that decision­
makers who differ in their convergent/divergent profile will approach 
a decision problem in the same fashion (indeed, divergers are noted 
for their "open-ended" approach to problem solving). There are 
numerous aspects of personality which are likely to have a bearing 
on decision-making, some wrell-defined, such as introversion/extraversion 
(see, for example, Eysenck, 1973), others less so.
' If, as I have argued, it would be difficult to get two decision­
makers to agree over precisely what constitutes an option, it followrs 
that as researchers, we wall have problems in using the idea of options 
as units of decision-making. We have a choice. We can define the 
decision-making environment in our own terms, and measure how 
decision-makers behave in our terms. If we do this, we are measuring 
in part the degree to which the decision-maker’s model of his 
environment corresponds with our own. This measure, and the measure 
of decision-making performance we are supposed to be studying will be 
inextricably and indefinably intertwined - such a situation is clearly 
unsatisfactory for research purposes.
Alternatively, we can carry out our research entirely in the terms 
of the decision-maker. This means, essentially, relinquishing our 
own model of the decision-making environment, and discovering and 
adopting that of the decision-maker himself (a different model for 
each decision-maker, of course). The work so far described in this 
thesis has led me to believe that this is the right approach. But it 
has far-reaching consequences. As things stand, we have no knowledge 
of the decision-maker’s model of his decision-making environment. We
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cannot define what is meant, in the decision-makers terms, by an 
option. When, Further, we try to describe processes such as 
"rigidity q F thought", as met in Chapter ], in the decision-maker’s 
terms, we are in even deeper water. Before we can begin to discuss 
such ideas, we need a v\fay of modelling the decision-making environment 
as the decision-maker sees it. '
This means, then, that the research strategy as stated in Chapter 
1., o F hypothesis selection and testing, is somewhat premature. Before 
we could even begin to consider such a programme, we would need a 
technique or language for describing e^q^licitly the subjective 
environment of the decision-maker. It is to this end that our third 
series of games was directed, and I can now present our revised research 
aim, which is ., ■ quite simply, to develop a means of describing the 
environment o f the deci sion-malcer in his own terms, in a w^ ay that 
provides a model of that subjective environment rich enough to be 
discussed and studied.
In the next chapter, I describe in detail a teclinique, cognitive 
mapping, which we adopted to achieve this aim. In the next section of 
this chapter I describe our third, "Major", series of games which 
provided the raw material of the cognitive map analysis.
I conclude this section by noting that this subjective approach 
to decision-making appears to be gaining popularity in Operational 
Research at the moment. T\'''0 relatively recently developed techniques 
of decision analysis, the hypergame technique (Bennett, 1980) and 
analysis of options (Radford, 1975) eiqjhasise the importance of the 
different perceptions of various actors in the decision situation, and 
their value as decision aids stems in large part from the w^ ay in which
a consideration of tine perceptions of other actors is demanded by 
the methodologies. The work of .vdon et al (1979), which will be 
met in the next cliapter, is very much concerned wdth making the 
[perceptions of the decision-maker exqplicit to himself, the idea 
being that the decision-maker is aided by a fuller understanding 
of the full ramifications of his own formulation and feelings 
concerning the decision problem.
Such a mood indicates, a trend away from rigorous problem 
definition, in objective fashion, to idiosyncratic and subject- 
dependent definition. In these terms a problem can only be said 
to be resolved when the decision-maker acknowledges it to be so.
It goes without saying that the criteria by which the solution is 
assessed are defined by the decision-maker himself. Decision-making 
aids may be seen as means whereby a decision-making environment is 
defined as fully and naturally as possible to allows the decision­
maker’s unique capabilities, such as invention and intuition, to be 
utilised. Decision-making aids may be catalysts to problem 
resolution, rather than themselves the means of resolution. Such 
aids may have something in common wdth the ancient Chinese divination 
teclinique the '’J Ching",. of which Watts (1957) e>qDlains (p. 35); "one 
does hot consult the oracle wdthout proper preparation, wdthout going 
quietly and meticulously through the prescribed rituals in order to 
bring the mind into that calm state where the ’intuition’ is felt to 
act more effectively". .A similar concern with catalysis of intuition 
and invention can be seen in modern, sometime outrageously off-beat, 
decision aids (for example, a set of "oblique strategy" cards by 
lino & Sclimidt, 1975).
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7. ^  Gaines Played wd th Army Majors
The third, "Major" series of ganes were to be have been played 
under different conditions of stress, generated by noise. In the 
event, we were unable to obtain permission to subject army officers 
to such stress, although we did get as far as preparing and testing 
equipment. Because of the arguments outlined in the previous 
section, however, this setback did not greatly disturb us- We 
believed that we had identified a more fundamental problem than that 
of decision-making behaviour under stress - nanely, that of developing 
means of discussing decision-making behaviour in a useful way.. The 
"Major" series would be played with this end in mind.
We did, however, include two different level-of-data conditions 
for communications coming up to the experimental players from the 
Task rrorces. In the "aggregated" condition players received 
communications from Task Force Commanders, as in the previous games.
In the "disaggregated" condition, communications came from the four 
commanders of individual battalions within each Task Force. In both 
cases, howTever, the information in the reports amounted to the same.
In analysis of the games we would be looking for differences in 
decision-making behaviour which could be related to these experimental 
conditions.
Seven players, labelled A, B, ... G, each played through both 
of the two game scenarios. At the time of play, all players w^ ere 
serving army officers holding the rank of major. Table 7.5 showrs the 
e>^)Grimental design (originally we had hoped for eight players, but 
one had to drop out unexpectedly, and could not be replaced).
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Scenario 1
. ....... . ■
Scenario 2
1 C G ■
2 A B
3 E- D
4 - F 4
5 G + c<-
6 F
7 R A-
3 D<- £ .
 ^ indicates a disaggregated game; other games were played in the 
aggregate condition.
Flayers A, C and I played Scenario 1 before Scenario 2.
"^layers B, D, F and G played Scenario 2 before Scenario 1.
’"layer B played two aggregate condition games.
Players A, C, D and G played aggregate condition before 
disaggregate condition.
Players £ and F played disaggregate condition before 
aggregate condition.
.tach Scenario was played three times in disaggregate condition.
Table 7.5. .bqjerimental design for the * "Major" series of games.
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1 note immediately that in the analysis Qf the games, no 
effect could be detected due to the aggregation/disaggregation 
condition. It seems that, at least at the levels that we used, 
players were easily able to assimilate the data into usable form 
irrespective of tlie format in which it wfas presented. Further 
consideration of this aspect of decision-making is interesting but 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It may be of interest to compare 
our results with those of Daniel (1980); w^ e have commented briefly 
in this vein in our Final Report (McDowrell et al, 1979b). The 
aggregation/disaggregation variable will not be mentioned further 
in the analysis of the games to be presented here.
Game Communications
The raw material for the analysis of a player's behaviour in the 
game was to be his communications in the game. As before, in each of 
the six rounds of the game the player, in his role as Divisional 
Commander, issued a directive statement to his subordinate Task Force 
Commanders, and a report statement to his Superior Corps Commander.
In addition, during a research phase in the first, third and fifth 
rounds, the player provided à commentary on his recent decision-making 
to the game directing staff.
All three types of material - directives, reports, and decision­
making commentaries - were recorded directly onto tape by the players. 
After the games, the recordings were transcribed (by a skilled 
secretary) into written form. These transcriptions are virtually 
word-for-word renderings of the players' speech - only very rarely 
was it necessary to guess at the content of an inaudible phrase or 
remark. A sample transcript, for player C in Round 1 of Scenario 1,
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is shown in Table 7.6; this communication set is one of the shortest 
we encountered.
Transcription of verbal communications was an efficient and 
effective way of recording decision-making data in the game. Occasional 
ambiguities of meaning did arise in )the transcripts - these corresponded 
to ambiguities in the recordings made by the players. There is no 
way of resolving these ambiguities. Had the Organisational Control 
Game been being played "for real", without the deception inherent in 
the Superior Commander System, a superior or subordinate player 
might well have queried these ambiguities, had he detected them. It 
should be eivhasised that ambiguities were found extremely rarely.
Where they occurred, an arbitary decision was talc en as to the 
intended meaning. At no time was there any danger of this arbitrary 
procedure severely altering the meaning of a substantial section of 
a transcript.
Initial Impressions of Communication Transcripts
Some impression of the output of the games w^ as gained by myself 
arid the others associated with the project during the preparation of 
the transcripts. When the transcripts were complete, they were reread 
as a set, bearing in mind that we were looking for anything that could 
be regarded as an indicator or measure of decision-making, and that 
could be compared from game to game.
It is worth making one point about the movements of reserve 
forces in the late stages of the game. It becomes immediately clear 
on studying these movements that it is impossible to attribute meaning 
to them on the basis of the geographical movements alone. In other...
Scenario 1, Flayer C, Round 1
Task Force Communi cation Phase
Orders fjr 3 Task Force: 9,10,11 and 1" battalions. No change, 
hold your positions.
Orders for 1 Task Force: 1,7,3,4 battalions of 1 Task Force.
Ho change, hold your positions.
Oor,:)s Communication Phase
Situation enemy North. Our units in contact are 7,3 and 9 Regiments 
Z Division, are in contact and in battle at the monent. Further South 
3,1 and " Regiments of F Division are moving into contact all in the area 
■'/est of Pontet-Canet. In the Sout’i in contact with our forward elements 
is 52,51 and 53 Regiments o^ 7 Division^ Soutlo-l'est o^ Batailley. In the 
middle of the area we have 1, 3 and 2 Regiments of X Division, whose 
present location is uncertain, but they are North of Croizet-Bages, are 
moving Cast and South-East. 3 Division and 7 Division are the two.divisions 
in contact at the moment.
Estimate of strength, material means, morale and knowledge of our 
situation is: no change.
Conclusions covering courses of action open to the enemy: I estimate 
the Z Division will be moving forward up the axis Pontet-Canet to Cantemerle 
and continuing to, if possible, overwhelm our forces in that area. To the 
South-West the 7 Division will be moving up the road Batailley to Langoa 
towards Cantemerle.
Our situation: activities of our own forces. No change from previous
situation report. Those units in contact are still in contact. Activities 
of forces not attached: no change.
Conclusions covering courses of action open to our own forces: we 
are under orders to defend our present locations where in contact at the 
moment, and will continue to do so.
Research Phase
appreciation in the decision-making process here was that in both 
thé North and South my area my directive was to hold my position as long 
as I could and I had reports from all the Task Force Commanders that 
although in contact in both of the Task Force areas, they were able to hold 
their positions, and they were in a reasonable position in which to defend 
the two thrust axes, so I decided at the moment to leave them wbere they 
were.
As far as resupply is concerned, appreciation there was to move up 
particularly cjuickly to the Southern Task Force (number 1) more resupply 
units, in order that they can continue fighting that intensive battle to 
the South.
Table 7.6. Transcript of communications for Player C in the first round 
of Scenario 1.
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words, a particular movement could have been made for a variety of 
quite distinct reasons. To identify the reasons, the transcripts 
of the games must be consulted. That this is so might have been 
predicted from the arguments already put forv/ard in this chapter.
It is, however, interesting to compare this with a similar observation 
recently reported in the O.R. literature (Huxham et al, 1931 ) for 
the case o^ simple matrix games, where the unsuspecting ejqperimenter 
might (wrongly) have supposed motivation for particular plays to be 
fairly obvious, and thus deducible from observation of the plays.
The immediate impression gained from the transcripts of the games 
wfas the large variety in the ways in which the players described their 
interpretation of and behaviour in.their decision-making environment. 
For a given scenario, in which all seven players were led through 
exactly the same sequence of objective situations and events, 
individual players would describe the game environment completely 
differently. Ne were left in no doubt that their perceptions of the 
same objective situations differed widely. This is, of course, 
consistent with our earlier exortation to regard decision-makers as 
unique individuals.
Despite what we have already stated in this chapter, in some 
respects the observation was still somewbat surprising; in other 
respects it now seemed quite natural. It was surprising, because our 
players, we know, were of broadly similar backgrounds - they were all 
army men, all held the rank of Major, all were articulate and 
apparently competent, and all were presumably of similar cultural and 
doctrinal background. Thus, that the most obvious feature of their 
perceptions in the game were the differences was, in one sense, 
unexpected. Yet, taking a less rigid view of the game, remembering
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that the j)layers were not merely subjects wi th measurable behavioural 
responses, but were, presumably, as complex as the experimenters 
themselves, we realised that to exjDect a high degree o F consistency 
between players might be a ridiculous idea. After all, we had partly 
chosen the.method oF tape-recording of free communication in order to 
permit players to give free reign to their own views rather than 
constrain them to terse orders or reports (as written communication 
tended to produce) or to thinking along lines suggested by the 
experimenters (as a questionnaire metlx)dology would tend to do).
Given the written transcripts of the players game communeations, 
there now remains the problem of translating them into a foritiat more 
amenable to study and comparison. We carried this out using the 
technique of cognitive mapping. Since I believe the cognitive map 
analysis of these games to be the most important part of our decision­
making research (as opposed to our work on game design and secondary 
tasks), I have chosen to devote the entire next chapter to this 
analysis.
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%  1. Introduction
Tn this cha^jtcr T shall describe the analysis oF our third,
''Major ', series o F games by the teclmic^ue of cognitive mapping.
This is a technique From psychology which ofFers an approach to the 
analysis o^ decision-making that begins to tackle the problems tliat. 
were described in th.» previous cha,>ter. Its use can be seen as 
part of a recent trend in some areas oF Operational Research to 
ex;)lore metiiods and teclmipues which emphasise the individuality o F 
the decision-maker and the uniqueness of his oini conception and 
understanding o F his decision-making environment. Some oF the 
v\ork described in this chapter has been published in the Operational 
Research literature (Klein & Cooper, 1930).
The aim o F Operational Research is to aid decision-makers. Tn 
the [last, this has been achieved largely by the provision of 
techniques, together with guidelines ^or their application, directed 
towards the resolution o-F reasonably well-defined problems. in this 
area Operational Research has been un» questionably successful.
Recently, however, attention has been increasingly directed 
tOT'ards a diFfgrent type q F problem. Tt has now been widely 
recognised that many o F the problems ^aced by decision-makers exist 
within com/)lex, ill-defined and interconnected ''messes' (Ackoff, 1979), 
located in fundamentally turbulent environments (Radford, 1973). 
Accordingly, much attention is now directed towards the problems of 
strategic decision-making in conFlict and crisis. Tt is recognised
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that purely analytical ap^.)roaches ar^:» inadecjuate to deal with such 
problems, and the need for the development o^ a more general "'science' 
o^ decision-making has been identified (Dando et al, 1977).
An im, ortant part of the development of a decision-making 
science is the provision o^ more detai led, models of the individual 
decision-maker than exist at t)i ■> mo;nent. • "^"syc ho logical research 
, -rovi des a wealth o'" information about the behaviour of individuals,
'/idle political science and international relations have long been 
concerned with high-level d./ci s ion-;i)aking, but it is only recently 
that combined ap -roaches have been adopted. The interdisciplinary 
stance of O.R. makes it id-mxlly suited to take an active role in this 
more unified a^).>ro3ch to the study of decision-making. O.R. can 
both contribute to this area, and learn from it.
The cognitive mapping teclinicjue to be described in this chapter 
is a means of examining th-e behaviour of individual decision-makers.
•A cognitive map is a representation of the perceptions and beliefs o^ 
an individual about his ov.n subjective world. ,'\s will be described in 
the next section, the teclmi c]ue has been employe-.i in the fields of 
international relations and administrative science, and recently there 
have Ixeen applications in O.R. Jt seems certain that cognitive ma;)ping 
is a fruitful method o' analysing decisions in a number of O.R. areas.
In the next section of this chapter, I shall briefly describe the 
cognitive map. )ing technirjue, and concisely review the literature 
concerning applications in related areas. This wi11 be followed by an
example of the preparation of a cognitive map from the output of a 
round of the Organisational Control Game. ] then proceed to present
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and discuss the cognitive map analysis of the series of ga/es. The 
results deal mainly with the initial perceptions of the players in 
the games, but include some consideration of dynamic aspects and the 
way in which perceptions alter as the game progresses, finally, I 
draw some conclusions about the Usefulness and applicability of 
cognitive maiDping, both for the type of decision-making experiments 
described in this thesis, and also in a wider O.R. jeontext.
S.P. Cognitive Ka/jping
Traditionally, scientists (and therefore by implication most of 
those involved in O.R.) have been concerned with the real, objective 
world, where phenomena can be observed and measured, ffowever, human 
decision processes never take place in this objective world. All that 
can be observed there are some of their effects. iluman decision 
processes always take place within the subjective world of the 
individual decision-maker. Cognitive mappiing offers a window on this 
subjective world. it provides a means of representing the way in whici 
a decision-maker models his decision-making environment, in terms of 
the concepts he himself uses. The technique has been used to examine 
the causal belief systems of decision-makers in a variety of contexts, 
including O.R.
A cognitive ma-) is derived from a text, a record of the verbal 
or i/nritten statements of an individual, '^ rom the text are identified 
the concepts used by the individual, and the causal relationships 
between them. Only twa types of relationship are considered in the 
application discussed here: positive and negative. A positive 
relationship occurs when a chaige in a predecessor concept causes a
202
similar change in the successor: an increase (decrease) in the first 
causes an increase (decrease) in the second. With a negative 
relationship, an increase (decrease) in the predecessor causes a 
decrease (increase) in the successor.
An example will serve to clarify these definitions. Discussing 
a particular friendly unit, one qilayer stated that ” ... morale is 
high, as they are advancing with little opposition Tiao concepts
may be identified in this text: 'diigh morale', and 'unopposed advance”.
These concepts are linked by a positive relationship, since the player 
believes that an ”unop,)Osed advance” causes or promotes "high morale”.
The ti'O concepts, and th.? relationship between them, are shown
graphically in figure 1.1.
The coding procedure is generally more complicated than in this 
example. Relationships between concepts are often obscure and sometimes 
ambiguous, but with care large, cognitive maps containing many concepts 
and relationships may be coded from a text and pictured graphically. 
Coding teclmi jues are described in detail by ivrightson (1976). An 
example of our o'vn coding procedures is given in the next section.
Vv'hen a text has been fully coded, i^ hat will have been constructed 
is a signed directed graph. Graphs of this type will of course vary 
in size and complexity, we shall see some examples of those constructed 
in our owi i^ ork later in the chapter. !^ or the time being J shall 
illustrate the 'finished article' with a purely fictional example, 
shoim in f'igure 3.R, in which the letters representing concepts and 
tlie relationships between concepts have been designated with no other 
purpose in mind than to demonstrate various structural features of a 
cognitive maj?.
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Text ...morale is high, as they are
advancing with little opposition,
Concepts A: High morale,
B: Unopposed advance.
'■lap
© -  — -<Z)
Figure 3.1. H ao conce^pts linked by a positive relationship,
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HJ
> C > D >  E 4-
Figurç? 3.2., A "fictional” cognitive map, illustrating: goals (in 
circles); actions’(in rectangles); a negative Feedback loop (D,E,H,I,J,0); 
a pair of balanced paths (A,C,D, 3) and (A,K,L,E); and a pair of unbalanced 
paths (P',G) and (E,:'i,G).
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To be a valid representation o F an individual’s cognitive processes, 
the concepts which a^>pear in the cognitive map must be those which the 
individual himself uses, and the relationsips must be ones which he 
believes e:(ist. To attribute another set of concepts and beliefs to 
the individual would defeat the whole object of the exercise, which is 
essentially to construct a model of the belief system of an individual.
The cognitive mapping technique permits complex and subtle 
diagrams of individual decision-making to be constructed, and these 
diagrams can elucidate and give insight into the processes by which a 
decision-maker organises his thoughts so as to make his decisions. A 
first step in looking at a cognitive map infmore detail is to identify 
certain types o^ concept within its structure. The first of these 
types are goals, which can be broadly defined as concepts which the 
decision-maker wishes to ma:<iinise, at least in part, for their ovn sake, 
and not merely because they facilitate some other concept. In a 
military situation, an obvious example of a goal would be to defeat 
the enemy. That goal, hov.-ever, might be regarded as possibly too 
long-term and non-operational, and might not be the concept with which 
the decision-maker would naturally v\ork. Me might prefer goal concepts 
which are more immediately realisable, like prevention of forward 
movement by enemy, or the breaking of enemy supply routes. In a cognitive 
map it is probably most useful to regard the goals as those ends towards 
which the decision-maker is immediately working. In our notation, we 
enclose goal concepts in circles in the cognitive map, as shoun in 
figure 8.3.
The other type o^ concept in a cognitive map which it can be 
useF^ul to identiFy are actions (enclosed in rectangles in our notation, 
as in Figure 8.2). These represent real actions that the decision-
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malcer, and possibly other actors in the environment, might take. An 
instance o F such an action concept might be to attempt to outflank the 
enemy. The decision-maker can choose to do this, or not, and the 
decision will have consequences.
Py this identification of goals and actions, cognitive maps are 
given a dynamic aspect, 'v'e can now trace paths of positive or 
negative relationships leading from actions to goals, and we can begin 
to see how specific actions affect specific goals in the decision­
making environment.
As we trace paths and examine structures in a cognitive map, 
certain features can be identified. The distance between actions and 
goals is one such feature - sometimes, it is found that several concepts 
intervene between an action and the goal which it affects, leading to 
long, linear paths of concequences appearing in the map. In other cases, 
actions may be very closely linked to goals. Compare the paths 
( A , C , D , X )  and (B,G,Y) in figure 8.2.
There is or course, no reason why feedback loops should not occur 
in the maps. A positive feedback loop, which must have an even number 
o"" negative links in its structure, iMOuld suggest that any alteration 
in a concept within a loop would tend to simplify that alteration. On 
the other hand, a negative Feedback loop, with an odd number of negative 
links, would tend to cancel out such alterations. The structure 
(O, 3,11,1, J, 0) in Figure 8.2 is a negative feedback loop.
Other structures that will often appear in maps are multiple paths 
between two concepts. It seems clear that the situation is relatively 
well-defined when all the paths have, in total, the same sign, '^ or
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example, if all the paths are positive (such as (A,C,D, 3) and (A,K,L, 3) 
in Figure 8.2), then obviously an increase in the initial variable 
causes an increase in the final variable. But what happens if we 
have, say, one positive path, and one negative path (such as (B,G) 
and (B,M,G) in Figure 8.2)? The precise relationship between initial 
and final variable is no longer clear. Tn fact, there is not enough 
information in the map to define it. Some measure of path magnitude 
would be needed to malce the overall relationship precise. It would 
be possible to attempt to assign rough magnitudes to paths to deal with 
this type of situation; however, it can be argued that the ambiguity 
in the simple picture may well reflect quite accurately the reality • 
of the decision-maker's cognitive process, that the ambiguity is 
uncomfortable, and that the decision-maker may, in fact, delete 
relationships until he is left with a situation which exhibits 
path- balance. That is, in some sense he deliberately fails to consider 
possibilities which lead to unbalanced path structures, because this 
strategy will lead to easier decision-making. This type of decision­
making behaviour is hy;x)thesised by Axelrod (1976a).
Cognitive Map Literature
Cognitive mapping was developed by Robert Aj<elrod as a means of 
analysing decision-making in political science. His a^jproach is 
described in detail in the book "Structureof Decision" (Axelrod, 1976a). 
As well as a thorough examination of the principles of the political 
science v.ork of Axelrod and his colleagues, the book includes a 
complete practicalQuide to tlieir methods of coding texts - that is, 
how concepts and relationships are identified in a piece of material 
to be coded (I'Arightson, 1976). The book also contains five case studies.
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The case studies include a comparison of the cognitive maps, 
derived from transcripts, of the participants of the "British eastern 
Committee" of 1.913, the purpose of which was to determine British 
policy in v\hat was then known as Persia (Axelrod, 1976b). The author 
finds tlio nu;nl)er o f causal assertions made by the participants 
surprisingly high, and records his aaazement that a decision-malcer 
could usefully handle so many assertions. Tn another of the case 
studies, Hart (1976), investigating international cooperation in the 
exploitation and conservation of ocean resources, presents cognitive 
maps of large organisations (rather than individuals) in which the 
beliefs mapped were derived with the aid of a panel of judges who were 
e>q^erts on the subject. [lart was particularly interested in the 
structure o^ the goal concepts of the organisations.
.(lart has also used cognitive mapping to compare the belief 
systems o^ three Latin .American policy mailers (Hart, 1977) and also . 
three presidents o^ the United States (Hart, 1978). Other applications 
of cognitive mapping in the field of political science include an 
a;^ )^plication to Norwegian oil policy (Bonham et al, 1978), an analysis 
of the perceptions of American foreign ;x)licy officials toxvards the 
.Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1970s (Bonham et at, 1979), and an 
analysis of Japan's decision to go to wax in 1941 (Levi & Tetlock, 
1930). More general discussions cognitive ma;.^ ping and allied 
teclmicfues in the context of political science include those by Shapiro 
and Bonham (197.3), Idnharn et al (1976), and Meradstveit and Narvesen 
(1978).
Boos and Hall (1980) provide a recent example of the use of 
cognitive rnapj^ ing in the field of administrative science. Explaining 
that essentially they are using influence diagrams whose structure
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is determined by the perceptions of the analyst, they use the 
diagrams they are able to derive to aid analysis of power within 
an organisation.
One of the most exciting uses of cognitive mapping recently has 
been in the field o.f Operational Research, carried out by Oolin Eden 
and his colleagues, and described in detail in their book "Thinking 
in Organizations" (Eden et al, 1979). Their approach is rather 
different to that so far described: rather than being primarily 
concerned with research, they are engaged in actively assisting 
decision-making by their clients in the real x^ orld. They see 
cognitive map,)ing as a tool to aid that process.
The approach, or philosophy, of Eden and his colleagues to their 
clients is that it is the decision-maker with the problem who actually 
ox^ ns the problem, who has the potential to understand it best, and x.\ho 
ultimately has to malce the decision. Thus the role of the consultant 
is not to take over the problem and proceed to solve it, but rather 
to assist the decision-maker in learning about his problem, understanding 
it fully, and ultimately leading him to a position in which he feels 
able to make a decision. This often taJces the form of making explicit 
knox'dedge that is usually implicit, unformulated, and which may even 
be regarded as "illegitimate" (that it ought not to be relevant to the 
problem, even if it is).
One of tlie primary x^ 'ays in x.vhich Eden and his colleagues assist 
their clients is by constructing cognitive maps (with computer ’assistance) 
in conjunction with The clients. Thus the clients see a model of. their 
oxxn thinking processes being built up. As the process goes on they 
find themselves questioning the validity of each conçonent of the
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map. As the map becomes more accurate, ax^areness of the full 
ramifications of the decision-problem increases. The cognitive 
map is a kind of mirror of the thinlcing processes of the clients.
■ The cognitive mapping teclxniques used by :Eden and his colleagues 
are not surprisingly somexAhat di Fferent in style from those used in 
the context of political science. One particular difference is that 
kien has blended cognitive mapping x\'ith psychological construct theory 
(Bannister & pransella, 1971). Tx'O case studies (Employing this and 
related methodologies have recently appeared in the literature: one 
is a description of aid given to the management of an ailing journal 
( Bden & Jones, 1980); the other describes assistance given to a 
community group assisting unem^>loyed youth in the city of Bath 
( Jones & Eden, 1931).
To this account of the cognitive mapping literature J vould add 
our oxAxn contribution (Klein & Cooper, 1982), which essentially reports 
on x«ork covered in this chapter. It may xvell be the only reported use 
of cognitive mapping to date as a means of analysis of a highly 
controlled decision-making ep<perlment. This may not be surprising, 
howover, in view of the fact, made clear in previous chapters, that 
complex decision-making experiments are rarely subject to such a high 
degree o ' control.
In concluding this brief reviex\' of the literature It is probably 
XAorth maJcing tX'O points, to avoid possible confusion. The first is 
that the term "cognitive mapping" has been used to describe the 
construction of mental representations of geographical areas (see, for 
example, Neisser, 1976): a related area, but not quite the same.
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The term "cognitive map" has also been used in an educational context 
( Skem/); 1979); once again, the concept is related, but cfuite distinct 
from the usage here.
The second point is that sojii^? of the principles of cognitive 
mapping can be employed in the field of artificial intelligence (see, 
for examtile, Holland & Reitman, 1978). It is clear that this type 
of e>qplicit modelling of human thought might be particularly valuable 
in a field which could be considered to be concerned mainly with the 
computer simulation of mental processes. This application, although 
fascinating, is beyond the scope of this present brief survey.
’ 7 Cbding Cognitiv'- 'ps
To code the Organisational Onntrol Game, the texts used were the 
transcripts of the players' communeations in the game, already 
described in the previous chapter. Ma:)s were coded from these te:<ts 
in two phases. The initial texts o " each .player - his directives to 
subordinates and his. first reports to his superior and to the game 
controllers - were used to construct maps of each players initial 
perceptions of the gaane environment. Subsecjuent texts were then 
used to revise each player's map as his perceptions altered with the 
progress o f time and the development of the game.
The details of the coding process were specifically tailored to 
the output of the game, and not surprisingly differ in various ways 
from other coding processes reported in the literature. It may be of 
value, therefore, to illustrate our coding process by shov.ing how the 
sample of game output reproduced in the previous chapter (Table 7.6)
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is coded. Note that this was one of the shortest texts, and produces 
one of the smallest maps.
Table S. I reproduces the te:<t. In this text concepts have been 
underlined and labelled in the right hand margin (labels are as used 
in the scheme e'V-ieyed for all the maps). Table 3,2 lists these 
concepts concisely, and tabulates the causal linics between then, 
finally the concepts are put together to form the cognitive map shown 
in Bigure 3. 3.
f\ number o points slx>uld be made. First of all, regarding
identification o^ concepts, we were anxious to avoid coding straight
descriptions of what x^ras actually happening. Thus, x,\'e x^ 'ere only 
looking for: (a) stated goals; (b) speculation or estimates of 
relevant factors, including enemy behaviour; (c) friendly actions.
Tlius the first section o'" the Corps Communication Phase report was-, not 
coded.
Secondly, in listing the concepts x'^e have abbreviated them, 
mailing every effort not to lose the sense of the concept.-as. originally 
stated by the player. it XA'ill be seen that the same concept can 
apparently occur more than once in a text; in such cases the coder 
must decide xvhather the concepts are truly the same or not, and code
them aj:)propriately (see concepts BIG and 33C).
Thirdly, casual links must often'be inferred. For example, no 
exji>lic.it mention is made of the fact that the enemy, actions R71 and 
R-'Zl act against the player's goal G2a, yet this seems clearly to be 
so, and the coding has been carried out accordingly. Many of the
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Scenario 1, Player C, Round 1
Task Force Communication Phase
Orders for 3 Task Force: 9,13,11 and 12 battalions. TJo change.
hold your positions.
Orders ^or 1 Task Force; 1,2,3,4 battalions of 1 Task Force.
B3C
}Io change, hold your positions. 
Cor os Communication Phase
B1C
situation enemy North. Our units in contact are 7,3 and Q Regiments 
of Z Division, are in contact and in battle at the monent. Further South 
3,1 and Z Regiments of ” Division are moving into contact all in the area 
'.vest of Pontet-Canet. In the South in contact with our forward elements 
is. 31,51 and 53 Regiments of 7 Division, South-West of Eatailley. In the 
middle of the area i^'e have 1, 3 and 2 Regiments of X Division, whose 
present location is uncertain, but they are North of Croizet-Eages, are 
r.YOving East and South-East. Z Division and 7 Division are the two divisions 
in contact at the moment.
Estimate o^ strength, material means, morale and knowledge of our 
situation is: no change. '
Conclusions covering courses of action open to the e 
the Z Division will be looving forward up the axis Pontet
RFZ1 
rnemy: I 
-Can et V
P8
estimate 
to Cantemerl?
and continuing to, if ^x>ssible, overwhelm our forces in that area. To the 
Soutlo-West the 7 Division will be moving up the road Eatailley to Langoa 
towards Cantemerle. '
R71
Cur situation: activities of our own forces. No change from previous
situation re;>ort. Those units in contact are still in contact. Activities 
of forces not attached: no change.
Conclusions covering courses of action open to our own forces: we 
are under orders to defend our present locations where in contact at the
moment, and will continue to do so.
Research Phase
G2a
B1C, B3C G2a P9
My appreciation in the decision-making process/here was that in both 
the North and South of my area my directive was to/hold my position as long^ 
as I could and I had reoorts from all the Task Force GOrrananders that
although in contact in both of the Task Force areas, they v^ere able to hold 
their positions, and they were in a reasonable position in which to defend 
the two thrust axes, so I decided at the moment to leave them where they  ^
were. BlC ,B3Ck'
As far as resupply is concerned, appreciation there wa.s 
particularly quickly to the Southern Task Force (number 1) more resupply
move UD
7 -------^  ~ ^  \   *  1   - - -  - -
units, in order that they can continue fighting that intensive battle to 
the South. ^  S 8  '
Table 8.1. Text for Player C, in the first round of Scenario 1,
with concepts underlined and labelled.
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Concepts
Goal: (G2a Defend present Task Force locations.
Blue actions: BIG
BICS
P.3C
ibid position of 1 Task Force.
Move supply to 1 Task ^orce 
particularly quickly.
i bid position of 3 Task Force.
Red actions: RFZl Z Division to move towards Cantemerle.
R71 7 Division moves towards Langoa.
Other Variables: ■53 '\bility of 1 Task Force to continue
fighting intensive battle.
P8 Change in strength of enemy.
P9 Assessment of ability to hold
position,
PIO Suitability of Task Force positions
to defence.
Links G2a BIC >  R71
BICS
RFZl >  G2a B3C ■> RFZl
R71
BIC
P8 R71
P8
P9 BIC
B3CP9
PIO BIC
PIG B3C
Table 8.2. Concepts and links betv-een concepts for ?^layer C, 
Scenario 1.
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C:1
BICS-
BIC R71P9
P8
B3CP10
U
Figure 8.3. Cognitive map of Player C in Scenario I,
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links between concents must be deduced rrom the overall sense of 
the te:<t in this v.ay.
cinally, notice that in the final map, an additional utility 
variable, U, has been added, purely -^ or completeness. All goal 
variables will have positive causal links to U, and we may say that 
th; - player ' s aim in the game is to maximise U. This may be
a useful device '“or analysis when several, possibly conflicting, 
goals appear in the cognitive map.
8.4 Results
Coding the initial texts yielded 14 cognitive maps (from the seven 
players, in each the tv\o scenarios). Broadly, analysis of the maps 
indicates marked differences between the players, yet, for any player, 
marked similarities across the scenarios. We have already seen 
Player C's map in Scenario 1 (Pigure 3.3 and Table 8.2). This map may 
be compared with the maps for Players A and C in Scenario P, which, 
with respect to number of concepts, are the extreme cases for this 
scenario (Table 8.3 and figure 8.4; Table 8.4 and Figure 8,5).
Concepts and Relationships
The most obvious difference between players is the number of 
concepts identified in their maps. This ranges from 10 (Player C) 
to '^ 6 (î^layer F ) in Scenario 1, and from 8 (^layer C) to 23 (Player 
S) in Scenario (see Table 8.5). However, for four of the seven 
players. Players A,B,C and G, the numbers of concepts in the ti'O 
scenarios is C(uite similar, despite the fact that they involve very 
different military situations. (Recall that in Scenario 1, the
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Goals:
B
Reca])ture Olivier.
Secure Railway.
Proceed to join rest of Corps 
eventually.
Blue actions:
B3A
B3AF
B3AM
P3n
31A
2 Task Force to attack Olivier.
3 Task î^ orce to move on as fast
as possible.
3 Task Force fall back to Douseaut 
if necessary.
3 Task Force take up position on 
Harr i s Hi 11.
3 Task ^orce hold Bouscaut.
Deploy 1 Task Force to counter B 
Regiment.
Red actions: RA2
RA3
RF.1
RB2
A Regiment defend Harris Hill 
Area.
A Regiment to move towards gap in 
hills.
B iRegiment to go West.
F, Reqimerit to go South.
Other Variables: Ml
N2
N3
m
•^1
22
P3
P4
Ability of A Regiment to hold 
Harris Hill.
'"resent opposition to 3 Task Force.
Destruction of A Regiment.
Danger of rear attack by A Regiment.
Speed of Blue Forces.
knowledge of enemy intentions.
znamy strength and morale.
Lack of scope to change anything.
Table 3.3. Concepts for Player A, Scenario 2,
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A:2
B1A
B2A
G2
P4 B3B
B3A
N4
BA2 B3AH N 3
B3AF
figure 3,4. Cognitive map of -layer A in Scenario 2.
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Goals: Recapture Olivier.
Secure railway.
Proceed to join rest of Corps 
eventually.
Blue actions: irc
BF,
Task Force to clear Olivier 
quickly.
3 Task Force to clear advancing 
enemy.
Task Forces to link up eventually.
Red actions: RAl
RCl
/\ Regiment to move on Bouscaut. 
C Regiment to hold Olivier.
Table 3.4. Concepts for '^layer C, ‘Scenario 2.
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C:2
B2C
G2BSD RA1
BB
Ü
Figure 3.5. Cognitive map of Player C in Scenario 2,
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blT'EÜR 0':' 
•'T3, N
MUflBCR OF 
LINKS, L
D8NSI1Y,
D
3Cij'l\RIO 1 z . 1 2 1 2
A 22 21 .38 33 "082 •079
R 22 22 26 29 •056 •063
C 10 8 13 12 •144 •214
'■’LAY[*R D 23 13 32 16 •063 . •103
16 23 21 39 . •038 • *077
F 26 18 39 24 ■ •060 •078
G 21 19 27 24 •064 •070
Table 3.5. Concepts, links and densities of the cognitive maps.
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Defence, the player is opposed by a superior enemy force, and he has
little freedom of action; on the other hand, in Scenario 2, the 
Advance-to-Oontact, the player has the initiative and military 
superiority. ) Some of the decision-makers, therefore, appear to be 
modelling their decision-making environment using a relatively 
constant number of concepts. This number apparently has little to 
do with the objective situation, and may represent some limit to the 
quantity odifferent concepts the decision-maker feels he can 
usefully cope with at any one time. This limit may vary quite widely 
between decision-makers. There is no suggestion, however, that the 
ruality of decision-making exhibited by those players with fewer 
concepts is in any way inferior, at least in these games.
The number o " causal, links in the maps follow a similar pattern 
to that siio’.mi by the numbers of concepts. If is common to calculate 
the ma^:) density, D, defined as the number of linics observed, L, 
divided by the maximum number of links possible between N concepts:
D ~ L/N(N-1 ).
: Numbers of links and densities are also s1tov\ti in Table 8.5.
I'lith only tlrree exceptions, the densities of all the maps lie between 
0.05 and 0.1. The three maps with the largest densities are the 
three smallest maps - in fact, they are exceptionally small. The 
concepts in these small maps tend to be o*^  central importance to the 
situation, and the decision-makers acknowledge many casual relationships 
between them. The larger maps all contain similar central sections, 
but there are also many more peripheral concepts, of limited influence 
and affecting only a small fraction of the others. The more concepts 
a decision-raalcer uses, the less each concept is likely to have a direct
223
A: Friendly Iiolding action.
B: ELneniy advance.
C: Enemy manoeuvre.
D: Friendly goals.
Case 1
Case 2
Figure 8.6. Alternative views of the same objective situation,
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causal effect on any other concent. ôs might be expected, the central 
sections odifferent players maps are frequently similar for a given 
scenario, with many concepts and links appearing in the saane or slightly 
altered form in several ;)layers' maps, although this is not always the 
case.
Pi cferences i n Oetailed Interpretation
0<^ ten, concepts that one player regards as fundamental do not 
appear on another player’s map, and From time to time the same 
concepts can be found to l»e related in entirely different ways by 
di'^ferent players. '"igure’ 3.6 shov.'s a specific examr>le from Scenario 
3. Case 1 illustrates the reasoning of most players: a friendly holding 
or delaying action will limit an enemy advajice; i'" allov/ed to proceed, 
the advance uould be detrimental to friendly goals; but a determined 
advance by the enemy will make the holding (action more difficult.
Case 2 shows the contrasting reasoning of Player G: a friendly holding 
action will cause the enemy to manoeuvre; this forced manoeuvre will 
ultimately put the enemy at a disadvantage, and so will have a positive 
effect on the attainiaient o'" friendly goals. The positive as opposed 
to negative links in Case 2 reflect the fact that only this player 
felt that he had the initiative in this situation, a point he maJces 
clearly in the text. This is a particularly fine example of the i^ ay 
in which one decision-maker can see the same objective situation in 
a completely different way from another.
Confidence of the ^layers
■Jt became clear on reading the texts that one of the main 
differences in the \Aay players approached a given scenario was in
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the degree of confidence they displayed in their ability to achieve 
their goals. A subjective rating was made by the experimenters of the 
confidence of each player in each scenario (Table 3.6). This rating 
was compared with two Cjuantitative measures, based on the cognitive 
maps and the texts.
Jn each cognitive map, paths of relationships leading from actions, 
events or circumstances to either an increased goal attainment or a 
decreased goal attainment were identified. Jach goal was considered 
separately. -"aths leading to a particular goal either begin with an 
action the decision-maker can take, or with some external factor over 
lA'hich the decision-ma!<er has no control, but to which he usually 
assigns a value. Jn the first case, where a path begins with an action, 
it is assumed that the decision-maker will always act in order to 
increase his goal attainment - thus such a path is always goal-increasing. 
Jn the second case, paths may be goal-increasing or goal-decreasing, 
depending on the value assigned to the initial factor and on the 
number o^ negative relationships on the path to the goal. The number 
of goal-increasing paths for all goals, divided by tiie total number 
of goal-increasing plus goal-decreasing paths, defines a goal-increasing 
score (Table 3.6).
This goal-increasing score, which we devised specifically for 
analysis of these naps, may be illustrated using the example of Player 
C in Scenario 1 (figure 3.3 and Table 8.2). There are three ’external’ 
concepts which begin causal paths, and, using the text (Table 3.1), it 
seems reasonable to assign the values ’’high ' to and i^ lO, and "low* 
to P3. b’e now have to identify all possible paths leading to the 
goal G2a. (P9, RIC, R71, G2a) is a path that leads to a goal increase;
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SC'NAP.IO 1
GRbv?
OR
R U W
SI JB J.JCTJ \7-■ 
BANK
G1
SGORl
GI
RANK
DS
SCORB
OS
R W K
A 1,2 5 .493 4 .602 4
B ■ 3,1 4 .394 7 .456 7
C 1,- 2 .714 3 .821 1.
0 2,1 6 .417 5 .560 5
1,3 3 .875 1 .647 . 3
R 2,1 7 .311 6 .549, 6
G 2,1 1 .800 2 .661 2
SC-TIARjO 1
r'LAY.iR
ORO
PL/AY
SUBJ SCTI'/I 
. . RANK
GI
SOOR i
GI
RAfiK
DS 
SOOR 3
DS
RANK
A 1,2 6 .300 6 .633 4
B 2,1 3 .331 7 .660 3
C 1,2 2 1.000 1 .799 1
D 2,1 4 .778 2 .587 5
2 1,2 7 .538 5 .557 6
TT 2,1 5 .769 3 .537 7
2,1 1 .733 4 .762 2
Table 8.6. Subjective ranks, goal-increasing (G.I.) scores and 
ranks, and description-spéculation (D. 5. ) scores and ranlcs for the two 
scenarios.
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on the other hand,. (f8, R71, G3a) leads to a goal decrease. Jn fact, 
there are seven possible paths in total in the map, of which five are 
goal-increasing, and two goal-decreasing. Thus the goal-increasing 
score is 0.714.
Intuitively, it seem reasonable to suggest that a high 
goal-increasing score might be associated with a high degree of ■ 
confidence, since it indicates that the player perceives a relatively 
high number of factors leading to increased as opposed to decreased 
goal attainment. The goal-increasing score measures two aspects of 
the decision-maker's view of his decision environment. It reflects 
both his perceptions of external factors affecting his goals, and also 
his freedom to act without external factors imposing constraints on him,
A content analysis of each text w^ as carried out to count the 
numbers of words of ^description', related to the current game situation, 
and ”speculation", concerned with possible future developments. A 
descriytion-speculation score was defined as the number of words of 
description divided by the total number of words of description plus 
speculation (Table 8.6).
Trom Table 3.6 it can be seen that the players who were 
subjectively judged as confident are characterised by both high goal- 
increasing scores and high description-speculation scores. The rankings 
based on subjective judgement, the goal-increasing scores and the 
description-spéculation scores show a high level of agreement; using 
a test based on Kendall's coefficient of concordance (Kendall, 1975), 
the agreement is significant for Scenario 1 at the 1 per cent 
probability level (5 - 313), and only just fails to achieve significance 
for Scenario 3 at the 5 per cent probability level (S - 15.2, critical
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value of S at 0.03 level 157.3). Players with low description- 
spéculation scores are those players who are thinking ahead. They 
consider more external factors which might adversely affect the 
attainment of their goals, and so they tend to have lower goal- 
increasing scores and they appear less confident.
Sequence pffects
A marked sequence effect is detectable when scores on the first 
and second games played by a player are compared. Goal-increasing 
scores and description-spéculation scores are generally lower on the 
second occasion an individual plays, irrespective of the scenario which 
he plays first. This suggests that on their second encounter with 
the gane, the players may be tal-cing a more serious and professional 
approach. By the time they played for the second time, the officers 
may have realised that the gane was very similar in many ways to the 
Oommand Post exercises with which they were familiar, that it was not 
an "amateur" game, and that it posed some interesting and non-trivial 
military problems. Subjective classification of players* confidence 
in the scenarios also suggests that a more cautious view is being 
taken on the second play (Table 3.7).
Dynamic Aspects
As the games develop through time, the military situations change, 
the players' perceptions change, and in consequence the maps are amended. 
The rate at which the maps must be amended varies from player to player. 
Table 8.3 and Rigure 3.7 show the amended cognitive map for Player C 
in Scenario 1 in the second round of the gane, which can be compared 
with his original map (Table 3.2 aui figure 3.3).
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FIRST SC3LAJU0 . 
•^ LAYSiJ
5LGÛMD SCENARIO 
PUAYLD
CÜNFTD3NT
'^ L/\Y£R3 c, ;,G C,G
L 'SS conttjd;:NT 
PLAY iRS
A,B,D,R B
L.IAST 0.>.'PIDiNT 
PLAY 1RS
A,D,3,^
Table 3.7, Sequence effects on subjective estimates of the 
players’ confidence.
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Goal: Defend present Task Force locations.
Blue actions; BIC
B1C3
B3C
2R3
Hold position of 1 Task Force.
Move supply up to 1 Task Force 
particularly quickly.
Hold position of 3 Task Force.
Move 3 Task Force to higher ground.
Red actions: RFZl Z Division to move towards Gantemerle.
R71 7 Division moves towards Langoa.
Other variables: S8 Ability of 1 Task Force to continue 
fighting intensive battle.
”3 Change in strength of enemy.
2P9S Ability of 1 Task Force to hold 
position.
2P9N ■ Ability of 3 Task Force to hold 
position.
2  PIGS Suitability of 1 Task Force position 
to defence.
2PlorJ Suitability o'^  3 Task Force position 
to defence.
Table 3.3. Concepts for Player C, Scenario 1, second round.
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. - • IC:1
BICS^
2P9S
BIC R71
2P9N
P8
2P10S
2P10N B3C RFZl
2B3
U
Figure 8.7. Cognitive map of Player C in Scenario 1, second 
round.
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The way in which the cognitive maps of the players are amended 
indicates a tendency ^or some sections to become elaborated and 
considered in finer levels of detail, while other parts are lost from 
consideration. Which sections are e^ganded and which are lost vary 
for different players. Arguably, both scenarios develop towards 
crisis situations; the focussing by the players on subsections of the 
maps as time passes may be related to the general hypothesis that, in 
crisis, decision-makers tend to concentrate on certain aspects of their 
decision-making environment at the e^qjense of others (see, for example, 
specific hypothesis cited by Wilburn, 197?).
8.5 Discussion
The results that 1 have presented in this cha^Dter show dramatically 
that the perceptions individuals have of a common decision-making 
environment differ in noticeable and sometimes surprising ways. In 
consequence, their decision-making behaviour might be e>ç>ected to differ 
too. The differences that have been observed fall into distinct classes, 
related to the size and complexity of the cognitive maps, their 
detailed interpretation, the players' confidence and anticipation of 
the future, and the way in which maps are altered as time progresses. 
These differences occur precisely because the decision-makers are 
individuals.
Do these differences, though, indicate real differences between 
the decision-makers? in other words, how^  valid is a cognitive map 
as a representation of real cognitive processes? This question can 
be approached at two levels: first, the validity of a player's
assertions as a statement of his true beliefs; second, the validity 
o^ a cognitive map as a model of the mechanism of thinking.
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Concerning the validity of the players' assertions, it wdll be 
recalled that an essential feature of the game methodology was the way 
in ivhich most of the texts which were analysed were generated as a 
natural part of play. In fact, as far as the players were concerned, 
the game could not proceed without them. There was very little 
prompting by the experimenters, and thus the texts should reflect 
wiiat the players themselves thought important. Additionally, the 
players were used to taking part in exercises of this kind, as part of 
their normal peacetime military role. There is no reason to believe 
that they engaged in deliberate deception about their true views and 
aims. There may, however, have been unintentional biases, in that 
players may tend not to articulate concepts and relationships which 
they have considered explicitly, but which they have assessed to be 
in some way irrelevant, inconsequential or "illegitimate". To detect 
this kind of effect, other independent evidence is needed.
Regarding the validity of cognitive mapping as a way of modelling 
the mechanism of decision-making, there is some doubt. Certainly, in 
some cases, more sophisticated treatment will be required to provide 
adequate models of the structure and complexity of thought. I-towever, 
despite the simplicity of its a^jproach, cognitive mapping can provide 
a useful analogy, enabling predictive inferences to be drawn about 
the outcomes of decision-making processes.
Irrespective of questions of validity, it is clear that the 
cognitive maps described here have elicited features of the decision­
making behaviour of individuals which are both consistent and capable 
of interpretation. The maps of particular players show marked 
similarities across the two scenarios, indicating that meaningful 
components of an individual's decision-making process are being
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detected, and these components are independent of the particular 
decision-making environment.
The exjjerience of the authors, coupled with the reports of 
related work, indicate that cognitive mapping and allied techniques 
can play a number useful roles in Operational Research. A cognitive 
map may be viewed as an external model of a decision process, a model 
which can present the complex ideas and interrelationships perceived 
by a decision maker in a concise, tangible and manageable form. In 
this framework, a cognitive map is a means of communication, not only 
for the transfer of perceptions and ideas between different decision­
makers, but also for aiding an individual decision-maker to elucidate 
his own perceptions.
One particular form of this communication is the process of 
problem negotiation between client and analyst described by 5den et al 
(1979). The use of cognitive maps to facilitate communication can 
also be envisaged in the teaching of decision-maJcing skills, and for 
assessing the ways in which decision-makers acquire problem-solving 
strategies as they learn about a newr problem.and its environment.
, I also feel that cognitive mapping has a role to play in decision­
making research, as presented in this chapter. The work that has been 
described here is essentially preliminary. It was an attempt to assess 
whether the combination of two comparatively newr techniques - research 
gaming and cognitive mapping - wras a worthwhile enterprise. The 
results have indicated that this joint approach can be a fruitful one.
It may be aijpropriate to end this chapter with a wrarning. The 
experiment that has been described here w^ as limited in size and scope.
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The players in the game were special, in that they were used to 
accepting a game world as one to be talc en seriously. Nevertheless, 
although it cannot be claimed that the results obtained can be 
generalised, they do form a basis from which hypotheses can be 
generated for more extended ex :^>eriment and testing.
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CHAf’TSR 9 
SITÏÏ4ARY AND OONCLUSIONS
9.1 Introduction
I begin this final chapter of the thesis by presenting a summary 
of the work described in the previous chapters. The summary wdll take 
the form of a recapitulation of the steps in the arguments and 
discussions w'hich form the bulk of this account. Where appropriate, 
specific results and conclusions wdll be identified and numbered.
following this summary, I shall discuss the work briefly, wdth a 
view to identifying where its value particularly lies, and in w^ hat 
directions future work might usefully proceed.
9. A Summary
My work, as presented in this thesis, can be conveniently divided 
into three areas: that concerned with gaming methodology and game 
design (Chapters 1, 3 and 4); that concerned wdth secondary task
methods (Chapters 5 and 6); and that concerned more specifically wdth 
decision-making research (Chapters 7 and 8). This summary follows this 
method of division.
Gaming T'ethodology and Game Design
In Chapter 1 I identified the relative lack of techniques provided 
by Operational Research for coping wdth decision-malcing in complex and 
ill-defined problem situations. Jn particular, decision-making under 
conditions of crisis, where human-decision making may be.at its '
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most susceptible to failure, was identified as an area in which 
research might usefully be carried out. Thus, the initial formulation 
of the aim of the work was arrived at: to develop a suitable 
methodology and use it to test the validity of models of decision­
making.
1 proceeded to define what is meant by "crisis", and discussed 
hypotheses concerning decision-making behaviour in crisis - in 
particular, hypotheses formulated by Milburn (197?). It was, 
specifically, a number of Milburn's hypotheses that w^ e initially 
conceived as being suitable for testing in our research. I went on 
to argue that a gaming approach was appropriate, research gaming 
being the experimental approach to decision-making.
iimphasis was made of the criticality of the processing load 
imposed by a game scenario, and of the nature of the relationship 
between stress and crisis. This led to a formulation of our initial 
research programme, which was based around a main programme of 
decision-making hy-x)thesis testing using a research game which we 
would design and develop. Against this main programme, two 
subsidiary programmes would be developed. The first was the development 
of a secondary task method for measuring mental processing load. The 
second was the development of an understanding of the stress aspect 
of crisis (ultimately this second subsidiary programme was not pursued).
In Chapter ? I began to collect and develop ideas about gaming 
that would ultimately lead to the development of our own research game.
I considered Bowen's (1978) classification of games by purpose, the 
major value of which is to emphasise the importance of a clear idea of 
the intended aim of a game during its design. I then turned to
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Bowen's (1978) classification oF games by structure and showed that 
a desirable research game structure would combine the rich interaction 
property of the three-room game with the replicability property of the 
single—decision game. ]f deception is resorted to, such a game may be 
possible. Stated more formally:
A research game recjuires the single-decision structure 
B(^,N,C) ,R(A,N,C), but should appear to the player to 
have the three-room structure B(^,M,C) .R(P,M,C). (1)
T described Sharp and Oando's (1977) Intelligence Man gaming system, 
which partially meets this requirement, before describing Cooper's 
(1973, 1979) Superior Commander system, which we were to use in our 
own work:
The Superior Commander gaming system permits the running
of a game wdth structure B(P,N,C) *R(A,N,C), which appears
to the player to have structure B(^\M,C) .R(^,M,C). (2)
Chapter 3 was concerned with the content rather than the structure 
of research games. Most of the discussion in this chapter is based on 
our early gaming experiments. We w%re able to identify six requirements 
for a research game, and three requirements for the game methodology 
employed:
A research game requires: (a) simple, easily learnt, rules.
(b) relatively fast play.
(c) easy recordability.
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(d) a strategic aspect.
(e) to be interesting.
(f) natural extraction of experimental
data. (3)
A research gaming methodology requires:
(a) replicability.
(b) complexity.
(c) emphasis on player's game
.participant role. (4)
I'then presentedthe Organisational Control Game, which we designed 
with the above recfiirements in mind.
The Organisational Control Game, played according to the 
Su;perior Commander gaming system, meets in full the 
recjuirements for a research game and gaming methodology 
listed in (3) and (4). (5 )
Chapter 4 consisted of a detailed description of the Organisational 
Control Game. Important aspects of the design of the game were emphasised: 
in particular, the two completely different game scenarios, one depicting 
a defence, the other an advance-to-contact. Points concerned with the 
practical running of the game.were also mentioned.
. The four chapters described above contain an account of considerable 
experience in the design, construction, testing and development of a 
research game, and may be of particular interest, therefore, to 
prospective game designers.
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Secondary Task Methods
Chapter 5 was a lengthy literature review devoted to consideration 
of secondary task methods for assessing mental processing load. In the 
course of the chapter the capacity model of human information processing 
was described. There are two distinct types of secondary task method 
- that in which the secondary task is used as a loading task, and that 
in wfhich it is used as a subsidiary measuring task. Both methods were 
clearly explained.
The review covered applications to the study of such cognitive 
processes as memory and learning, as well as to the characteristics 
of tasks such as vehicle driving. ïibwever, it became clear that all 
the tasks that had been studied can be categorised as tasks in which, 
to a large extent, res^x)nse models appropriate to the task decisions 
are already available to the subject:
Secondary task methods have not been applied to com-jlex
problem-solving tasks in which straight-forward mentalj 
, -models providing appropriate immediate responses are 
: not available to the subject. (6)
. Chapter 6 described an ex^jeriraent w^ e conducted to determine whether 
the gap could be filled. As the problem-solving task we used a series 
of chess problems, and the e>q)eriment attempted to rank these problems 
in order of complexity by using a mental arithmetic secondary task with 
a number of subjects. The ex^jeriment showed that this was a workable 
means of ranking the problems.
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Secondary task methods can be used to measure the 
processing load associated with complex problem­
solving tasks. (7)
Thus, we have shown the viability of a technique for measuring 
the processing load imposed by a variety of tasks that might be of 
interest to Operational Research scientists. It might, for example, 
be applicable to the assessment of the complexity of game scenarios, 
as w^ e had originally intended. Operational Research scientists may also 
find several of the applications described in the literature review 
chapter of interest.
Decision-Making Research
Chapter 7 began by discussing a series of games played with eight 
retired military officers, all of whom held senior positions in United 
Kingdom local government at the time of play. In particular, these 
players were compared with earlier student players, the two groups being 
classified as "e>q)erienced'’ and "inexperienced" players. Three 
differences between the groups were observed.
Cxjjerienced players made use of their previous
ex, >eri ence, injecting their own ideas, assumptions
and perceptions into the game; inexperienced players
tended to accept the game precisely as presented. (3)
Cx^jerienced players exhibited greater knowledge, 
performing equally well on both scenarios; 
inexperienced players managed advance-to-contact
quite well, but had little idea about the way to 
conduct a defence.
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(9)
Jxixeriencod players viewed problems as complex and 
ill-defined; inexperienced players made rather 
cursory assessments, and looked for unicjue "best ’ 
solutions. ■ (10)
From this we drew the obvious but important conclusion:
Students do not behave in the same way in a game
environment as experienced decision-makers. (11)
At the same time, we were developing some doubts about the ' 
immediate course of our research, '■•.e began to feel that before we 
could begin to consider a research programme such as that originally 
formulated, we would need a technitjue or language '"or describing 
explicitly the subjective environment of the decision-maker. This can 
be stated:
. 1 n deci sion-tnaI<ing research, it is essential to develop 
a means of describing the environment of the decision­
maker in his own terms, in a way that provides a model 
Qf that subjective environment rich enough to be 
discussed and studied. (1?)
In our final series of games, played with army majors, w'e 
attempted to follow up this belief. We hoped to use cognitive mapping 
as a way of describing subjective decision-making environments. The 
cognitive mapping analysis of the games was described in Chapter 3.
A number o'^  results were presented.
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The cognitive maps of the players in the game show
marked differences between the players, yet, for
any player, marked similarities across the scenarios. (13)
The number of concepts and relationships between
concepts in a cognitive map of a situation varies
widely from player to player. (14)
There is a suggestion that some players may employ 
a relatively constant number of concepts to describe 
different situations. (15)
Cognitive maps show up differences in detailed
interpretation of the decision-making environment
by different players- (16)
confident players are characterised by high goal- 
increasing scores in their cognitive maps, and high 
description-spéculation scores in their game texts. (17)
Two general conclusions can be drawn as a result of the cognitive 
map analysis. .
Cognitive mapping may be a useful way of revealing
the individual decision-making characteristics of
subjects, particularly regarding their perceptions
of their decision-making environments. (18)
The combination of the two comparatively new
techniques of research gaming and cognitive mapping
can be a fruitful approach to the study of decision-making. (19)
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Chapters 7 and 8, therefore, can be seen to develop ideas about 
decision-making research, and in particular were a plea to put the 
horse before the cart: before attenpting to study decision-making, in 
prescriptive fashion, we should ensure that we are in a position to 
adequately discuss and describe that which we wish to study. Having 
made this plea, I then proceeded to do something to answer it, I 
believe with some degree of success.
It is worth making two points concerning the cognitive m ^  analysis. 
The first point is that the results that have been presented derive 
from an experiment that was limited in both size and scope. Results 
(13) to (17) above were obtained in the context of a military decision­
making game played by a relatively small number of military decision­
makers. Therefore there is a clear need to examine whether the 
cognitive mapping technique gives similar results when applied to 
decision-making by further subjects in both similar contexts and different 
contexts. In this way we would be able to gain some idea of both the 
generality and area of applicability of these results. Since there is 
a clearly subjective element in the analysis procedure, it would be 
desirable that such work be carried out by a number of different workers. 
This would give some indication of the effects due to the particular 
perceptions of the analyst.
The second point concerns the degree to wbich the cognitive map 
analysis technique provides a valid rpresentation of the decision­
making process and the characteristics of individual decision-makers. 
Conclusions (18) and (19) have been deliberately formulated in rather 
tentative fashion because it is, at present, not certain how good this 
representation is. Ideally we would require a conpletely ind^endent 
means of identifying and measuring the characteristics of decision-
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making in order to confirm that these are genuinely reflected in a 
cognitive map representation# However, because decision-making takes 
place in subjective worlds, we can only realistically hope to work 
with representations of decision-making processes# We should therefore 
be looking for consistency between representations, and also consistency 
within the cognitive mapping representation# The cognitive map analysis 
I have presented, taken together with other cognitive mapping work 
(see Chapter 8), shows a fair degree of these types of consistency: 
results are both self-consistent and show some correspondence with 
external notions of decision-making# I believe cognitive mapping 
does provide a good and useful representation of decision-making - 
although I note that every representation must have its limits# Further 
work, demonstrating features of consistency, will enable us to strengthen 
the tentative conclusions I have presented here#
9.3 Final Discussion
In this section I identify what I see as the main value of the work 
described in this thesis# I also mention future directions in which 
work might usefully proceed. Once again, it is convenient to split the 
work into three sections#
Beginning wdth game methodology and game design, the work in this 
thesis can be seen as part of a general rethinking that has taken place 
in recent years concerning the value of gaming. Game designers have 
become more critical of their work, and are increasingly concerned wdth 
defining their objectives more accurately and ensuring that a research 
game measures wbat it is intended to meaisure# Bowen ' s (1978) work, an 
admost entirely theoretical monograph on the subject of games, can be 
seen as indicative of this trend#
On the negative side, the trend has resulted in an increasing 
number of workers becoming disillusioned wdth gaming as a research
tool# Relatively little of this disillusionment has reached the
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literature, but most o*^  us in gaining have heard criticisms concerning 
the validity of any results we may offer. This stems from the wide 
realisation that a successful gaming experiment cannot simply be 
ap/)roached as one might approach an experiment on the behaviour of 
laboratory rats. uestions of the player's subjective role in the 
game, and the context in which the game is presented to him are 
critical and cannot be ignored. The failure to take these issues 
into account '|uite rightly calls into question the validity of much 
early gaming work.
However, I believe that the work in this thesis shows that these 
difficult issues can be faced and dealt with to a most encouraging 
extent. As 3 believe the thesis demonstrates, in the course of our 
research programme we spent a great deal of time considering what it 
was we wanted to look at, how we could look at it, and what we could 
and could not measure. Issues such as the control of a game and the 
subjective role of the player have been met squarely and dealt with. 
These considerations led us to develop the Organisational Control 
Game and Superior Commander system. This combination constitutes a 
worthwhile game which I believe can be used as an effective research 
tool - indeed, that this is so is demonstrated pratically in the final 
chapters of this thesis, ’furthermore, the Superior Commander system 
could clearly be used in a variety of contexts as the basis ^or an 
effective research game.
Thus the success of the Organisational Control Game and Superior 
Cjommander system is seen as a demonstration that even with a far more 
critical approach to gaming, it is possible to carry out a valid 
research gaming progranune. 3 believe that this type of a^xproach will 
continue to be o^ value in the field of decision-making research.
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Turning now to the secondary task uork, the experiment described 
in Chapter 6 very clearly demonstrates the applicability of secondary 
task teclmipues to the assessment of decision-making loads imposed by 
complex problem-solving and decision-making tasks. I have already 
noted that this technique could be used to assess the complexity of 
gane scenarios. A variety of other applications are likely to be 
found in other areas: for example, the design of effective decision­
making systems. At the same time, the technique as used for other 
types of task, as described in the literature review in Chapter 5, 
may be of value to the Operational Research scientist who happens to 
"^ ind himself faced with certain types of ergonomic problem.
As far as decision-making research is concerned, the value of 
the work lies in tvo areas. To begin with, I regard the identification 
of the need for a means of describing the individual's subjective 
decision-making environment as an important feature of the i^ork. Once 
again, this can be seen as part of a recent trend - in this case, a 
trend to question initial assumptions, particularly concerning the 
perceptions of individual actors in a situation. Clearly, if such 
matters are now seen to be of central importance, rather than an 
implicit framework on which;research is based, researchers must be 
certain that they are able to adecjuately describe these matters. Yet 
researchers have tended to rush into decision-making research wittout 
fully establishing this essential basis of their research. The 
formulation o'" our research programme in Qiapter 1 is to some extent 
an example of this: consequently, as I have shoun in Chapter 7, it was 
(]uite radically revised.
The second area of value is the cognitive mapping work described 
in Cliapter 8. 1 have already written at length in that chapter of the
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value of the techni jue in Operational Research. Here I wish only 
to point out til':? value of the cognitive mapping technique as a means 
for analysing and investigating decision-making of various kinds.
This point is demonstrated in this thesis in the context of research 
gaming, and others (,iden et al, 1979) have demonstrated it in the 
context of practical assistance to decision-makers.
It is in tI'd s area that 3 feel that much interesting future work 
lies. In conjunction with a research game, a cognitive map a^ ;^ proach 
might be ada;.)ted to begin to study the type of hypothesis in which we 
were originally interested. ilypotlveses can be formulated in cognitive 
mapping terras, and in this form can be tested. For example, in 
Chapter I we considered two of Milburn's (197' )^ hypotheses:
1 lypothesis 13 (p.^74); Crises increase a tendency towards 
rigidity of ,)crception and thought.
I lyiiothesi s 17 ( p. f 75 ) : In a crisis one's oi^ n alternatives 
appear to contract while the other side's options seem to 
groiv.
These hypotheses suggest various new hypotheses that can be 
expressed in terms of cognitive maps. !^ or example. Hypothesis 13 
gives rise to:
3n a crisis, the cognitive map of a decision-maker 
exhibits relatively little development and 
elaboration as time progresses.
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Tn a crisis, new data tends to be ignored when its 
use would tend to require the revision o^ oarts of 
an established cognitive map of the decision-maker.
Hypothesis 17 suggests:
]n a crisis, the number of concepts representing 
actions available to the decision-maker in his 
cognitive map will decrease, i^hereas the number 
o concepts representing actions available to 
opponents will increase.
In a crisis, the goal-increasing score o^ the cognitive 
map o^ a decision-maker tends to decrease.
0^ course, this type o'" formulation does not automatically grant 
a straightforward hypothesis-testing experiment. in particular, 
unless we choose to use some stress definition of crisis, what actually 
constitutes a state of crisis may remain poorly defined. Possibly a 
cognitive map definition might be formulated, 've recall, from the 
definitions in CliajJter I, the importance of tlireat, time and surprise 
in the definition of crisis. Thus, we might describe a decision-maker 
as being in a state of crisis when a large amount of new data causes 
a sudden, possibly catastrophic, change in his cognitive map (surprise), 
and when the new cognitive map explicitly indicates lack of time and 
high threat as being percieved as central to the situation in which 
the decision-maker is placed.
i-iven if the specific suggestions presented here turn out to be 
of little consequence, the fundamental message of the cognitive mapping
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work should not be lost sight of: decision-makers are individuals.
Any science o^ decision-making must accept this as a fundamental 
feature, perhaps the most important feature, of the raw material 
u'hich it is intended to account for and elucidate. Techniques which 
are intended to develop this fundamental point, by understanding 
decision-making within the context of the decision-maker’s own 
subjective world, are essential. This thesis has, in its entirety, 
described a journey towards this realisation. This may be, ultimately, 
the most important point which is made in this thesis.
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This paper discusses some aspects of a game for research 
into decision making. From our experience with commercial 
board wargames, we identify six requirements for a research 
game, and three requirements for its control. The Organisa­
tional Control Game, a wargame which we have developed, 
is shown to satisfy the requirements. The Superior Com­
mander system is used to control the game, and the impor­
tance of the dummy task is discussed. We conclude that 
commercial board wargames can be adapted to examine 
decision making scientifically, we offer some guidelines for 
game development, and we consider extensions to other con­
texts, particularly those related to business games.
1. Introduction
There have been many studies of tlie behaviour of 
the Decision Maker in crisis, ranging from detailed 
observations of the actors in specific international 
crises to broader generalisations concerning the type 
of effects that miglit be caused by crisis (see, for 
example, [9]). However, comparatively little has been 
done to investigate models of decision making in
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crises in controlled experiments. It seems clear that 
crisis influences decision making in certain definite 
ways, and it would be useful to be able to compare 
and study models of the Decision Maker which attempt 
to account for such phenomena.
The aim of our work has been to develop a suitable 
methodology to test models of the Decision Maker.
It is difficult to study decision makers in naturally- 
occurring crises in a controlled fashion: crises, by 
their nature, are often unexpected, they occur infre­
quently, and they take many forms. In such situa­
tions, important variables are not subject to control 
in the strict way we would like for hypothesis-testing. 
We wish to study decision making in environments in 
which variables can be manipulated to enable specific 
aspects to be examined. A gamirig approach seems 
suitable for this purpose [4]. Our initial experimental 
work has been directed towards the development of a 
game in which a subject would be required to make 
decisions under experimentally controlled conditions, 
and in which it would be possible to analyse decision 
making in detail.
This paper is directed to tliose interested in 
research methods for investigating decision making, 
and it discusses some of our experience with board 
wargames for this purpose. We begin by outlining our 
initial experiments with a commercially-available war- 
game. From this, we derive general requirements for 
an experimental game and a gaming methodology for 
research into decision making. Next we describe 
briefly a game we have developed and a method for 
controlling it experimentally to satisfy our require­
ments, and we note possible extensions to other areas.
The conclusions we draw are based on our own 
specific research context. This is concerned with the 
ways in which decision makers’ perceptions of the 
options and alternative courses of action open to 
them change under various conditions, particularly 
tliose related to crisis or stress and to different levels 
of data aggregation. However, our conclusions are not 
restricted to this context, and we believe them to 
have more general applicability to a wider area of 
decision making and gaming research. Some of these 
broader considerations are discussed in the final 
section.
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2. Experiments with a tactical wargame
Wargaming has been used for the analysis of mili­
tary situations and the training of commanders since 
the early nineteenth century [1 3 ] ,but it is only in 
the last 25 years that wargames have become widely 
available to the public [12], and a variety of commer­
cial board wargames is now produced [10]. The first 
stage of our research programme was to assess 
whether commercial board wargames could be 
adapted for research purposes.
The game we chose to study was Panzer Leader [2], 
a wargame depicting tactical armoured combat in 
World War Two. This game is complex, with many 
types of fighting units and a variety of terrain. Its 
complexity was one of its most attractive features, 
suggesting that it mightTiave potential for research.
It was envisaged that scenarios could be designed 
which involved decisions concerning a wide range of 
alternative courses of action, offering many options 
to players. Palmer [10] regards Panzer Leader and its 
companion Panzer Blitz [1] as exciting and requiring 
a high level of skill. It was hoped that these features 
would encourage experimental subjects to become 
involved with the scenarios and induce them to play 
well.
Our initial choice of a gaming methodology was 
the Intelligence Man system developed by Sharp and 
Dando [11]. In this system, subjects believe them­
selves to be acting as advisers to real players, and 
they are led through identical series of predetermined 
moves. Subjects supply the experimenter with infor­
mation about their views of the game via messages to 
the players whom they believe they are advising, and 
possibly by a real move which concludes the game. 
Sharp and Dando used their Intelligence Man system 
successfully with an adaptation of the commercial 
boardgame D/p/omccy [3].
2 .1. Recording a tactical game
A desirable feature of an experimental game is 
that it is possible to record the course of the game 
accurately and quickly, with a minimum of distur­
bance to the players. Our preliminary investigations 
concerned the feasibility of recording Panzer Leader 
games. Two games using one simple scenario were 
played, with four student players. The experimenters 
attempted to record the play on prepared forms.
The results indicated convincingly that recording 
Panzer Leader is not practicable. Either play must be
held up frequently, or there must be a long pause at 
the end of each turn while the recorder notes the out­
come in detail. Neither alternative is satisfactory. 
Additionally, for several operations in Panzer Leader 
the player must explain to the recorder exactly what 
he is doing; virtually all combat requires such com­
mentary.
Even when the time spent on the recording process 
exceeded tolerable limits and interference to the 
players was considerable, recording errors still oc­
curred. It is clearly not possible to record Panzer 
Leader or similar games reliably without severely dis­
rupting the flow of the game.
2.2. Intelligence Man system applied to Panzer Leader
Our next experiments were to assess whether the 
Intelligence Man system could be implemented using 
games like Panzer Leader. Intelligence Man worked 
for Diplomacy [11], but the kind of wargames we 
hoped to use differed from Diplomacy in many ways 
and the applicability of Intelligence Man could not 
be taken for granted.
The output of an Intelligence Man experiment is 
to a large extent obtained in the messages the adviser 
sends to the person he believes is playing the game, 
and therefore it is important to find out exactly what 
the subject, in his role as adviser, makes of his task.
He may see himself as similar to a real player, and his 
messages may provide detailed suggestions concerning 
the microstructure of play; alternatively, he may take 
a wider view, and, freed o f the constraints of organis­
ing the details of movement and combat, may point 
out a range of strategies and options. It is in this latter 
mode that the output of the game is most interesting 
for our research purposes.
Four students were used for an Intelligence Man 
evaluation applied io Panzer Leader. Two subjects 
played a normal game, while the otiter two acted as 
advisers to them. The advisers were separated from 
the players (all communications being in writing, and 
carried by the experimenters) and they were presented 
with an identical game. It is important to note that 
Intelligence Man, as used here, differs from conven­
tional Intelligence Man experiments in that there was 
a real game going on — no deception was involved.
Our purpose was to study the nature of the output of 
the advisers and their general attitude to the game. 
Their reactions to the specific scenario were not being 
tested.
Despite repeated discouragement from the experi-
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menters, the advisers tended to become extremely 
involved with the detailed mechanics of the game.
The game was viewed from a tactical rather than 
strategic viewpoint and there was little sign that the 
advisers had studied and assessed alternative courses 
of action. They were, in effect, thinking as frustrated 
players rather than as advisers. This was not the result 
for which we had hoped.
It seems an intrinsic quality of Panzer Leader and 
similar tactical games to encourage this mode of 
thinking. Panzer Leader was designed as a game of 
tactical level combat, and to expect subjects to look 
for broad strategies when it is clear that the outcome 
will be decided at a tactical level is perhaps unfair. 
Everything about the format of Panzer Leader, the 
wealth of terrain detail, the diversity of units, and the 
range of combat strengths, demands attention at a 
tactical level. We are now satisfied that this type of 
game has little to offer us in our experimental work.
3. Requirements for a research game
From our experiments with Panzer Leader we have 
derived general conclusions about the qualities an 
experimental game and a gaming methodology should 
have to be useful for research. Here we concentrate 
on the requirements specific to the game itself.
G1 : Simple, easily leamt rules. The rules of Panzer 
Leader are very detailed. Even experienced players 
sometimes unintentionally broke them, without their 
opponents noticing. It is .clear that the game rules 
must be much simpler than those of Panzer Leader, 
simpler, indeed, than those of all but the most ele­
mentary commercial wargames. Not only must the 
rules be simple to apply, but they must be easy to 
learn. Ideally, when the game simulates closely the 
environment in which the decision maker usually ' 
operates, the rules will be the normal “rules” of that 
environment, and so will be known to the player. Few 
formal game rules will then be required.
G2: Speed o f  play. It is essential that play in an 
experimental game moves quickly, otherwise the sub­
ject may become fatigued and lose interest in the 
game towards the end. (Usually it is towards the end 
of a game that we would hope to extract the most 
interesting information.) We feel that an experimental 
wargame should not last longer than 3h, and we 
regard 30 min as the maximum acceptable time for 
a turn, although it would be preferable if this could 
be cut by as much as half.
G3: Ease o f  recording. It should be possible to 
keep an accurate record of an experimental game. . 
The format of the game should allow easy, swift 
recording, with the minimum of interference to the 
players.
G4: Strategic aspect. For our research, a strategic 
orientation is the most important property of the 
game, because strategies and options form the mate­
rial which we would like the subject to consider. We 
would like a game which is entirely strategic, pre­
senting no tactical aspects to the subject at all. He 
should adopt a strategic frame of mind naturally, 
prompted only by the format of the game; it should 
not appear to be a rather unconventional and con­
trived way of looking at the situation. Scenarios must 
be rich in strategic options, and there must be poten­
tial decisions for the subject to make. To some extent 
preparation of these rich scenarios could clash with 
the requirement that the game be simple; careful 
design of scenarios is necessary to reconcile this con­
flict.
G5: Interest. To be successful, an experimental 
game needs to hold the attention of the subjects for 
the duration of play. Thus, in designing a simple 
game, we must not allow the game to become too 
abstract and unrealistic. A strategically-rich game 
seems likely to hold the interest o f subjects.
G6; Natural data extraction. As much as possible 
of the data we wish to extract from the experiment 
should be provided by the player in the natural 
course of the game. Intelligence Man achieves this 
elegantly: data is supplied by the advisers’ communi­
cations to their (non-existent) players, and by their 
final move. We would hope for a similarly natural 
data extraction process, which would encourage the 
player to regard himself as a participant in a game 
rather than a subject in an experiment.
4. Requirements for a methodology
The requirements for a research gaming methodol­
ogy have been discussed in detail elsewhere [5,6]. We 
state them here for completeness.
R1 : The Player in a game must believe that he is 
an active Decision Maker.
R2: A game must contain sufficient complexity 
and detail to be accepted by the Player as realistic.
R3: The experimenter must be able to control a 
game so that he can replicate it exactly with different 
subjects.
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5. The Organisational Control Game
The Organisational Control Game is a game which 
we have designed to satisfy our research requirements. 
It is a wargame in which the player acts as a Divisional 
Commander (Div Comd) in a Blue (friendly) force 
engaged in combat with a Red (enemy) force. Sub­
ordinate to the Div Comd are three Task Force (TP) 
Comds, and above him is a Corps Comd (Fig. 1 ). De­
tailed combat resolution occurs at the TF level; the 
Div and Corps Comds provide advice and orders and 
exercise overall control. From the Div Comd’s point 
of view, the game resembles a traditional wargame or 
Command Post Exercise. However, all communica­
tions are transmitted by Game Control, and there is 
no direct contact between different levels of com­
mand.
The game uses the Superior Commander system.
It is a single-decision game [4], in which Blue plays 
against a predetermined Red threat. It is also a single­
player game; TF and Corps Comds are played by 
Game Control, and they respond in a preset way. 
However, the Div Comd does not know he is the only 
player, nor that the game is predetermined. He be­
lieves that he is an active decision maker in an inter­
active game involving other purposeful players. The 
game is complex and realistic, yet it can be controlled 
and replicated, and so detailed comparisons of the 
single decision from game to game can be made.
The Superior Commander has been described else­
where [5,6], and we shall not discuss it in detail here. 
We note, however, that it satisfies the three require­
ments for a methodology R l—R3, and we shall elab­
orate on one aspect of it, the dummy task.
5 .1. The dummy task
The main tasks of the Div Comd are to collect and 
collate information received from the TF and Corps 
Comds and from local reconnaissance units, and to 
issue advice and orders. He also has another task, 
keeping an adequate line of supply from his base area
C O R P S  COM D
DIV COM D
T F  CO M DS
Fig. 1. Command structure of the Organisational Control 
Game. The player is a Div Comd.
to his forward TF’s. This appears to be an important 
function for the Div Comd, as his combat guidelines 
indicate that the results of combat at the TF level 
may be affected by the provision of logistic support 
(see below). However, this is not the case; all combat 
is predetermined, and supply has no effect on the 
outcome. The supply task is a dummy task. (The 
allocation of air strikes was used as a dummy task in 
an early version of the game.)
The dummy task has important functions in the 
Superior Commander system. It helps to maintain 
the deception that the player is interacting and influ­
encing the game (requirement R l), and it adds com­
plexity and realism to the scenario (requirement R2), 
without affecting the replicability of the game 
(requirement R3). As we see below, it also assists the 
Organisational Control Game to satisfy some of the 
game requirements G l—G6. The concept of this kind 
of dummy task.is believed to be new; it has been 
adapted in at least one other research game to main­
tain the involvement of players and to avoid loss of 
concentration [8].
5.2. Game requirements
We now show that the Organisational Control 
Game, with the Superior Commander system, satisfies 
the requirements G l—G6. The results are based on a 
series of games with six student players, and a second 
series of games with ten former senior military staff 
officers. A detailed discussion of some aspects of 
these games is given in [7].
Gl ; Simple, easily learnt rules. The design of the 
game is such that all combat is resolved at TF level.
By removing the possibility o f commenting on the 
detailed tactical aspects of the game, many o f the 
problems associated with learning the rules necessary 
in a complex wargame are eliminated. The Div Comd’s 
rules are extremely simple, and even an inexperienced 
player was able to grasp them very quickly. For 
example, in the first scenario the Div Comd is given 
the following guidelines:
Combat is resolved in detail at the Task Force 
level, and Divisional Commanders require no 
detailed knowledge of the combat rules.
An enemy regiment may be twice the size of a 
friendly battalion, but at the beginning of the game 
the strengths of enemy units not in contact with 
friendly forces are unknown. As a rough guide to 
the relative fighting strengths of the units, a bat­
talion stands a good chance of defending success-
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fully against an enemy regiment, but a larger 
enemy force will probably defeat it.
The defensive strength of a unit is increased if 
the unit did not move in the previous turn; this 
represents the ability of a unit to “dig in”. Both 
the offensive and defensive strengths of units are 
severely reduced if they are not kept in supply.
The strengths of units are increased if they occupy 
hill hexes or town hexes.
G2: Speed o f  play. Because individual units are 
represented as aggregates on the Div Comd’s map, 
there is very much less work to do in assessing them 
and organising them in each turn. This reduces con­
siderably the time taken for each move.
G3: Ease o f  recording. The Div Comd cannot move 
units directly, only indirectly through his orders to 
the TF Comds, and detailed combat evaluation only 
occurs at TF level. Very little recording is therefore 
necessary.
G4; Strategic aspect. The Organisational Control 
Game at Div Comd level is very different from Panzer 
Leader. Details of the tactical battle are eliminated 
from the Div Comd’s map, and his view is in all 
respects strategic. He generally gives strategic rather 
than tactical advice to his TF Comds, and he is con­
cerned almost entirely with strategies and possible 
courses of action, both of his own forces and the 
enemy. This approach is encouraged by the dummy 
task: the need to maintain logistic support requires 
the player to think closely about his own lines of 
communication, his future plans and the intentions 
of the enemy.
G5: Interest. The Div Comd’s task in the Organisa­
tional Control Game, while conceptually simple and 
unencumbered by detailed rules, is interesting for a 
player. We base this conclusion on our observations 
of the players’ concentration during the course of the 
games, and their comments during post-game debrief­
ing. The students were very enthusiastic (they even 
designed their own multi-player hierarchical game, 
using ours as a model), while the military players 
were able to make detailed suggestions for modifica­
tions and improvements to the game. (For further 
discussion o f this point, see [7].) The players claimed 
that the dummy task was one reason for their interest 
in the game; they thought it was important, they 
could control it directly, and, although it was straight­
forward, it did lead them to consider some wider 
strategic problems.
G6: Natural data extraction. In the initial versions 
of the game, Div Comds sent written orders and advice
to the TF Comds, and prepared written assessments 
for the Corps Comd. These reports, which provided 
the main experimental data, were a natural part of 
the game communications. However, the second 
series of games, with players with military experience, 
forced us to modify this procedure [7]. At the sug­
gestion of the experienced players, all reports are now 
verbal ones, recorded on cassette tapes, and the 
reporting has been divided into phases, separating the 
advice and orders which are a natural part of the 
game from the assessments which are more obviously 
part of the experiment. The same information is 
sought, but the players are happier with this arrange­
ment.
The dummy task may also be a source of experi­
mental data. The allocation of supply and the em­
phasis placed on different aspects of it may reveal or 
confirm the player’s intensions and priorities, again 
as a natural part o f the game.
6. Discussion
Of the requirements we have considered for a 
research game, a strategic aspect is particularly impor­
tant if the Superior Commander System is to be used. 
Only at a strategic level can the deception that the 
player is affecting the game be maintained, and hence 
the replicability of the game guaranteed. If a player is 
allowed to make tactical decisions, almost by defini­
tion these must be interactive in some sense, and so 
the player will expect to see some result. We provide 
a dummy logistic task to deceive the player that he is 
making meaningful decisions, but the deception could 
not be sustained if he was permitted, for example, to 
direct the movements of individual combat units. It 
seems likely that this is a general result for games 
using this method of control.
The hierarchical command structure in the Organi­
sational Control Game allows the tactical and strategic 
aspects to be separated naturally. It would appear 
that the Superior Commander could be applied in 
other hierarchies, in areas where there can be a similar 
separation of tactical and strategic decisions. For 
example, the system could be implemented in the 
context of a business corporation (Fig. 2), where the 
operational (tactical) decisions are taken by Regional 
Managers (corresponding to the TF Comds), while 
medium-term strategic planning is undertaken by a 
National Manager (the Div Comd), under the overall 
guidance of a Corporate Headquarters (the Corps
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CO RPO RA TE HO
NATIONAL HQ
“ I
REGIONAL H Q S
Fip. 2. A corporate business hierarchy suitable for the 
Superior Commander. The player would be a National 
Manager.
Comd). A hierarchy based on functional divisions is 
also possible in a business context (Fig. 3), where the 
functional groups might include areas such as produc­
tion, sales, finance, distribution and R & D.
Most existing business games are interactive, con­
centrating attention on operational (tactical) decisions 
in a directly competitive market place, rather than on 
the longer-term strategic aspects of the firm. How­
ever, there seems no reason why these games could 
not be adapted to construct a game suitable for 
research into business decision making, just as we 
have adapted board wargames to develop the Organi­
sational Control Game. With careful scenario design 
it should be possible to satisfy the requirements 
G l—G6, and the application of the Superior Com­
mander system should be straightforward. The kind 
of dummy task that is used will depend, of course, 
on the specific game context and on the purpose of 
the research.
In this paper the only commercial wargame we 
have discussed in detail has been Panzer Leader. How­
ever, we have played a variety of board wargames, 
exliibiting many different features, and we have 
extracted those characteristics of physical design, 
layout and rules which are most suited to our needs. 
(In the wargame context, useful references for this
n a t i o n a l  HO
REGIONAL HO
FUNCTIONAL
G R O U P S
Fig. 3. A functional business hierarchy suitable for the 
Superior Commander. The player would be a Regional 
Manager.
purpose are [10] and [12].) We recommend that 
anyone seriously considering using a game for 
research, whether one that is commercially available 
or one, like ours, which is developed specially, should 
play a variety of commercial games to obtain a broad 
understanding of their capabilities. This is a general 
recommendation which seems as appropriate to games 
in a business context as to wargames.
We have shown that commercial board wargames, 
with the Superior Commander system, can be adapted 
to examine decision making scientifically, and we 
have indicated some properties we think a research 
game should have. Using these guidelines, it seems 
likely that other commercially-available games, and 
particularly business games, could be adapted simi­
larly for research purposes.
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INTRO DUCTIO N
A RESEARCH game has been developed to investigate the behaviour of decision makers. 
Previous papers have described both the Organisational Control Game, a hierarchical 
wargame in which the player has the role of a Divisional Commander, and the Superior 
Commander system used to control and replicate it.*~^ In this note, some results are 
reported from two series of plays of the Organisational Control Game, the first with 
students as players and the second with former military staff officers, and their behaviour 
is compared.
The first series of games, with the student players, was used to test the Superior 
Commander system and to develop two different game scenarios, one featuring a defence, 
the other an advance-to-contact. The long term aim of the work was to test hypotheses 
about the ways in which a decision maker's perceptions change as the level of stress 
increases.'^"*' And this series of games indicated that the Superior Commander system 
permitted the collection of the data necessary for this.
In the second series of games, the players were ten retired military officers, all of 
whom held senior positions in U.K. Local Government at the time of the experiment. 
After the success with the student players,^ serious problems were not expected with 
these experienced players, but as the games progressed, it became clear that important 
changes were required in the mechanics of the game and the design of the scenarios. It 
was not possible to use these games for testing hypotheses.
The importance of using players with relevant experience during the process of game 
development is clearly demonstrated.
EXPERIENCED A N D  INEXPERIENCED COM M ANDERS
The differences in the behaviour of the two groups of players can be grouped into three 
categories, although these categories are inter-related and should not be considered in 
isolation.
1. The military officers who played the game used their previous experience of command. 
They considered factors which they had found valuable in practice, even though these 
factors were not mentioned explicitly in the game rules or briefing. They injected their 
own ideas, assumptions and preconceptions into the game; to an extent they “built 
their own scenarios” using the one provided as a basis. The students, on the other 
hand, tended to accept the scenario as presented, probably due to their experience with 
commercial wargames (in which game rules are more rigid and there is less flexibility).
2. The military officers had a more developed knowledge than the students, performing 
equally well on both the defence scenario and the advance-to-contact. They were more 
conscious of the losses that were possible in each case, and they had a better grasp of 
the principles of war (although these were violated on occasion). The students pre­
ferred attack to defence, and showed little appreciation of possible losses. While they
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managed advance-to-contacl quite well, they had almost no idea about the way to 
conduct a defence.
3. The experienced players viewed the problems posed by the scenarios as complex and 
ill-defined, with no “best” solution. In reports to superior and subordinate com­
manders in the game, they assessed situations more fully and formed better strategic 
views of the scenarios. In contrast, the students made rather cursory assessments, 
looking for unique “best” solutions. They tended to see situations in uncomplicated 
terms, viewing all data as known with certainty, with no “fog of war”. They also tended 
to regard all data as equally important, whereas the experienced players were more 
selective in their approach.
Both groups of players exhibited a wide range of playing styles, and both groups 
appeared very involved in the game. The deception inherent in the Superior Commander 
system, which was known to work for student players,^ was also achieved with the 
experienced players: they were convinced that the game was interactive. As noted above, 
the experienced players made assumptions which “expanded” the original scenario, per­
haps to make it more lifelike; it is suspected that this process, together with the precon­
ception that no attempt would be made to deceive senior managers who were doing the 
experimenters a favour by playing the game, is important to the success of the deception.
DISCUSSION
The experience indicates that student players are very useful in the initial process of 
designing the general structure of a game, planning experiments and testing for gross 
breaches of validity, but experienced players must be involved in the final detailed design 
(see also Hartley et al.^). After each of the second series of games a debriefing session was 
held, when the players themselves made valuable contributions and suggestions for im­
proving the realism and level of detail of the scenarios, the mechanics of representing 
units and transmitting information, and methods for extracting research data. The con­
ceptual abilities and verbal skills of the experienced players were decisive in this process. 
It is believed that scenario creation should be a dynamic, interactive procedure, involving 
both the game designers and players with suitable background and experience, and that 
this procedure should be a continuous one. Each series of games then becomes a learning 
process for the game designers, who benefit by having their scenarios probed each time 
the game is played (see also Brewer^).
The simple but nevertheless important point demonstrated by the games described in 
this note is that students do not behave in the same way in a game environment as 
experienced decision makers, Therefore, it would be unwise to generalise game results 
obtained with student players to professional decision makers. Differences in behaviour 
are both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative differences in the alternative options 
considered and in the levels of skill displayed were expected, but these were also impor­
tant qualitative differences. The students approached the game differently from the ex­
perienced players, and exhibited a different range of decision making styles. The quanti­
tative and qualitative differences are apparent in all three of the categories identified in 
the previous section.
Many behavioural studies in the operational research and management literature have 
used student subjects to derive conclusions about professional decision making. It is clear 
that extreme care is required in making such derivations. This point has been demon­
strated before, notably in accounting and financial contexts.®"** Birnberg and Nath*" 
identify two ways in which student and professional decision makers are likely to differ, 
viz. “common skills and experience” and “basic personality traits". These factors are 
likely to result in the quantitative and qualitative differences noted above. Students, 
having considerably less experience and training in the decision making environment.
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display less quantitative skill when required to work in that environment. Their different 
personality traits, including cognitive styles, values and beliefs, are bound to have a 
qualitative effect on their decision making.
In general, qualitative differences in decision making styles are likely to become appar­
ent in comparisons between any distinct groups of individuals. This is seldom explicitly 
recognised in operational research, although instances where it is implied can readily be 
found. Bowen.*^ for example, notes the limitations of having a Royal Navy officer 
representing an enemy submarine commander.
The recognition and study of different decision making styles is believed to be essential 
to the understanding of decision making. Single decision games provide a suitable en­
vironment in which to identify and measure the different dimensions of decision making
that together make up the decision making style of an individual
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The difficulty of objectively measuring the decision­
making load imposed by a complex decision problem on a 
human decision maker is identified. It is suggested that a 
technique for such measurement would be useful in Oper­
ational Research. The secondary task technique, a method 
much used by psychologists and ergonomists to assess the 
mental processing load presented to subjects by a variety of 
tasks, is discussed. It is observed that the type of complex 
problem often of interest in Operational Research is charac­
terised by the involvement of model building in the process 
of solution. An experiment is presented to compare the 
mental load presented by a number of different chess prob­
lems using a mental arithmetic secondary task, and it is 
shown that the method appears to be valid for the study of 
complex problems.
1. Introduction
Situations are often found in Operational Research 
in which it would be useful to have some objective 
measure of the complexity of a problem facing a deci­
sion maker. Different problems might be expected to 
present different decision-making loads to a decision 
maker, and it would be of interest to know how deci­
sion-making load varies according to the precise fea­
tures of the problem. In particular, it might be useful 
to be able to identify those problems which present
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decision makers with particularly high decision 
making loads. In the case of large-scale decision­
making systems, this would allow the decision points 
at which satisfactory decision making is likely to 
break down to be located. These points are not neces­
sarily easily identifiable, either by inspection or by 
theoretical analysis o f the systems.
An objective method of assessing problem com­
plexity might be extremely valuable in a variety of 
areas. In problems of medical diagnosis, for example, 
where diagnoses based on a limited quantity of data 
are often required in a short time, an objective 
technique would permit investigation o f the way in 
which ease of diagnosis varies according to the quan­
tity and quality of the data, its nature, and the way 
in which it is presented. Similar considerations 
apply to military decision-making in battle, where 
once again time is likely to be a severe constraint. 
What types of decision tend to overload military 
decision makers, causing their decision-making to 
deteriorate? By answering this question with some 
certainty, it might be possible to begin to devise suit­
able decision rules and decision-making systems 
which would avoid, to some extent, the worst effects 
of unexpected overload.
The authors’ interest in problem complexity arose 
in the course of experimental gaming work [6,7]. A 
wargame was being used to study the decision-making 
behaviour of players under various conditions. Two 
different scenarios had been designed, and a method 
was sought to compare objectively the decision­
making load imposed by them. The secondary task 
method of assessing mental processing load, a tech­
nique used by experimental psychologists and ergono­
mists, was adopted.
This paper discusses the secondary task technique 
in an Operational Research context. Section 2 out­
lines the tlieory o f the technique and briefly describes 
some previous work in the field, while Section 3 con­
siders the nature o f the decision-making problems 
relevant to Operational Research. Section 4 describes 
an experiment involving this type of problem, and 
presents preliminary results. Conclusions are pre­
sented in Section 5.
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2. The secondary task technique ^
The secondary task technique is based on a model 
of the decision maker as a mental processing system 
of limited capacity (Fig. la). Kerr [10] identifies and 
discusses critically the salient points o f the model and 
the assumptions implicit in it. According to the 
model, any mental load lower than the capacity of  
the system will undergo satisfactory processing 
(Fig. lb ), and errors due to overload will not occur. 
However, if capacity is exceeded, then overload 
occurs, and mental processing consequently deterior­
ates (Fig. Ic); additional errors in performance will 
occur in this case.
Consider now two tasks, the loads o f which are to 
be compared (Fig. 2a). If neither task individually 
overloads the system, they will both be carried out 
properly, and no direct measure o f load in terms of 
performance standard will be possible. How can the 
tasks be compared? In the secondary task technique, 
the subject is asked to perform a secondary task of 
constant difficulty at the same time as the main tasks 
(Fig. 2b). This task is such that the combined loads 
of the main and secondary tasks together exceed the 
capacity of the decision making system. Now over­
load does occur, and processing errors are observed.
Subjects are asked always to give priority to the 
main, primary, task, so that this task is not affected 
by overload. The deterioration of performance is 
directed to the secondary task. It is argued that the 
greater the deterioration o f  the secondary’ task, the 
greater must be the mental processing load presented 
by the main task.
Psychologists have used secondary task techniques 
successfully in many areas. In ergonomics, for exam­
ple, secondary tasks have been used to evaluate man- 
machine systems: the loads imposed on human oper­
ators by different pieces of equipment biult for the 
same purpose can be compared (e.g., [8]), and in this 
way guidelines for the redesign of systems to increase 
the effectiveness of the human operator may be pro­
vided. Brown [3] reviews the secondary task litera­
ture and describes the essentials o f the technique. 
Rolfe [13] provides a fuller and more recent review 
of, in particular, the ergonomic literature.
* The secondary task technique to be described here is the 
subsidiary measuring task technique, as distinct from the 
loading task technique. The distinction, which it is not 
necessary to describe here, is clearly defined by, e.g., Brown 
(31.
Fig. 1. (a) A mental processing system of limited capacity.
(b) Loads lower than the limit are processed satisfactorily.
(c) If the limit is exceeded, processing deteriorates.
A series of experiments on motor-vehicle driving 
illustrates the power o f the technique. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that the load imposed by 
driving in heavy traffic is greater than that imposed 
by driving in light traffic, but how can this be shown 
in practice? Driving behaviour can seldom be seen to 
deteriorate, and, when it does, the results are often 
catastrophic. However, secondary tasks have shown 
the differences in driver load under different condi­
tions, without adversely affecting driving. Brown and 
Poulton [5], for example, using a mental addition 
secondary task, compared driving in a quiet residen­
tial area to driving in a busy shopping area, and found 
that the error rate under the ‘shopping’ condition 
(7 3  mean percentage errors, eight drivers) was signif­
icantly higher than under the ‘residential’ condition 
(6.3 errors), and that both error rates were higher 
than a non-driving control (4.1 errors). The error 
rates appear to correspond to the difficulty o f the 
primary task. Similar experiments have investigated 
fatigue effects in police drivers [1,2], and the train­
ing o f bus drivers [4].
Fig. 2. (a) The loads due to two primary tasks, neither of 
which overload the processing system, (b) The loads of the 
primary tasks, combined with a secondary task of constant 
load.
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3. The nature of complex decision problems
245
Operational researchers might be interested in 
tasks which differ in an important way from the 
types of task investigated by psychologists using sec­
ondary task techniques. In virtually all the studies 
reported in the psychological literature, the primary 
tasks can be categorised as short-term tasks in which 
solution models for decisions are already available 
to the subject (Fig. 3a). (Note that in the driving 
tasks cited above the aspects studied are related to 
the physical handling and control o f the vehicle.) In 
other words, for a given set o f stimuli, the subject 
already possesses the essentials o f a suitable response. 
After perceiving the input stimuli, the subject con­
sults his mental model of the situation, which he 
already has available in memory, and he selects the 
appropriate response. This process rarely takes more 
than a matter of seconds.
The types of task o f interest here are different. 
Being those necessary to solve complicated problems, 
they are generally far more complex, possibly less 
easily formulated, and straightforward solution 
methods are unlikely to be immediately available. A 
different process takes place to solve the problem 
(Fig. 3b). Following the perception o f the input 
stimuli, the subject.has to construct a model of the 
situation. He then uses this model to select a 
response, as before. The important point is that the 
subject must construct his model as an integral part 
o f  the complex decision process. By constructing the 
model he is learning how to solve the problem.
In tliis type o f problem, there is unlikely to be a 
unique ‘best’ solution. Indeed, it is often impossible 
to compare the quality of different solutions. Cor­
rectness may depend to a greater or lesser extent on 
subjective assessments as well as on objective factors. 
In generalj solutions to complex decision problems 
cannot be considered as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, and the
PERCEIVE CONSULT \ RESPONDSTIMULI MODEL ?
PERCEIVE CONSTRUCT
S CONSULT \ RESPONDSTIMULI J MODEL ? MODEL ------- 7
quality o f the decision cannot be used as a guide to 
the load imposed by the problem.
4. A secondary task experiment
A preliminary experiment was designed to extend 
the secondary task technique to the study of com­
plex decision-making problems. As experimental 
problems, chess problems were used. The degree of  
complexity o f these problems, and the model build­
ing that their successful solution requires, are similar 
to those the imposed loads of which operational 
researchers might wish to assess. A useful additional 
feature is that in chess problems a best solution 
usually exists, and different solutions can often be 
compared quite meaningfully.
The subjects were six undergraduate students 
at Royal Holloway College. Preliminary work had 
shown that simple problems were required in order to 
be within the ability of the average student. A series 
o f fourteen suitable problems [11] was compiled, in 
the majority o f which a subject was asked to select 
the move he would make next to win as quickly as 
possible. A typical problem is reproduced in Fig. 4, 
in a similar form to that in which it was presented 
to the subjects. Players were allowed two minutes 
to attempt each problem. At the end o f two min­
utes they were asked to write down the solution. The 
first five problems were ‘learning’ problems; only the 
results o f the final nine problems were analysed.
The secondary task was run concurrently with the 
chess problems (and also by itself at the beginning 
and the end o f the series of problems). A tape record­
ing o f pseudo-random digits, from two to nine, read
Fig. 3. Solution processes for (a) simple and (b) complex 
problems.
Fig. 4. Chess problem 6 in the experimental set. White to 
move, playing up the board. K to B4 gives a mate.
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out at five second intervals, had been prepared. For 
the secondary task, subjects were asked to call out 
the sum of each pair of digits. For example, if the 
first two digits were ‘two’ and ‘seven’, the correct 
response would have been ‘nine’, and if the next digit 
was ‘three’, the next response ought to have been 
‘ten’. The number of mistakes and omissions in this 
task was recorded, and a total error score for each 
problem was obtained.
The problems were ranked for each subject accord­
ing to the number of errors occurring in the mental 
arithmetic. With the assumption that the fewer errors 
that are made in the secondary task, then the easier 
is the main problem, this gives a rank ordering of 
problem difficulty. Agreement between the rankings 
for individual subjects was significant at the 2% level 
(Kendall concordance test, = 19.7, i> = S , p <  0.02, 
[9]). This indicates that the secondary task technique 
is measuring some property of the problems which is 
consistent from subject to subject. The individual 
rank orderings were combined to produce a total 
ranking o f the problems in order of increasing com­
plexity. This ranking, in which the total arithmetic 
task error rate for each problem has been normalised 
and summed over all subjects, so that the contribu­
tion from each subject to the overall result is the 
same, is shown in Table 1 (a).
The individual rank orderings show a high degree 
o f concordance, and it has been assumed that these 
orderings correspond to the difficulty of the prob­
lems. An independent test of the meaning of the 
orderings would be desirable. In the case o f chess 
problems, such a test is possible. Most of the prob­
lems have one solution which is clearly better than aU 
other possible solutions. Sixteen players in all have 
attempted these problems, wliich have been ranked 
according to the number of times the correct solu­
tion was given. (Some of the players attempted the 
problems as part o f another experiment.) It is sug­
gested that those problems which are solved most 
often present the least processing load, and those 
which are seldom solved present the greatest load.
The ranking of the problems by solution rate is 
shown in Table 1(b). There are significant similari­
ties between this ordering and the secondary task 
ordering (Kendall’s t = 0 .6 3 ,p <  0.05, [9]). Problem 
14 was solved more often than any other problem, 
and the arithmetic task indicates that the load it pre­
sents is less than that presented by any other prob­
lem. At the other end o f the scale, problems 7 ,12  
and 11 were solved least often, and they seemed to 
be the problems which presented the greatest load to 
the subjects. The five problems in the centre of the 
scales, however, display no apparent agreement in 
ranking.
Fig. 5 gives some suggestion o f why this might be 
so. Each point on the graph represents a problem. 
The scale on the horizontal axis represents the num­
ber o f times (out o f a possible maximum of sixteen) 
that each problem was incorrectly answered. The 
scale on the vertical axis is the total arithmetic task 
error rate for each problem, normalised and summed 
over all subjects.
At the bottom left hand comer of the graph is 
problem 14, often solved, and with a low processing 
load. At the top right are problems 7 ,11 and 12, sel­
dom solved, and with a high load. The central group
12
•8
•10
4  8
NUMBER OF INCORRECT ANSWERS
I I I I
12
Fig. 5. Total normalised secondary task error rate plotted 
against the number of incorrect answers for problems 6 to 
14.
Table 1
Problems ranked in order of increasing difficulty. Problem numbers in parentheses are of equal rank
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(a) by secondary task 14 9 10 8 (6 13) 11 7 12
(b) by solution rate 14 13 (8 10) 9 6 11 12 7
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consists o f the other five problems. These problems 
cluster together on both scales. For these problems, 
the solution rates are all similar, and so are the arith­
metic error scores. This indicates that the two 
rankings of these problems do not agree because the 
problems are o f similar complexity. Neither ranking 
method can differentiate between these problems. 
This effect can also account for the difference be­
tween the two rankings of the ‘high load, seldom 
solved’ problems (problems 7,11 and 12).
5. Conclusions
The points in Fig. 5 lie within a well-defined band 
across the graph, running as might be expected if the 
secondary task technique is measuring the load associ­
ated with the problem. This result indicates that this 
type o f mental arithmetic secondary task is suitable 
for measuring problem complexity as intended.
A step that might be taken in the immediate 
future is to modify the arithmetic task in order to 
make the method more sensitive. It is felt that such 
modifications are possible. Eventually, the method 
might even be able to separate significantly those 
problems that appear in the central group of Fig. 5.
In this case it would provide a better measure of 
problem complexity than the solution rate measure. 
Other kinds of secondary task may also be applicable 
[12].
The experiment that has been presented in this 
paper indicates that secondary task techniques can be 
used to measure the complexity of ‘difficult’ prob­
lems for which no obvious solution is available. As 
has been discussed, the chess problems with which 
this work has been concerned are similar in impor­
tant ways to the complex decision problems with 
which decision makers are likely to be faced, and 
which arise frequently in Operational Research. We 
believe that the method has potential for extension 
to ‘real’ decision problems, the precise nature of
which may be difficult to define, and where unique 
‘best’ solutions may not exist. We suggest that the 
secondary task method may provide a new technique 
for operational researchers to use in the investigation 
of a variety of complex decision making tasks.
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This paper illustrates the use of a cognitive mapping technique to examine the behaviour and 
perceptions of individual decision-makers. A cognitive map is a representation of the subjective 
decision-making environment of an individual. Seven military officers each played two scenarios in a 
research wargame. Analysis of their communications in the game showed that individual players 
were remarkably consistent over the two scenarios, but their perceptions of their common decision­
making environment differed noticeably. Differences related to the size and complexity of their 
cognitive maps, the detailed interpretation of the maps, the players' confidence and anticipation of 
the future and the way in which the maps were altered as time progressed.
INTRO DUCTIO N
T he aim of Operational Research is to aid decision-makers. In the past, this has been 
achieved largely by the provision of techniques, together with guidelines for their appli­
cation, directed towards the resolution of reasonably well-defined problems. In this area 
Operational Research has been unquestionably successful.
Recently, however, attention has been increasingly directed towards a different type of 
problem. It has now been widely recognised that many of the problems faced by deci­
sion-makers exist within complex, ill-defined and interconnected ‘messes’,^  located in 
fundamentally turbulent environments.^ Accordingly, much attention is now directed 
towards the problems of strategic decision-making and decision-making in conflict and 
crisis. It is recognised that purely analytical approaches are inadequate to deal with such 
problems, and the need for the development of a more general ‘science’ of decision- 
making has been identified.^
An important part o f the development of a decision-making science is the provision of 
more detailed models of the individual decision-maker than exist at the moment. Psycho­
logical research provides a wealth of information about the behaviour of individuals, 
while political science and international relations have long been concerned with high- 
level decision-making, but it is only recently that combined approaches, have been 
adopted. The interdisciplinary stance of O R. should make it ideally suited to take an 
active role in this more unified approach to the study of decision-making. O R. can both 
contribute to this area and learn from it.
This paper illustrates the use of a cognitive mapping technique to examine the behav­
iour of individual decision-makers. A cognitive map is a representation of the perceptions 
and beliefs of an individual about his own subjective world. The technique has been 
employed in the fields of international relations'* -^ '^  ^ and administrative science,’ and 
recently there have been applications in O.R.®’^  It seems likely that cognitive mapping 
may be a fruitful method of analysing decisions in a number of O R. areas.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Young O.R. Conference. Coventry, December 1980.
O.R.S. 33/1— E
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In this paper, cognitive mapping is discussed in the context of a research wargame. The 
general gaming approach and the experimental structure are outlined in the next section. 
Following that, the methods of deriving cognitive maps from text are described, with 
examples drawn from the games. Results are then presented: these mainly deal with the 
initial perceptions of the players in the games but include a brief discussion of dynamic 
aspects and the way in which perceptions alter as the game progresses. Finally, conclu­
sions are drawn about the usefulness and applicability of cognitive mapping, both for the 
type of decision-making experiment described in this paper and also in a wider O.R. 
context.
G A M IN G  APPROACH TO DECISIO N-M AK ING  RESEARCH
The cognitive mapping technique will be described in the context of a research wargame 
known as the Organisational Control Game. Both the game and its associated system of 
control, the Superior Commander system, have been fully described and discussed in the 
l i t e r a t u r e t h e r e f o r e ,  in this section of the paper only those features essential to the 
present work are outlined.
The Organisational Control Game is a board wargame in which the player has the 
role of Divisional Commander. He believes that he is part of a team, consisting of 
himself, one superior commander and two subordinate commanders, and he believes that 
this team is playing interactively against a purposive enemy. In fact, the enemy, and all 
players other than the Divisional Commander, are played by the game controllers; their 
actions are entirely predetermined, but the player does not know this. The important 
consequence of this deception is that different players can be led through the same 
sequence of pre-planned events in the game, so that it is possible to compare the behav­
iour of different players in exactly the same sequence of objective circumstances.
Seven serving army officers (labelled A. B G) played the game. At the time of play,
all held the rank of Major. Each player played twice, on different occasions, once in a 
defence scenario (Scenario 1 ), and once in an advance-to-contact scenario (Scenario 2). 
The two scenarios depict quite different military situations: one question of interest in 
the work was whether this would lead to consistent differences in the decision-making 
behaviour of the players across the scenarios.
During the course of the game, in each time period, a player was required to make 
reports to his superior commander and to issue directives to his subordinate com ­
manders. At less frequent intervals he was required to make comments to the game 
controllers (as researchers) on his decision-making in the game. All such communications 
were recorded on tape, and transcripts of these recordings were used as texts from which 
the games were analysed.
COGNITIVE M APPING
Traditionally, scientists (and therefore by implication most of those involved in O.R.) 
have been concerned with the real, objective world, where phenomena can be observed 
and measured. However, human decision processes never take place in this objective 
world. All that can be observed there are some of their effects. Human decision processes 
always take place within the subjective world of the individual decision-maker. Cognitive 
mapping offers a window on this subjective world. It provides a means of representing 
the way in which a decision-maker models his decision-making environment, in terms of 
the concepts he himself uses. The technique has been used to examine the causal belief 
systems of decision-makers in a variety of contexts, including O.R.
A cognitive map is derived from a text, a record of the verbal or written statements of 
an individual. From the text are identified the concepts used by the individual and the 
causal relationships between them. Only two types of relationship are considered in the 
application discussed here: positive and negative. A positive relationship occurs when a 
change in a predecessor concept causes a similar change in the successor: an increase 
(decrease) in the first causes an increase (decrease) in the second. With a negative re-
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J. Two concepts linked hy a positive relationship. Text: .. morale is high, as they are advancing with little
opposition . . Concepts: A— high morale: B— unopposed advance.
lationship, an increase (decrease) in the predecessor causes a decrease (increase) in the 
successor.
An example will serve to clarify these definitions. Discussing a particular friendly unit, 
one player stated that “ . . .  morale is high, as they are advancing with little oppo­
s i t io n . . .”. Two concepts may be identified in this text: ‘high morale’, and ‘unopposed 
advance’. These concepts are linked by a positive relationship, since the player believes 
that an ‘unopposed advance’ causes or promotes ‘high morale’. The two concepts, and 
the relationship between them, are shown graphically in Figure 1.
The coding procedure is generally more complicated than in this example. Relation­
ships between concepts are often obscure and sometimes ambiguous, but with care large 
cognitive maps containing many concepts and relationships may be coded from a text 
and pictured graphically. Coding techniques are described in detail by Wrightson.^^
In the gaming application described here, the texts used were the transcripts of the 
players’ communications in the game. Maps were coded from these texts in two phases. 
The initial texts of each player— his first directives to subordinates and his first reports to 
his superior and to the game controllers—were used to construct maps of each player’s 
initial perceptions of the game environment. Subsequent texts were then used to revise 
each player’s map as his perceptions altered with the progress o f time and the develop­
ment of the game.
RESULTS
Coding the initial texts yielded 14 cognitive maps (from the seven players in each of two 
scenarios). Broadly, analysis of the maps indicates marked differences between the 
players, yet, for any player, marked similarities across the scenarios. Figures 2 and 3 
show the extreme cases for Scenario 2 (Players A and C), while Figure 4 shows Player C’s 
map in Scenario 1. Only a limited description of the meaning of these maps is given with 
the figures, since in this paper the analysis is restricted.
Concepts and relationships 
The most obvious difference between players is the number of concepts identified in 
their maps. This ranges from 10 (Player C) to 26 (Player F) in Scenario 1, and from 8 
(Player C) to 23 (Player E) in Scenario 2 (see Table 1). However, for four of the seven
R B2_
RBI . N2
[G2
B3BP3
[G3,
'N4
N3RA2
RA3
Fig. 2. Cognitive map o f Player .4 in Scenario 2. Boxes indicate actions open to the friendly player; circles 
indicates his goals: V indicates his utility; other concepts are actions open to the enemy {initial character R), 
external fuciOTS specific to North and South areas (initial characters N and S) and other external factors (initial
character P).
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B2C RC1
B3D 'G2,■RA1
BB [ça.
Fig. 3. C oynitite map o f Player C in Scenario 2. The .symhoLs are a.s described fo r  Figure 2.
players. Players A, B, C and G, the numbers of concepts in the two scenarios is quite 
similar, despite the fact that they involve very different military situations. (In Scenario 1, 
the defence, the player is opposed by a superior enemy force, and he has little freedom of 
action; on the other hand, in Scenario 2, the advance-to-contact, the player has the 
initiative and military superiority.) Some of the decision-makers, therefore, appear to be 
modelling their decision-making environment using a relatively constant number of con­
cepts. This numbei apparently has little to do with the objective situation and may 
represent some limit to the quantity of different concepts the decision-maker feels he can 
usefully cope with at any one time. This limit may vary quite widely between decision­
makers. There is no suggestion, however, that the quality o f decision-making exhibited by 
those players with fewer concepts is in any way inferior, at least in these games.
The number of causal links in the maps follows a similar pattern to that shown by the 
number of concepts. It is common to calculate the map density, Z), defined as the number 
of links observed. L. divided by the maximum number of links possible between N  
concepts:
D =  L / N { N - l ) .
Numbers of links and densities are also shown in Table 1. With only three exceptions, 
the densities of all the maps lie between 0.05 and 0.1. The three maps with the largest 
densities are the three smallest maps— in fact, they are exceptionally small. The concepts 
in these small maps tend to be of central importance to the situation, and the decision­
makers acknowledge many causal relationships between them. The larger maps all con­
tain similar central sections, but there are also many more peripheral concepts, of limited 
influence and affecting only a small fraction of the others. The more concepts a decision­
maker uses, the less each concept is likely to have a direct causal effect on any other 
concept. As might be expected, the central sections of different players’ maps are fre­
quently similar for a given scenario, with many concepts and links appearing in the same 
or slightly altered form in several players' maps, although this is not always the case.
SB
B1C
P8
P10 B3CI
Fig, 4. Coynince map o f Player C in Scenario I. The symbols are as described for Fiyure
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T a b l e  I. C o n c e p t s ,  l i n k s  a n d  d e n s i t i e s  o f  t h e  c o g n i ­
t i v e  MAPS
Numbers of Number of 
concepts. N links. L Density. D
Scenario 1 2 1 2 1 2
A 22 21 38 33 0.082 0.079
B 22 22 26 29 0.056 0.063
C 10 g 13 12 0.144 0.214
Player D 23 13 32 16 0.063 0.103
E 16 23 21 39 0.088 0.077
F 26 18 39 24 0.060 0.078
G 21 19 27 24 0.064 0.070
Differences in detailed interpretation
Often, concepts that one player regards as fundamental do not appear on another 
player’s map. and from time to time thp same concepts can be fouq4 to be related in 
entirely different ways by different plaj^ers. Figure 5 shows a specific example from 
Scenario 2. Case I illustrates the reasoning of most pla\ ers: a friendly holding or delay­
ing action will limit an enemy advance; if allowed to proceed, the advance would be 
detrimental to friendly goals; but a determined advance by the enemy will make the 
holding action more difficult. Case 2 shows the contrasting reasoning of Player G: a 
friendly holding action will cause the enemy to manoeuvre; this forced manoeuvre will 
ultimately put the enemy at a disadvantage and so will have a positive effect on the 
attainment o f friendly goals. The positive as opposed to negative links in Case 2 reflect 
the fact that only this player felt that he had the initiative in this situation, a point he 
makes clearly in the text. This is a particularly fine example of the way in which one 
decision-maker can see the same objective situation in a completely different way from 
another.
Confidence o f the players
It became clear on reading the texts that one of the main differences in the way players 
approached a given scenario was in the degree of confidence they displayed in their 
ability to achieve their goals. A subjective rating was made by the experimenters of the 
confidence of each player in each scenario (Table 2). This rating was compared with two 
quantitative measures, based on the cognitive maps and the texts.
In each cognitive map, paths of relationships leading from actions, events or circum­
stances to either an increased goal attainment or a decreased goal attainment were ident­
ified. Each goal was considered separately. Paths leading to a particular goal begin either 
with an action the decision maker can take or with some external factor over which the 
decision-maker has no control, but to which he usually assigns a value. In the first case, 
where a path begins with an action, it is assumed that the decision-m^ker will always act 
in order to increase his goal attainment— thus such a path is always goal-increasing. In 
the second case, paths may be goal-increasing or goal-decreasing, depending on the value
C a t*  1
C at*  2
© - £ ------ _ © - i ---------- . ©
Fig. 5- A lurnudi c views o f  (he same ohjeedve situadon. Concepts: A —friendly h'dyliny Qvdoi]; B—epemy advance;
C —enemy manoeuvre: D —friendly goals.
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T a b l e  2 . S u b j e c t i v e  r a n k s ,  g o a l - i n c r e a s i n g  (G.I.) s c o r e s  a n d  r a n k s  a n d  d e s c r i p t i o n -  
s p é c u l a t i o n  (D.S.) SCORES AND RANKS FOR THE T W O  SCENARIOS
Player Order of play
Scenario 1 
Subjective rank Gl score Gl rank DS score DS rank
A 1.2 5 0.493 4 0.602 4
B 2.1 4 0.294 7 0.456 7
C ■ 1.2 2 0.714 3 0.821 1
D 2.1 6 ■ 0.417 5 0.560 5
E 1.2 3 0.875 1 0.647 3
F 2.1 7 0.311 6 0.549 6
G 2.1 1 0.800 2 0.661 2
Scenario 2
Player Order of play Subjective rank Gl score G I rank DS score DS rank
A 1.2 6 0.300 6 0.622 4
B 2.1 3 0.231 7 0.660 3
C 1.2 2 1.000 1 0.779 1
D 2,1 4 0.778 2 0.587 5
E 1.2 7 0.538 5 0.557 6
F 2.1 5 0.769 3 0.537 7
G 2.1 1 0.722 4 0.762 2
assigned to the initial factor and on the number of negative relationships on the path to 
the goal. The number of goal-increasing paths for all goals divided by the total number 
of goal-increasing plus goal-decreasing paths defines a goal-increasing score (Table 2).
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to suggest that a high goal-increasing score might be 
associated with a high degree of confidence, since it indicates that the player perceives a 
relatively high number of factors leading to increased as opposed to decreased goal 
attainment. The goal-increasing score measures two aspects of the decision-maker's view 
of his decision environment. It reflects both his perceptions of external factors a fleeting 
his goals and also his freedom to act without external factors imposing constraints on 
him.
A content analysis of each text was carried out to count the numbers of words of 
‘description’ related to the current game situation and ‘speculation’ concerned with poss­
ible future developments. A description-spéculation score was defined as the number of 
words of description divided by the total number of words of description plus specu­
lation (Table 2).
From Table 2 it can be seen that the players who were subjectively judged as confident 
are characterised by both high goal-increasing scores and high description-spéculation 
scores. The rankings based on subjective judgement, the goal-increasing scores and the 
description-spéculation scores show a high level of agreement; using a test based on 
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance,^^ the agreement is significant for Scenario 1 at the 
1% probability level (S =  212) and only just fails to achieve significance for Scenario 2 at 
the 5% probability level (S =  152, critical value of S at 0.05 level =  157.3). Players with 
low description-spéculation scores are those players who are thinking ahead. They con­
sider more external factors which might adversely affect the attainment of their goals, 
and so they tend to have lower goal-increasing scores and they appear less confident.
Sequence effects
A marked sequence effect is detectable when scores on the first and second games 
played by a player are compared. Goal-increasing scores and description-spéculation  
scores are generally lower on the second occasion an individual plays, irrespective of the 
scenario which he plays first. This suggests that on their second encounter with the game, 
the players may be taking a more serious and professional approach. By the time they 
played for the second time, the officers may have realised that the game was very similar 
in many ways to the Command Post exercises with which they were familiar, that it was
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T a b l e  3 . S e q u e n c e  e f f e c t s  o n  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  
p l a y e r s ' c o n f i d e n c e
First scenario 
played
Second scenario 
played
Confident
players
Less confident
G.E. G C.G
players A. B.D. F B
Least confident
players A. D. E. F
not an ‘amateur’ game, and that it posed some interesting and non-trivial military prob­
lems. Subjective classification of players' confidence in the scenarios also suggests that a 
more cautious view is being taken on the second play (Table 3).
Dynamic aspects
As the games develop through time, the military situations change, the players’ percep­
tions change, and in consequence the maps are amended. The rate at which the maps 
must be amended varies from player to player.
The way in which the cognitive maps of the players are amended indicates a tendency 
for some sections to become elaborated and considered in finer levels o f detail, while 
other parts are lost from consideration. Which sections are expanded and which are lost 
vary for different players. Arguably, both scenarios develop towards crisis situations; the 
focussing by the players on subsections of the maps as time passes may be related to the 
general hypothesis that, in crisis, decision-makers tend to concentrate on certain aspects 
of their decision-making environment at the expense of others (see, for example, specific 
hypotheses cited by Milburn*®).
DISCUSSION
The results presented here show that the perceptions individuals have of a common 
decision-making environment differ in noticeable and sometimes surprising ways. In 
consequence, their decision-making behaviour might be expected to differ too. The differ­
ences that have been observed fall into distinct classes, related to the size and complexity 
of the cognitive maps, their detailed interpretation, the players’ confidence and anticipa­
tion of the future, and the way in which maps are altered as time progresses. These 
differences occur precisely because the decision-makers are individuals.
D o these differences, though, indicate real differences between the decision-makers? In 
other words, how valid is a cognitive map as a representation of real cognitive processes? 
This question can be approached at two levels: first, the validity of a player’s assertions 
as a statement of his true beliefs; second, the validity of a cognitive map as a model of the 
mechanism o f thinking.
Concerning the validity of the players’ assertions, an essential feature of the game 
methodology was the way in which most of the texts which were analysed were genera (ed 
as a natural part o f play. In fact, as far as the players were concerned, the game could not 
proceed without them. There was very little prompting by the experimenters, and thus the 
texts should reflect what the players themselves thought important. Additionally, the 
players were used to taking part in exercises of this kind as part of their normal peace­
time military role. There is no reason to believe that they engaged in deliberate deception 
about their true views and aims. There may, however, have been unintentional biases in 
that players may tend not to articulate concepts and relationships which they have 
considered explicitly but which they have assessed to be in some way irrelevant, inconse­
quential or ‘illegitimate'. To detect this kind of effect, other independent evidence is 
needed.
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Regarding the validity of cognitive mapping as a way of modelling the mechanism of 
decision-making, there is some doubt. Certainly, in some cases, more sophisticated treat­
ment will be required to provide adequate models of the structure and complexity of 
thought. However, despite the simplicity of its approach, cognitive mapping can provide 
a useful analogy, enabling predictive inferences to be drawn about the outcomes of 
decision-making processes.
Irrespective of questions of validity, it is clear that the cognitive maps described here 
have elicited features of the decision-making behaviour of individuals which are both 
consistent and capable of interpretation. The maps of particular players show marked 
similarities across the two scenarios, indicating that meaningful components of an indi­
vidual’s decision-making process are being detected, and these components are indepen­
dent of the particular decision-making environment.
The experience of the authors, coupled with reports o f related work, indicates that 
cognitive mapping and allied techniques can play a number of useful roles in Operational 
Research. A cognitive map may be viewed as an external model of a decision process, a 
model which can present the complex ideas and interrelationships perceived by a de­
cision maker in a concise, tangible and manageable form. In this framework, a cognitive 
map is a means of communication, not only for the transfer of perceptions and ideas 
between different decision-makers, but also for aiding an individual decision-maker to 
elucidate his own perceptions.
One particular form of this communication is the process of problem negotiation 
between client and analyst described by Eden et al.^ The use of cognitive maps to 
facilitate communication can also be envisaged in the teaching of decision-making skills 
and for assessing the ways in which decision-makers acquire problem-solving strategies 
as they learn about a new problem and its environment.
It is also felt that cognitive mapping has a role to play in decision-making research, as 
presented in this paper. The work that has been described here is essentially preliminary. 
It was an attempt to assess whether the combination of two comparatively new techni­
ques—research gaming and cognitive mapping— was a worthwhile enterprise. The results 
have indicated that this joint approach can be a fruitful one.
It is appropriate to end with a warning. The experiment that has been described here 
was limited in size and scope. The players in the game were special, in that they were 
used to accepting a game world as one to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, although it 
cannot be claimed that the results obtained can be generalised, they do form a basis from 
which hypotheses can be generated for more extended experiment and testing.
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